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 What kind of economic development trajectory can be expected in cosmopolitan 
cities that display a high degree of cultural, religious, ethnic and social diversity?   Much can 
be gleaned from examining defined periods in their history that show a rapid transition in 
religious/cultural and socio-economic terms.  Cape Town, a city that prides itself on its deeply 
rooted diversity and hybridity, and aspires to global status as a creative urban hub after having 
emerged from the rigidities of apartheid, appears not to be able to manage a breakthrough to 
sustained long-term development.  An examination of the city's transformational period 
during the early decades of the nineteenth century may explain why this is so.  Competitive 
diversity in religion, culture and business provided the template for a highly individualised 
development path with a short time horizon.  This work uses the analytical tools of human 
development theory, cultural value analysis, the linkages between religion and economics, 
rational choice theory, urban development studies, and the study of identity formation and 
creolisation to construct a lens for the review of religious and socio-economic discourse in 
Cape Town during the first half of the nineteenth century.  The period was defined by an 
explosion of proselytising activity by Christian missions and Islam, by a transition from the 
hierarchical Dutch colonial era to a globalising integration into British imperial policy and 
thought, and by a search for new identities by newly emancipated slaves and indigenous 
people.  The result was the fostering of a competitive spirit in urban individuals who seized 
the opportunity of having choices, but were reluctant to consider planning for the long run.  
Public discourse of the period, examined through the debates observable in the newly 
emerging independent press as a public forum, reflected this mindset in both religious and 
economic behaviour, tempered by a pragmatism that oscillated easily between competition 
and short-term collusion.  The historical case study confirms that a city which experiences 
both an intensive competition between religions, and a transformation into a creole, hybrid 
society of individuals, is unlikely to be amenable to a top-down systematic planning approach 
to development, but will thrive in informal, small-scale, innovative ways.  Comparisons with 
other colonial port cities of the nineteenth century, and with present-day Cape Town 
experiencing religious competition from Pentecostalism and re-creating its creole nature, bear 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
1.  Prologue 
 
Where there is not liberty of conscience, there is seldom liberty of trade, the same tyranny 
encroaching upon the commerce as upon religion.  In the Commonwealth and other free 
countries one may see in a sea port, as many religions as ships.  The same god is there 
differently worshipp'd by jews, mahometans, heathens, catholiques, quackers, anabaptistes, 
which write strenuously one against another but deal together freely and with trust and peace; 
like good players who after having humour'd their parts and fought one against another on the 
stage, spend the rest of their time in drinking together. 
Although the Episcopalian and the Presbyterian are the two main sects in Great Britain, all the 
others are welcome and live quite well together, while most of their preachers detest each 
other with about as much cordiality as a Jansenist damns a Jesuit.  Come into the London 
Exchange, a place more respectable than many a court....Here the Jew, the Mohametan and the 
Christian deal with one another as if they were of the same religion, and reserve the name 
"infidel" for those who go bankrupt.....Upon leaving these peaceful and free assemblies, one 
goes to the synagogue, the other for a drink; yet another goes to have himself baptized in a 
large tub....Some others go to their church to await divine inspiration with their hat on their 
head.  And all are content. 
If there would be only one religion in England, there would be danger of despotism, if there 
were two they would cut each other's throats, but there are thirty, and they live in peace and 
happiness. 
        Voltaire1 
 
 For two decades after the world witnessed the simultaneous fall of 
Communism and Apartheid, South Africa and Cape Town have been exposed to the 
bracing winds of globalization and a liberal open economy.  Cape Town, a historically 
multicultural and hybrid city with a political and social trajectory that differed from 
the rest of South Africa, should be thriving as one of the vigorously dynamic locations 
of a cosmopolitan global network of culturally and economically integrated cities. 
 It is not.  On the map of a global network of interconnected cities, it is 
marginal at best.2  Even Johannesburg, emerging into the post-apartheid era 
                                                 
1 Quoted in Jerry Z. Muller, The Mind and the Market (NY: Anchor, 2003), 27-29. 












economically and financially stronger, albeit culturally less cosmopolitan, has only 
secured a precarious foothold at the margin of the system of "world cities", and its 
efforts to maintain that status are foundering on the rocks of social tension and poor 
governance.  Rapidly growing urban GDP and concomitant linkages into a global 
network may propel cities in emerging economies (Mexico City, Sao Paulo, Buenos 
Aires, Mumbai, Istanbul, Singapore, Manila) into the top ranks of "world cities".  
Why is Cape Town "muddling along in eccentricity" instead of harnessing local 
initiative and innovation to grow economically?3 
 On the face of it, Cape Town has the ingredients:  a vibrant ethnic and cultural 
mix, a rich and colourful history, a services-based economy heavy on tourism, 
creative art, the media, finance, insurance, and real estate, and all ancillary services.  
In a world where financial, advisory, and cultural services are the glue that connects 
the network of "world cities", these assets do not seem to be played to full advantage. 
 A historical parallel exists, having the advantage that a complete period of 
transition can be observed from its beginnings to the fading out of rapid change.  Cape 
Town, together with its immediate hinterland, during the first half of the nineteenth 
century offers a useful test case of an urban, mercantile area, linked into the 
globalising British colonial network, and living with the results of the accumulation of 
races, cultures and religions during the preceding two centuries.  Wedged between the 
static Dutch eighteenth century with its rigid social hierarchies and dominant feature 
of being a slave society on the one hand, and the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries with their hardening attitudes towards the issues of race and colour on the 
other hand, the window between slave and Khoi emancipation in the 1820/30s and the 
second half of the century was a laboratory of social and economic change.  Social 
status and formal bondage had ceased to be the defining features, but race and colour 
had not yet congealed into the new dominant paradigm.  The franchise was 
expanding, creolisation and the development of a hybrid “coloured” ambiance were in 
progress in Cape Town.  Conveniently, the nineteenth-century world from the 1820s 
onwards shows an emergence from mercantilism towards global liberal economics, 
driven by British imperial reach.  Cape Town was integrating into the colonial 
network. 
                                                 
3 Judith February, "Muddling Along in Eccentricity: How Cape Town Does Things Differently, Cape 












 The boom of conversions to Christianity and Islam early in the century, driven 
by Christian mission and the emergence of a more visible, assertive Muslim 
community, had elevated religious identity to an important place in the plethora of 
multicultural identities at the Cape, joining race, social status, and cultural traditions.  
Various flavours of Christianity and Islam competed for souls in ways that were 
acceptable to the secular authorities of the day:  a constraint that forced religious 
competition in the urban area into a market-oriented format.  The consequence of non-
violent competition was a collection of religious communities that had to learn how to 
get along with each other and with the powers that be, shaping their doctrine and 
practice to appeal to Capetonians in search of a spiritual home.  In comparison, rural 
mission stations and rural settler churches enjoyed a measure of local spiritual 
monopoly, allowing them to design their parochial communities in something akin to 
sellers' markets, operating in neighbouring but independent islands of spiritual service 
provision. 
 The aim of this work is to examine the linkages between religious 
competition, the change of cultural values, the construction of identities, and socio-
economic development at the Cape during this fluid period.  Drawing on a variety of 
local sources of public discourse of the period, primarily the newly emerging forum of 
the press, as well as on secondary sources of scholarly work that has dealt in depth 
with elements of the transition, a picture emerges on how religious and cultural 
diversity interacted with social and economic development.  If there is a link between 
religious diversity and human development, rather than only between single religions 
and economics, Cape Town by mid-nineteenth century shows it.  The search is not for 
strict causality, always an elusive goal, but for compatibility in a fluid cultural 
environment. 
 Fluidity and a process of change are the key characteristics of the phenomenon 
we are after.  The correlation is to be found in a dynamic environment, not in a static 
one.  We could do worse than to adopt Charles Taylor's recent summary of the nature 
of the historical transition to a secular age: we are looking for the linkages appearing 
in the transition from a pre-modern hierarchical society with a pre-determined place 
for everyone, to a modern era of a society of individuals who determine the cultural 
and social structure of this society in "real time", secular time.  Taylor's "abolition of 












well beyond it.  It is not the whole of society that shuffles to a new secularising 
paradigm – it is a mutation of the worldviews, still heavily religious, that enables new 
and different interpretations of humankind's place in the universe, and thus facilitates 
change.  A "secularising" society does not abandon strong religious worldviews, it 
embeds them in a spectrum of other opinions, and makes them compete.4  Choice is 
the keyword of a secularizing transition, and the guiding principle of Cape Town in 
the early nineteenth century.  
 Lessons from this period of the first, British-led globalisation are applicable to 
Cape Town's ongoing transition at the beginning of the twenty-first century: from 
1990 onwards, a formal “emancipation” from the race-based dispensation of the  short 
twentieth century has taken place, the globalisation of liberal economics and free 
trade is embracing the city again, religious diversity is increasing with the growth of 
charismatic and Pentecostalist denominations, and the previous injection of Victorian 
liberal and humanitarian ideas is matched by the current influence of the “post-
modern” spectrum of discourse, and the discourse of reconciliation and  affirmative 
action. 
 The South African discourse on the cultural identities of the population groups 
classified rigorously by the apartheid regime is dipping its toes tentatively into this 
line of thinking, but is only slowly emerging from being enmeshed in the racially 
flavoured thought processes that dominated this fragmented society throughout the 
twentieth century.  For the exploration of the self-image of major race-designated 
groups of South African society, such as Whites, Xhosa, Zulu or Indian, the centrality 
of ethnic and racial identity continues to be treated as conventional wisdom, leading 
to optimistic visions of a “rainbow nation”, a peaceable kingdom of many 
homogeneous ethnicities coexisting tolerantly in one state.5  Those whose ethnic 
description has been a largely negative one (“not white, not indigenous African”) do 
not easily fit into this template of a set of ethnic essentialisms, and are searching for 
definitions of their identities in the post-apartheid era, as they have done in the post-
emancipation era of the 1830s.  They have been liberated from the arbitrary catch-all 
“Coloured” label (ironically, a label that replaced the "slave" and "free black" ones in 
                                                 
4 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 2007), 77, 95, 148-158. 
5 A risky assumption that denies vigorous cultural mixing.  See Zimitri Erasmus (ed), Coloured by 












Cape Town earlier), but have not been presented with a convenient alternative.  In 
Cape Town, this hybrid condition is not limited to people of mixed racial origin only: 
an entire urban society has taken on the creole mode. 
 Confusion is the common reaction.  “I am a mixed bredie [stew]” is the quoted 
statement of a mixed-race artist at the Cape, presumably delivered with a sigh of 
resignation.6  A “Coloured identity”, derived from the interplay of many races, 
religions, languages and customs, can not be rooted in a single coherent tradition.  In 
fact, it may be impossible to define such a thing as a single “Coloured identity”.  This 
is where the concepts of individual vs. collective identity, creolisation processes, and 
the simultaneous operation of various identities begin to be relevant.  Rather than 
trying to construct a social group called “Coloured” and to assign a specific hybrid 
cultural identity to this group (the old apartheid fallacy), it may be more productive to 
take the lead from the unnamed “mixed stew” philosopher, and investigate how 
individuals in the colonial and post-colonial cosmopolitan environment of the 
Western Cape have negotiated and continue to negotiate their identities.  They may be 
doing this again in a process of bricolage, a makeshift improvisation where “…real 
people negotiate their way through life, grasping, combining, and opposing different 
elements”.  We are not looking at “complete systems of thought colliding”, but at 
individuals struggling to make sense of their place in society.7 
 This is what this work attempts to do, paying particular attention to identity-
drivers other than the racial hierarchy that could be exerting a significant influence on 
identity formation and economic development.  The orbits of religion, language, 
social status, occupational status, politics, and the colonial port city environment are 
explored for cultural impact.  Cultural drivers such as religious diversity (various 
Christianities and Islam) or language had and still have a significant relation to the 
self-image, sense of belonging, and socio-economic behaviour of Capetonians.  This 
may be so on both sides of the arbitrary pigmentation boundaries that try 
                                                 
6 Zimitri Erasmus, "Some Kind of White, Some Kind of Black", in Barnor Hesse (ed), Un/settled 
Multiculturalisms (London/NY: Zed Books, 2000), 199.  An amusing illustration of the hopelessness of 
apartheid categorisation efforts can be found in Wilmot James, "Inside Out" column, Cape Times, 
March 20, 2008: DNA evidence jumbles all received wisdom of racial and cultural identities. 
7 Richard Elphick, "Writing Religion into History", in Henry Bredekamp and Robert Ross (eds), 












unsuccessfully to separate “Coloured” from “White” on one side and from “African” 
on the other.  Perhaps more importantly, the cosmopolitan nature and history of Cape 
Town, akin to other creole cities, militates against the use of clearly defined, exclusive 
collective identities, and calls for the recognition of autonomous individuals who find 
their place by using multiple identities.  For each individual, different life situations 
may well require the use of different primary identities, notwithstanding the heavy 
historical burden of a race-dominated public discourse.  Individualism comes up 
trumps. 
 This, indeed, is the concept promoted by Amartya Sen:8  despite the arguments 
put forward by racist, xenophobic, and sectarian hate preachers, individuals do not 
instinctively cleave to one primary and exclusive identity.  They negotiate life by 
switching between identities, according to the current circumstances they find 
themselves in.  In Sen's dispensation, identities claimed to be the dominant ones for a 
population group tend to be abused for the incitement of violence against others.  
Sanity in social and cultural life can only prevail if individuals are recognised as the 
owners of a whole portfolio of identities.  Even benign, "multiculturalist" approaches 
will fail if they rely on classifying people in homogeneous groups.  The "...diminution 
of human beings involved in taking note only of one membership category for each 
person (neglecting all others) expunges at one stroke the far-reaching relevance of our 
manifold affinities and involvements".9  The nineteenth-century Cape displayed the 
effect of exercising this choice of identities, and present-day Cape Town again shows 
what Kader Asmal has called "multiple loyalties" embedded in a "cosmopolitan 
multiculturalism".10 
 
2. The Hypothesis: Religious Competition and Economic Behaviour 
 
 Cape Town during the pre- and early Victorian decades of the 1820s to the 
1850s matches closely the model of a culturally and religiously diversifying, 
creolising, and cosmopolitan colonial port city in a vigorous state of flux, exposed to 
significant economic and cultural liberalising trends originating in the new colonial 
                                                 
8 Amartya Sen, Identity and Violence (NY and London: W. W. Norton, 2007), passim. 
9 Ibid., 176/177. 












metropolis.  The overall economic development performance accompanying this 
major socio-cultural transition is comparatively sluggish, but individuals in trades, 
services, commerce and investment are doing well.  The conclusion suggests itself as 
follows:  vigorous competition among worldviews, religions, and identities, in a 
creolised community regulated by a secular government intent on preserving law and 
order within an ideologically liberal constitutional framework, is closely correlated 
with a high degree of economic individualisation, and with a lack of significant 
progress in sustainable economic development.  The components of human 
development that emphasise individual autonomy, freedom of choice, innovation, and 
flexibility become more prominent than those that encourage long-term risk taking, an 
expansion of trust, collaboration for the public good, and investment for a more 
distant future.  The short term view swamps the long term one, self-expression runs 
ahead of organised cooperation. 
 If this is so, there are conclusions that could be valid for a city like Cape Town 
in the current phase of again entering a liberalising, globalising world order, after a 
period of isolation during an era of rigid, racially defined hierarchy.  The hope for 
sustained, well-planned economic development with a long horizon may be in vain in 
a location that prides itself on its religious diversity, cultural mix, and creole nature.  
The more suitable development path for such a city may be one that relies heavily on 
the quirky, innovative resources of its hybrid individuals. 
 
3. Theoretical Background 
 
Your Lord inspired the bee, saying "…Feed on every kind of fruit…"  From its belly comes 
forth a fluid of many hues, a medicinal drink for men.  Surely in this there is a sign for those 
who would give thought. 
        Qur’an 16: 68-6911 
 
The most important thing to learn is the value of impurity. 
        Salman Rushdie12 
 
                                                 
11 N. J. Dawood (trans), The Koran (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1956), 299. 












 Impurity has value?  It is not intuitively obvious that it has.  Mixing, 
hybridising, bricolage, metissage, syncretism, synthesis – are these features of 
behaviour that add value to or detract from socio-economic development?  As with 
every existential question, strong opinions abound on both sides of this conundrum.  
But perhaps we should be asking a more basic question: Do strong cultural diversity 
and its consequences of rapid change and hybridisation have a noticeable impact on 
economic and social development at all?  And if so, where does this dynamic take a 
community? 
 “I am a bastard child of history”, Salman Rushdie states provocatively, and 
goes on to explain that the underlying message in his oeuvre “…celebrates hybridity, 
impurity, intermingling, the transformation that comes of new and unexpected 
combinations of human beings, cultures, ideas, movies, songs.  It rejoices in 
mongrelization, and fears the absolutism of the pure.  Melange, hotchpotch, a bit of 
this and a bit of that is how newness enters the world”.13  Strong words, especially for 
essentialists and purists who like to see cultural matters ordered neatly and cleanly.  
But they encapsulate the key assertion that global contacts between elements of 
different cultures create local creole environments that are conducive to innovation 
and creativity14  Such contacts have been common throughout history between the 
colonizers and the colonized, between dominant expanding societies or ideas and 
those at the receiving end of this expansion.  What is being celebrated here is the fact 
that cultural mixing is a never-ending process that throws up new cultural faits 
accomplis at every turn. 
 Perceptions of this mixing bowl, of course, vary with the location of the 
observer.  The outside spectator tends to see the linkages between the different strands 
of values and identities, while the participant embedded in a hybridising community 
will cling to seemingly clear and consistent bits of truth as the core of the story.  The 
inside/outside paradox has been summarised admirably by Sir Richard Burton 
(perhaps only an eccentric polymath could distil its essence in this manner): 
 
All faith is false, all faith is true, 
                                                 
13 Quoted in Ulf Hannerz, Transnational Connections (London and NY: Routledge, 1996), 65/66.  
Original quote from Salman Rushdie, Imaginary Homelands (London: Granta 1991), 394. 












Truth is the shattered mirror strown 
In myriad bits; while each believes 
His little bit the whole to own.15 
 
 Kwame Anthony Appiah uses this image of the shattered mirror as a jumping-
off point for his discussion of the elusive concept of "cosmopolitanism", a state of 
mind that empowers the hybrid individual to construct a workable value system that 
recognises the diversity around him or her, but stops short of embracing a 
meaningless relativism of innumerable incompatible truths.16  This complements 
Sen's concept of multiple identities, noted above, by recognising that the very process 
of negotiating a hybrid identity acknowledges that the individual is working with a 
portfolio of them. 
 The dynamics of a society full of such conflicted individuals is what we are 
after.  This is not a question of a few "cosmopolitan" people cropping up in an 
otherwise homogeneous community (a universally common occurrence), but it is the 
case of an assemblage of diverse groups turning itself into a workable cosmopolitan 
society.  Consequently, this work draws on several different traditions of scholarship 
that are related but do not always refer to each other's findings, ranging from socio-
economic development and the analysis of urban spaces, through to the debate on 
identity, multiculturalism, and creolisation in open societies, and to the issue of 
coexistence and competition between religions.  The broad arena of cultural and 
religious studies holds together this multi-disciplinary approach.   
 The method used to arrive at findings is closely related to that of selected 
works of "historical sociology", employing secondary literature from various 
disciplines where authors have explored niches of primary material in depth, and 
validating the linkages between them by investigating the nature of public discourse at 
the time.17 Rather than apply rigid social models to historical situations, or searching 
for clear causality between dependent and independent historical variables, the 
approach chosen here is akin to the "interpretive" school of historical sociology which 
                                                 
15 From Burton's "Kasidah of Hadji Abdu El-Yezdi", quoted in Kwame Anthony Appiah, 
Cosmopolitanism (NY: Norton, 2006), 5. 
16 Ibid., passim. 
17 See for instance Theda Skocpol (ed), Vision and Method in Historical Sociology (Cambridge: 












identifies a set of key theoretical concepts that are then applied to a historical process 
to illuminate the linkages.18  Max Weber's general notion that religious and economic 
thinking can be closely intertwined is used as one of the planks in the platform on 
which this work stands.  So is the contention of Georg Simmel that a society whose 
members are focused on the competitive process between individuals, rather than on 
grandiose collective goals, tends to become more tolerant and conciliatory: 
antagonistic tension between competitors brings with it greater understanding of the 
preferences of others, whether economic or religious.19  In this, Simmel echoes Adam 
Smith's observation that pragmatic, business-like dealings between individuals in a 
market, embedded in morality and the rule of law, make for a more peaceful society 
than the imposition of monopolies in politics, religion or the economy.20  Finally, 
Ronald Inglehart's painstaking work to bring out the linkages between 
cultural/religious values and socio-economic development provides a framework and 
road map.21 
 
The Theoretical Tools in a Nutshell 
 
 Before delving into the underlying theory in more depth, and illustrating it by 
referring to separate bodies of scholarship, a short outline of the set of theoretical 
concepts used in this work is in order. 
 
• The “human development” concept, as refined over time by scholars of 
development, includes not only measures of economic growth and income 
levels, but also indicators of public health, levels of education, civil liberties, 
institutional soundness, and cultural and religious freedoms.  Much of the 
process of “development” is a path towards more freedom of choice in all 
                                                 
18 Ibid., 368-374, referring to the methods of Bendix, Geertz, et al. 
19 Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (London: Allen and Unwin, 1976); 
Georg Simmel, The Philosophy of Money (London and NY: Routledge, 2004). 
20 Emma Rothschild, Economic Sentiments (Cambridge MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 2001), 52-71. 
21 Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy 












areas of life, more autonomy of the individual to participate meaningfully in 
society, and a greater ability to construct a better life. 
 
• The development process is inextricably linked to changes in individual and 
social values that have been shaped by past religious and cultural 
underpinnings of societies.  The trajectory of human development is not linear 
or unique, but adapts to the cultural background and external environment of 
each community.  The value changes that take place over time can be mapped 
in recognisable clusters that correspond to mainly religiously-shaped 
formative periods of societies.  Max Weber’s “protestant ethic” is only one 
example of attempting to link religion and economic growth to a specific time 
and place.  In general, culture matters for the pattern of development. 
 
• Urban areas have been drivers of change, cross-fertilisation and development, 
setting them apart from more slowly changing rural areas in the same nations 
and societies.  Economic and social change takes place differently in cities, 
thus making it necessary to separate urban development from that in the 
remainder of countries.  More generally, mercantile and trade-oriented 
communities show a different development path from agrarian ones.  Ports 
embedded in an international trade and colonial network are similarly distinct.  
As economic and cultural analysis, constrained by data availability, commonly 
operates with national aggregate indicators, focusing on this 
urban/cosmopolitan difference requires the analyst to seek more area-specific 
information. 
 
• Cosmopolitan cities connected to wider economic and cultural networks 
become locations of cohabiting and competing cultures and religions.  
Although the interaction also takes place between cultural and religious groups 
as collectives, changing them in the process, the key impact is on how 
individuals navigate the need to accommodate the multiplicity of potential 
identities.  Religious, cultural, or ethnic worldviews lose their exclusivity in 
the presence of close coexistence.  Secular authorities impose law and order, 












membership.  Creolisation of a location enables individuals to construct new 
identities, and to switch between them as necessary.  Competition between the 
religions and worldviews on offer encourages individuals to exercise rational 
choice in which ones to adopt, at what time. 
 
• Locations that acquire a plurality of cultures, religions, and hybrid identities 
tend to shift their centre of gravity from a “collective” to an “individualistic” 
mindset.  Identity becomes something that is acquired and used by choice and 
design, not by fate and birth.  The process of individualisation brings with it 
the inclination to challenge, doubt, create, and take the initiative for change – 
an entrepreneurial but conflict-prone state. 
 
• The development record of locations of this kind may be mixed.  Religious, 
cultural, and ethnic diversity in an urbanizing space can go hand in hand with 
high creativity, competitiveness, and individual initiative.  It can also lower 
social and economic stability, thus depressing steady economic growth.  
Community conflict is more likely than in a monocultural location, but 
competition in the market for goods, services, worldviews and ideas may 
compensate for this. 
 
 
The Human Development Framework 
 
 Amartya Sen has redefined the concept of “development” into a new accepted 
paradigm, distilling its essence as the enhancement of human capabilities to seek and 
achieve a better life.  This kind of personal capability needs to have aspects that bear 
on economic opportunities, political and social inclusiveness, a transparent 
institutional environment, and personal security.22  In this reading of the meaning of 
development, there is no asking whether certain political, institutional cultural, or 
religious features of a society are prerequisites for or consequences of socio-economic 
improvement in people’s lives – they are integral constituent components of the 
                                                 
22 Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (NY: Anchor Books, 1999), particularly the introduction to 












development process, forming a consistent development package.  This is not an 
argument for a unique trajectory of change valid for all societies, but the recognition 
of basic universal human rights and liberties that are to be inscribed in a culture-
specific package. 
 At the heart of this view of development is the expansion of personal freedom, 
particularly the freedom to choose among life’s options.  This again is a fundamental 
universal value, enhancing the individual’s ability to participate meaningfully in a 
society based on mutual respect and dignity.  This is an agent-oriented view of 
freedom, the freedom to act and to effect change.  The capability to seize economic 
opportunities in the market, the ability to be heard in government and in civil society, 
the equality before the law regardless of gender or other identities, upward social 
mobility, and the assurance that one can freely select from cultural and religious 
options, or create new ones – all are linked to the freedom of choice among a wide 
range of opportunities.  The existence of individuals or groups in a society whose 
capacity to influence this framework is limited is ample evidence of the need for 
further human development.  Such change has to come from within a society.  “Social 
capital”, the many networks of human interaction and association that make up a 
complex society are the endogenous drivers of this process.  When the networks, 
originally based on kinship, expand to create pluralism and decentralised authority, 
the radius of trust and cooperation widens, creating new freedoms to choose.23 The 
concept of a comprehensive process of moving towards a society of equal opportunity 
and enhanced capabilities of individuals has attracted the attention of international 
development institutions.  Both the World Bank and the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) have embraced a holistic view of human development á la Sen, 
focusing on enhancing human capabilities towards more equality.24   
                                                 
23 Ibid., passim.  See also Francis Fukuyama, Trust (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1995); Jürgen 
Habermas, Faktizitaet und Geltung (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1998); Jürgen Habermas, Zwischen 
Naturalismus und Religion (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2005).  The basic argument has been rehearsed 
before in Karl Jechoutek, "Through the Eye of the Needle", in Augustine Shutte (ed), The Quest for 
Humanity in Science and Religion (Pietermaritzburg: Cluster, 2006), 276-310. 
24 World Bank, World Development Report 2006 (Washington DC: WB and Oxford University Press, 











 Ideally, the separate elements of this development package advance through 
their process of change in step, smoothly and simultaneously.  As choices expand, the 
framework for exercising these choices expands with them, yielding a platform for 
balanced socio-economic development.  Alas, reality does not conform to this 
desirable path, other than in the very long run: parts of the package move ahead of 
others, choice in one area of life blossoms while improvement in other areas 
stagnates.  In the short run, we are left with fits and starts, discontinuities that make it 
difficult to see the direction the society is taking.  Is the appearance of vibrant 
individual enterprise on a small scale an indicator of imminent economic growth and 
social inclusion, even if the institutional underpinning for economic and cultural 
freedom is still lagging behind?  Is the emergence of religious diversity relevant for 
future development, even if civil and social liberties are not improving?  These 
questions will occupy us in this work, and will guide the analysis of the Cape Town 
case.  At this point, let us merely note that differential change among the components 
of the development package can be expected to be the norm, not the exception. 
 Deepak Lal has summarised the state of the art in recognising different speeds 
of change neatly.25  He distinguishes between four equilibria that the process of 
change attains periodically, only to move on to another equilibrium position over 
time.  Market equilibrium in economic exchange can be achieved relatively quickly, if 
supply and demand can adapt in a reasonably transparent market.  A longer period is 
required in getting to a new equilibrium in "material culture", such as institutions, 
technology, scientific concepts, habits and objects, etc.  Several generations must pass 
before a new equilibrium in "cosmological belief" (encompassing such terms as 
worldview and religion) is reached.  Finally, equilibria in "evolutionary change" that 
alter basic human behaviour occur only within millennia.  What we have here is a 
different rate of change from one paradigm to another, depending on the broadly 
"cultural" concept that is subject to the paradigmatic shift. 
 Increasingly, then, development theory and practice recognise the seemingly 
disjointed nature of change, and take into account the flavour imparted to this broad 
process by the cultural and religious heritage of a society.  The "cosmological" 
cultural traditions embedded in a society tend to influence at what pace and in which 
                                                 












manner the more short-term components of development change over time.  
Similarly, the dynamics of change require the recognition that a movement towards 
cultural and religious liberty are key ingredients of the development package.26  This 
realisation is fed by the distinct body of scholarship we turn to now. 
 
Cultures and Religions Matter 
 
 What is now termed human development, has gone through many incarnations 
as the debate on “modernisation”, or the move between “traditional”, “modern” and 
“post-modern” worldviews, culminating in a more differentiated view of "multiple 
modernities".  For purposes of this work, it is not necessary to delve into the 
definitional debate of these terms:  the following discussion uses the term 
"modernisation" more broadly, as a proxy for the process of change from a 
traditionally structured society to a dynamic, more pluralistic one.   Common to all 
interpretations of this process of change is the thought that there is a link between the 
cultural-religious paradigm of a society and its socio-economic performance in this 
transition.  Early observers such as Max Weber and their contemporary followers seek 
to establish the flow of causality from religion and culture to economic change;27 
other current work is looking for causality running the other way, trying to establish 
whether socio-economic change influences cultural and religious values.28  The 
direction of search tends to be influenced by the theoretical allegiance of the analyst, 
                                                 
26 UNDP, Human Development Report 2004 – Cultural Liberty in Today’s Diverse World (NY: UNDP, 
2004);  Vijayendra Rao and Michael Walton (eds), Culture and Public Action (Stanford CA: Stanford 
Univ. Press, 2004);  Katherine Marshall, "Development and Religion: A Different Lens on 
Development Debates", in Peabody Journal of Education, Vol. 76, Nos. 3&4), 2001, 339-375; World 
Faiths Development Dialogue, Cultures, Spirituality, and Development, 2001, www.wfdd.org.uk; 
Sharon M. P. Harper (ed), The Lab, the Temple, and the Market (Ottawa: IDRC, 2000). 
27 Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (London: Allen and Unwin, 1976); 
David S. Landes, The Wealth and Poverty of Nations (NY and London: W. W. Norton, 1999); 
Lawrence E. Harrison and Samuel P. Huntington (eds), Culture Matters (NY: Basic Books, 2000); 
Lawrence E. Harrison, The Central Liberal Truth (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2006); Rodney Stark, 
The Victory of Reason:  How Christianity Led to Freedom, Capitalism, and Western Success (NY: 
Random House, 2005). 












be it materialist or idealist.  The search for strict causality, however, may be a red 
herring.  In the light of the holistic view of development discussed above, changes in 
all spheres of life may well move in the same direction, reinforcing the momentum 
along the way.  The mere fact of linkage may be more important than the direction of 
causality.  One fact, however, stands out.  Simultaneous changes in cultural/religious 
values, socio-economic structures, and political patterns take place continuously along 
innumerable trajectories.  There is no predetermined, linear path of "modernisation", 
but a meandering way of adjusting values and facts to each other, informed by local 
cultural heritage.  The work of Ronald Inglehart and his collaborators in the World 
Values Surveys is a key contribution here, and their use of terms is applied in this 
work.29 
 Different aspects of change move cultural value sets in different directions.  
One set of values moves between the poles of traditional, religiously informed 
authority and a secular-rational authority, illustrating the difference between a more 
static, zero-sum society, and a growth and accumulation oriented society – the classic 
image of “modernisation”.  Another set of values oscillates between a survival mode 
with high group solidarity, and a mode of self-expression of individuals with the 
luxury of choice – the move towards “post-modernity”.  Higher incomes tend to be 
associated with the secular and self-expression ends of the spectrum.30  The 
“modernist” components of cultural values tend to be associated with a strong secular 
authority and less importance of cultural/religious identities, the “post-modernist” 
ones with decentralisation and cultural/religious pluralism.31  The cultural and 
religious heritage determines the mix between them. 
 These value structures inform our analysis below.  What is of primary interest 
to us here, are two facts evident from the data, both cross-country and over time: first, 
the movements along the tradition/secular-rational and survival/self-expression axes 
                                                 
29 A well-argued summary, consolidating the results of decades of empirical research, is Ronald 
Inglehart and Christian Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge Univ. Press, 2005).  The clusters of values that underlie the survey work can be found on 
pages 48-76.  See also the numerous country-specific publications yielded by the data generated in 
multiple waves of the World Values Surveys, directed by Ronald Inglehart at the University of 
Michigan, listed in www.worldvaluessurvey.org.  
30 Inglehart and Welzel, Modernization, 48-76. 












do not go in one direction only.  Societies can move back and forth, depending on 
changing circumstances or external shocks.  Eastern Europe and South Africa 
experienced a temporary reversal of value trends, back to survival and tradition, after 
the fall of communism and apartheid.  Second, the movements between tradition and 
secular rationality on the one hand, and between survival mode and self-expression on 
the other hand, can be correlated and sequenced in a typical manner, but do not have 
to be.  In line with our observation above that components of the development 
package can move independently of each other, it is perfectly possible that a move 
towards "post-modern" self-expression races ahead of the society's trajectory towards 
"modernist" secular rationality, or vice versa.32  We will return to this phenomenon 
when discussing the case of Cape Town where it appears that an early change from a 
communalist group survival mode to more explicit individualism took place without a 





 The apparently parallel trajectories of "modernisation" and "secularisation" 
have given rise to the well-surveyed debate on whether a secularisation of global 
societies has been taking place or not.  Scholars have oscillated between different 
views on this, and have changed their minds as events have unfolded over the 
decades.33  Previously firmly held beliefs that a tidal wave of secularisation was 
sweeping away religion from the public sphere and ensconcing it in private corners of 
consciousness have given way to a realisation that public religious discourse is alive 
and well, and is even strengthening as secular trends grow more visible.  The general 
history of the debate need not concern us here, with one exception:  the definition of 
"secularisation" as the emergence of choice between religion and non-religion in a 
pluralist market of worldviews.  Charles Taylor's magisterial treatment of this issue is 
                                                 
32 Inglehart and Welzel, Modernization, passim. 
33 Prominent examples of this are Peter Berger and Jürgen Habermas, see Peter Berger (ed), The 
Desecularization of the World (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1999); and Jürgen Habermas, Zwischen 












a good starting point.34  In a nutshell, the part of his argument that is applicable to this 
work is the realisation that secularisation trends and religious revival are not mutually 
exclusive but co-existing as choices that can be made by individuals and groups in a 
society that does not impose a single worldview.  This shift from a cultural monopoly 
to a pluralism that allows both religious and secular worldviews constitutes 
"secularisation".  Others have defined secularisation as the "combination of 
substantive religious pluralism with critical inquiry",35 essentially another way of 
expressing the importance of expanding diversity along the path of modernisation. 
 What Berger terms "desecularisation", and Habermas calls the "post-secular 
world" has also been labelled "secular re-enchantment"36  It is understood not as a 
reversal of Weberian disenchantment of the world, but as an addition to it, providing 
multiple options to either be or not be religious.37  This concept will occupy us when 
dealing with the actively pursued religious diversity at the Cape in the early 
nineteenth century. 
 
Religion and Culture 
 
 At this point, having frequently invoked culture and religion in the same 
breath, we have to pause and consider the extant work on the connection between 
these two terms.  If culture and religion were quite distinct concepts, it would be fairly 
easy to pick apart the separate impact of each on a society, and select one to focus on 
for purposes of the proposed work.  The literature indicates overwhelmingly that this 
is not so.  Whether “culture” is defined as a fundamentally individualized concept 
expressing rational self-determination in the sense of Humboldt and Kant, or as a 
social construct traceable to Herder and the tradition of social anthropology,38 the 
                                                 
34 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age, passim. 
35 Janaki Bakhle, "Music as the Sound of the Secular", in Comparative Studies in Society and History, 
Vol. 50, No. 1 (2008), 256-284. 
36 Ibid., 259.  See also Ali Hassan Zaidi, "Muslim Reconstructions of Knowledge and the Re-
Enchantment of Modernity", in Theory, Culture and Society Vol. 23, No. 5, 2006, 69-91; and Seyyed 
Hossein Nasr, Religion and the Order of Nature (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1996). 
37 See the discussion in Taylor: A Secular Age, passim. 
38 Andrew Sartori, "The Resonance of “Culture”", in Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 












overlap with religious concerns is significant.  Clifford Geertz, describing culture as a 
“historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols…the webs of 
significance man himself has spun”, continues to state simply that “religion is a 
cultural system” – one of the symbolic constructs of human societies.39  
Anthropologists, of course, are not the only ones who make the connection.  
Theologians have wrestled with the linkage, from H.R. Niebuhr’s complex ways in 
which “Christ” and “culture” interact, to Kathryn Tanner’s view that “culture is the 
focus for engagement” and that “theology is part of culture”, and to Pope Benedict's 
(then Cardinal Ratzinger’s) assertion that “faith itself is culture”40.  South African 
theologians maintain that “theology is the engagement vehicle of religion with 
culture”, and that “religion is inculturated, culture is imbued with religion”.41  Fazlur 
Rahman, Abdolkarim Soroush and other Islamic thinkers engaging with the 
"modernisation" debate insist that “religion is a concrete programme for a socio-
political order in human society”.42 
 Small wonder, then, that religious thought has been performing a “cultural 
turn” similar to other disciplines in the humanities.43  While much of this fascination 
with reading cultural significance into everything may be due to intellectual fashions, 
it is undeniable that religion and culture have been woven together so densely to make 
it almost impossible to untangle them.44  For purposes of this work, therefore, we can 
safely proceed on the assumption that cultural and religious identities and values can 
                                                 
39 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (NY: Basic Books, 1973), passim. 
40 H. Richard Niebuhr, Christ and Culture (NY: Harper & Row, 1951); Kathryn Tanner, Theories of 
Culture (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1997); Joseph Kardinal Ratzinger, Glaube, Wahrheit, Toleranz 
(Freiburg: Herder, 2004), 56; see also Wolfgang Stegemann, "Religion als kulturelles Konzept", in 
Stegemann (ed), Religion und Kultur (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2003). 
41 John de Gruchy and Chirevo Kwenda, unpublished lecture notes, University of Cape Town, 2007. 
42 Fazlur Rahman, Islam and Modernity (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1982). 
43 See, inter alia, Richard B. Miller, "On Making a Cultural Turn in Religious Ethics", in Journal of 
Religious Ethics, Vol. 33 (2006); Christian Strecker, "Turn, Turn, Turn, To Everything There Is a 
Season", in Stegemann (ed), Religion und Kultur. 
44 See the interchangeability of the religious and cultural values concepts in Inglehart and Welzel, 
Modernization; and in Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, Sacred and Secular (Cambridge: Cambridge 












be treated as overlapping to an extent that allows us, on occasion, to treat them as 
interchangeable. 
 
The Religion/Economy Nexus 
 
 A somewhat different relationship exists between the concepts of “religion” 
and “economics”, a linkage that becomes important in the examination of the 
interaction between religious/cultural values and human development.  Here we are 
not dealing with overlapping definitions, but with issues of correlation.  Although 
Max Weber’s ghost haunts this body of scholarship as well, it consists mostly of work 
by economists searching for “instrumental variables” to explain economic behaviour, 
or by ethicists struggling to reconcile economic principles and moral theory.  Luckily, 
Adam Smith prepared the ground well by writing not only “The Wealth of Nations”, 
but also the “Theory of Moral Sentiments”, thus making a case for the compatibility, 
or rather the inseparability, of economics and ethics.45  Economists and philosophers 
have built on this foundation, formulating theories that allow a sound reconciliation of 
these disciplines.46  As William Shea puts it, rather than plumping just for the 
empirical material side, or just for the culturally and morally essentialist one, a messy 
middle way in which conditionality runs both ways may be the best.  “Material 
conditions, including economy, are real;…ideas, culture, and even religion are as 
real…both are products of the same human intelligence and the same human 
propensity to screw things up, and…this is so of all human economies and all 
religions”47.  The same point to dilute the strict analytical separation between "facts" 
                                                 
45 See the thorough discussions of the "two Adam Smiths" in Emma Rothschild, Economic Sentiments; 
and Eun Kyung Min, "Adam Smith and the Debt of Gratitude", in Mark Osteen (ed), The Question of 
the Gift (London: Routledge, 2002). 
46 Major contributions are e.g. Amartya Sen, On Ethics and Economics, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1987); Amartya Sen, Inequality Re-Examined (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1995); Emma 
Rothschild, Economic Sentiments; Daniel M. Hausman and Michael S. McPherson, Economic Analysis 
and Moral Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1996); several relevant contributions 
(Turner, Akenson, Cummings et al) are also found in Jacob Neusner (ed), Religious Belief and 
Economic Behavior (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1999). 












and "ideas" is made by Appiah, and, in the sense of the close linkages between 
cosmology and economics, by Lal.48 
 The temptation to test Weber’s loosely documented hypothesis is hard for 
economists to resist, particularly in the context of looking for drivers of economic 
growth.  One of the key recent works on the matter is that of Barro and McCleary,49 
indicating that it is the incidence of faith itself, not the formal participation in 
religious institutions, that may be closely correlated to economic growth.  As in all 
empirical studies, causality is difficult to establish, confirming the pragmatic view 
that religion and economic performance simply move in tandem – an admission that 
the development package of changes is interrelated, not sequential.50  The best results 
that can be established appear to be circumstantial or eliminating: it has at least been 
shown that the hypothesis that religious affiliation and economic performance are 
uncorrelated can be safely rejected, and that religion (and particularly Islam) is not a 
drag on growth.51   In fact, new readings of the Islamic tradition of economic 
jurisprudence argue that the extant Islamic body of law encourages a competitive, 
transparent market as a manifestation of spiritual unity, and financial intermediation 
to ensure long-term prosperity.  Muslim merchants spreading out from the early 
Muslim empires could well have conformed to Weber's definition of a capitalist spirit, 
a feature that bears on the discussion on Cape Islam below.52   All the above are not 
                                                 
48 See Appiah, Cosmopolitanism, and Lal, Unintended Consequences.  Lal, apparently inadvertently, 
makes a key point: his whimsical aside that "…as a good Hindu, I naturally believe that the truth lies 
somewhere in between [materialist and idealist theories]" (p.8) opens the door to the very fact that a 
certain religious background colours the individual's perception of socio-economic mechanisms in 
society.  
49 Robert Barro and Rachel McCleary, Religion and Economic Growth, NBER Working Paper No. 
9682 (2003), www.nber.org. See also Robert Barro and Joshua Mitchell, Religious Faith and Economic 
Growth: What Matters Most – Belief or Belonging? (Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, 2004), 
www.heritage.org.  
50 For a useful summary, see Sriya Iyer, "Religion and Economic Development", in S. N. Durlauf and 
L. E. Blume, The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics (Palgrave Macmillan, forthcoming). 
51 Marcus Noland, "Religion and Economic Performance", in World Development, Vol.33 (2005), 
No.8, 1215-1232. 
52 See for instance Salah El-Sheikh, "The Moral Economy of Classical Islam: a Fiqhiconomic Model", 












particularly robust empirical findings in statistical terms, but serve to confirm that the 




 A separate strand of analysis on the nexus between religion and economics 
uses economic analytical tools to establish the pattern of religious adherence.53  This 
is useful in understanding the behaviour of religious institutions in situations where 
potential members have a choice in a “spiritual market” within which competition 
between faiths takes place.  This “rational choice” approach identifies religious 
markets, and constructs a political economy of religion, assuming that the potential 
“consumers” of religious membership act rationally in selecting which faith to join.  
Religious groups act as suppliers in a functioning, perhaps regulated market that 
prevents the enforcement of exclusivity by coercion.  In this context, the rational-
choice school is a de facto subset of the voluminous religious pluralism literature,54 
only arguing the case for non-violent competition and cooperation in economic terms.  
Membership in religious groups emerging under such market conditions constitutes a 
“social good”, increasing the social capital of a society that is necessary for broad 
human development.55 
 Rational Choice theory may have limited applications to religious behaviour in 
global terms, as many critical comments on the work of Stark, Bainbridge, Finke, 
Iannacone et al have argued.56  Extrapolating from the relatively open and fluid 
                                                 
53 See particularly Rodney Stark and Roger Finke, Acts of Faith (Berkeley, CA: Univ. of California 
Press, 2000); and Ted G. Jelen (ed), Sacred Markets, Sacred Canopies (Lanham & NY: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2002).   
54 Work in this field that is relevant to competition issues includes Jay Newman, Competition in 
Religious Life (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier Univ. Press, 1989); and Martin E. Marty, When Faiths 
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55 Norris and Inglehart, Sacred and Secular, 180-195. 
56 Steve Bruce, Choice and Religion: a Critique of Rational Choice Theory (Oxford: Oxford University 
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market among Protestant denominations in the US is not easy, and soon runs into 
cultural traditions, ascriptions, and inertia that create more exceptions than would be 
desirable for a solid theory.  Furthermore, the application of a simple rational-choice 
model to a complex cultural decision-making process suffers from the same 
shortcomings as any applied use of an elegant model to messy real-life issues.57 
 Nevertheless, religion in pluralist societies is frequently observed to be 
tempted into advertising that mimics that for consumer products, indicating that in an 
environment of competition among faiths and worldviews, business techniques to 
influence consumer decisions are useful.  In the current period of globalisation, the 
promotion of, say, fashion styles that appeal to Muslim senses of modesty is more 
successful when they are shown to be cleverly innovative and attractive to younger 
consumers.58  Popular evangelical preachers and imams with their own TV shows 
unabashedly use advertising techniques of the consumer industry, echoing the 
marketing zeal of the nineteenth-century missionaries and da'wa promoters.  The 
more demanding aspects of joining the faith are played down, the self-help 
therapeutic ones are presented prominently.59  One could be forgiven if one would 
recognise this as a functioning market in spiritual services. 
 While it may be impossible to ever resolve the debate between the 
secularization theorists and the rational choice promoters whether increased pluralism 
and religious competition enhance or destroy religious vitality in general, the key 
principles of rational choice as vehicle for religious behaviour of individuals can be 
tested against specific circumstances.  They can be summarized as follows, roughly 
following Stark and Finke’s micro foundations of the religious market: 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Weberian and comparative religions perspective, www.findarticles.com, August 2007; Peter Ellway, 
Shopping for Faith or Dropping Your Faith? www.csa.com, August 2007 (released May 2005 by 
ProQuest). 
57 See e.g. Amartya Sen, "Rational Fools – A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic 
Theory", in Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 4 (1977), 317-44. 
58 See the animated debates in the secular Western media on modest swimwear (the "burkini"), 
fashionably loose "Islamic" garments, or the stealthy introduction of colourful chadors into Iran. 
59 See the discussion in Mathias Zick Varul, "After Heroism – Religion vs. Consumerism", in Islam 












• People attempt to make rational choices in life, exhibiting individual 
preferences and seeking rewards. 
 
• Otherworldly rewards (perhaps replacing unreachable this-worldly ones) can 
be supplied by religions, magic, etc.  The rewards can be obtained by making 
a deal with God (or gods) as intermediated by formal religions. 
 
• People seek to minimize the costs and risks associated with the deal. Degrees 
of commitment required by various religious institutions are part of the cost, 
the degree of communal support mitigates the risk. 
 
• Both social capital (ie interpersonal attachments) and religious capital (ie the 
degree of immersion in a religious culture) will be conserved or increased. 
 
Cape Town during the first half of the nineteenth century appears to conform to a 
pattern that fits the above criteria, especially as the mixed-race underclass emerged 
from the hierarchy of a slave society into the realm of defining personal identity.  The 
criticism usually levelled against rational choice theory, namely that established 
patterns are perpetuated by cultural momentum and not subject to individual choice, 
may not be applicable here – we are dealing with a period of significant cultural 
change, exposing a large segment of the hitherto non-affiliated population to several 
options of religious belonging. 
Randall Collins provides the underpinning for this line of argument.60  Building 
on Weber's understanding that the search for salvation could be an expression of 
distress, he concurs that "socio-economic oppression is an effective source of 
salvation beliefs".  This may well be the same as Stark's "compensators" that enable 
people to find solace and reward in spiritual matters.  However, Weber does not focus 
only on the need of the underclass to seek salvation.  The essence of the "Calvinist 
ethic" also means that the better-off need reassurance of the legitimacy of their 
happiness.  In the Cape context, this would imply that popular Cape Islam and the 
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Methodist mission provided platforms for the spiritual needs of the underclass, while 
the Calvinism of the Dutch Reformed and Presbyterian churches catered to the 
anxieties of the commercially successful. 
In fact, one could add the Islam of the well-established Muslims to the Calvinist 
category, as the devotee's commercial success can be seen as a satisfactory indication 
of godliness.  This is not unknown in today's Turkey, where the area of Kayseri, the 
home of president Abdullah Gul, has been called the "home of Islamic Calvinism".  
The predominant strain of Islam in Kayseri places a high value on entrepreneurship, 
hard work, thrift, wealth creation, and investment in the future – a veritable Weberian 
spirit of capitalism in the Islamic ethic.61 
Rational choice of religion by slaves and ex-slaves (half the population) in early 
nineteenth century Cape Town can be recognised by following the discussion on the 
motivations for this choice.  Robert Shell has argued that the choice of Islam as 
preferred religion of slaves and the Cape underclass was a signal of deliberate cultural 
and social differentiation from the dominant Christian paradigm of the masters, and a 
result of the masters' resistance to accepting slaves as Christians.62  John Edwin 
Mason's counterclaim is that this choice of Islam has much more spiritual content than 
Shell suggests, being a genuine search for salvation among available alternatives.63  
Whether the true motivation is located more in social strategy or in spiritual 
considerations, or in a combination of both, it is clear that Cape slaves and free blacks 
in the early 1800s made conscious rational decisions about whether to strive against 
resistance for inclusion in the dominant Christian culture, or to opt for the more 
convenient and tolerated, but socially inferior path to Islam.  The rationality of these 
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Competition and Regulation   
 
What the rational choice approach neglects to some extent is the degree to which 
the religious market needs to be regulated in order to function.  A liberal, open and 
pluralist society may not need much of this regulation, except for a hands-off 
approach by government and an enforcement of religious tolerance.  A society based 
on colonial or otherwise non-democratic rule, however, requires an active regulatory 
involvement of the authorities of the day, to prevent religious competition from 
slipping into communal violence.  This was the case under British rule at the Cape, 
which placed a high premium on the maintenance of order and the rule of law, whilst 
tending towards the establishment of a degree of religious freedom, consistent with 
the ideology of the day in the mother country. 
The kind of regulation encountered here resembles most closely Lessing's parable 
of the three rings in Nathan der Weise, granting the various suppliers of "religious 
goods" the freedom to compete, but in a way that is constructive and non-threatening 
to the common good. The analogy between the wise Saladin and the early British 
governors at the Cape may not be compelling, but the common elements are there.  
The importance of regulation in inter-religious competition has been highlighted by 
Jay Newman early in the debate about using economic concepts in the sociology of 
religion, and remains relevant if the rational choice concept is to be applied to non-US 
situations.64 
Competition in a regulated religious market, then, involves the demand side 
represented by individuals exercising choice, and the supply side, consisting of the 
various religious communities offering spiritual goods.  The former has been well-
covered by the Rational Choice theorists, the latter has been dealt with by the 
literature on religious pluralism.  The pluralist school of thought is in two minds about 
the value of competition, fearing conflict and violence because of incompatible 
salvation concepts.  The instincts of the pluralists, honed by centuries of religious 
strife, are to avoid outright competition and to advocate dialogue between religions 
                                                 












that seeks common denominators or common causes.65  In the shape of a "pluralist 
theory of religion", this approach even seeks to uncover the core beliefs of all 
competing faiths, a sort of philosophia perennis that would make competition 
unnecessary.66  The idea is that diversity reinforces faith and the recognition that no 
single dispensation can claim to have full understanding of the transcendent, and that 
every explanation or scripture renders only an inadequate approximation of the 
transcendent reality.  This realisation channels the dialogue into the search for a 
"highest common denominator", exploring the common transcendental truth.67    
Acknowledging that dialogue may not always be a productive vehicle to achieve 
cooperation, the pluralists admit that a well-regulated competitive market may 
strengthen the role of faith overall.  Marty calls this kind of pluralism an "active 
diversity in a conducive legal framework".68  Newman notes that competition can be a 
force both for good and for evil, keeping faiths on their toes but also tending towards 
conflict, and thus must be regulated.69 
 Modern plurality exists in a different political and intellectual environment 
from that of pre-modernity.  This environment, outside authoritarian societies, is that 
of the liberal democratic order.  Secularisation and the march of Enlightenment 
thought have produced a tribe of “detached observers” who engage in a 
phenomenological examination of various claims to truth.  Equal political and human 
rights, coupled with freedom of speech and the principle of tolerance (embodied in the 
neutrality of the secular state towards religions) have created a habitat for open 
discourse and exchange of ideas.  In short, the Habermasian “unfinished project of 
modernity” provides a strong incentive for an informed dialogue among equals, 
whether faith-based or secular.  The modern paradigm is “unfinished” in the sense 
that it encourages a discursive hermeneutic circle: rights and accepted truths are not 
given ex ante, but are subject to constant public interrogation and discussion, leading 
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to new agreements that again have to be validated publicly in the light of changing 
circumstances.  What this amounts to is a “discursive validation” of a paradigm, and 
indeed a “recursive” one as it has to be renewed by continuous reassessment.70 
 The deliberative environment implies a pluralism of values, providing 
fundamental liberties of expressing beliefs and opinions; a pluralism of interests that 
guarantees a procedure of discourse between opposing views; and a pluralism of 
modes of association that makes the discourse multipolar and interactive.71  The focus 
of the pluralist habitat is the process of interpersonal communication in order to arrive 
at knowledge, based on the two pillars of basic rights and inclusiveness – in Paul 
Knitter’s words, a “dialogical community”.72  The communicative praxis of such an 
environment, i.e. the exercise of “public reason”, empowers not only secular 
worldviews but also religious ones.  The key process in the discourse is the learning 
curve of both “secular citizens” and “religious citizens”, who have to accept that 
public discourse about values can be conducted in different epistemological 
“languages”.  The search for knowledge and mutual understanding involves the 
acceptance of each other’s language to describe concepts of truth.73 
 
Religions in Regulated Pluralism 
 
 This is not an easy thing for believing members for established religions, who 
have to deal with the accumulated tradition of scriptural interpretation, religious law, 
and developed doctrine, all of which militate against compromise and radical re-
evaluation.  To be sure, even the “secular citizen” has to struggle with the idea that a 
contribution to the values debate put forward in religious language is an argument 
worth listening to.  But he is operating comfortably in an essentially secular model of 
pluralism, in which the very idea of competing ideas about the public and private 
good is an intrinsic one.  The “religious citizen” (corporate or individual), on the other 
hand, has to overcome his disbelief that other truths than the own are conceivable.  
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What is more, the believer has to accept limits that are set on the free exercise of all 
requirements of his religion in the interest of others, and at the same time defend his 
right to be protected against the unlimited exercise of secularist and other religions’ 
encroachments on his way of life.  These boundaries have to be agreed in the very 
process of pluralist discourse.74  In this process, truth ceases to be absolute and 
exclusive, and becomes contextual, socially and linguistically diverse, and 
interpretable in different ways – in short, dialogical and relational.75  Furthermore, it 
becomes a matter of human choice.  Muhammad Talbi, in noting the basic human 
right to be different and to exercise one’s conscience, states that “Faith is a choice, 
and a choice is only a choice if it is a free and reasonable one”.76   
 Having one’s own beliefs questioned with impunity is a sobering experience.  
Believers are forced to face the dilemma of whether to compete vigorously with other 
religions and the secular worldview, thus risking the slippery slope of violence and 
intimidation; or whether to cooperate and seek as much agreement as possible, risking 
a dilution of the beliefs and the creation of a cartel based on the lowest common 
denominator.  Can both be balanced successfully?  Can a well-regulated competition 
among worldviews be maintained?77  The well-known categorisation of responses 
lists how adherents of religions have chosen to deal with this dilemma in a variety of 
ways: 
 
• Outright rejection of the plurality of views, adhering to an exclusivist 
interpretation of truth contained only in the own scripture, in a specific 
interpretation.  Only one way to salvation is accepted, often accompanied by 
efforts to undermine the liberal order, or manifested in a retreat into a fortress-
type isolation.  Christian and Islamic representatives of extreme purism  
occupy this category,78 but elements of this reaction can also be found in the 
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pre-Vatican II Catholic church, or in the uncompromising stance of Karl Barth 
in dismissing any possibility of salvation outside a personal submission to 
grace through Christ, untainted by institutional religion.79 
 
• Self-confident inclusiveness, communicating with other faiths based on the 
agenda that the own truth is superior, and that eventually other worldviews 
will be brought into the fold of the own.  This “new mission approach” has 
many faces, but it is particularly prominent in the Christian effort to seek the 
dialogue with Islam and Judaism, and to a lesser extent with Buddhism and 
Hinduism, on the basis that other revelations are possible and welcome, but 
that they are mere preparations for Christian salvation.  The Protestant face of 
this complex form of communication is partly based on the theological work 
of Paul Tillich, and visible in the implementation of interfaith dialogue by the 
World Council of Churches.  On the Catholic side, Karl Rahner’s concept of 
the “anonymous Christians” outside the church has informed the post-Vatican 
II outreach to other religions.  Similar sentiments are apparent in some Muslim 
outreach efforts such as that of Seyyed Hossein Nasr.  Proclaiming a self-
assured but tolerant and open-minded position rather than adjusting its own 
basics is the preferred mode.80 
 
• Essentialism that treats all religions as limited outward manifestations of an 
underlying primordial absolute truth, drawing on deep spiritual resources to 
establish a mystical unity between believers in different faiths.  The key in this 
response to plurality is the subjective piety and spiritual immersion of the 
individual, seeking the eternal essence of religions in a spirit of awe and 
fascination with the divine.  Some Sufi, Hindu, and mystical Christian 
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traditions have chosen this response of seeking the perennial philosophy and 
unity with the divine behind the visible religious cultures.  The boundary 
between this reaction and the “inclusivist” one is fluid, as the essentialist 
believer may determine that the primordial truth looks very much like the one 
he or she is familiar with.81 
 
• Indifferent relativism, concluding that all religions and worldviews have truth 
and validity, and seeking to attain knowledge and meaning through a 
syncretist assembling of suitable material.  The communication between 
cultural and religious groupings becomes a conversation, a postmodern 
exchange of mutually tolerated views that primarily aims at understanding and 
accepts that there may be many equally valid “ultimate truths”, many 
historically shaped manifestations of the divine.  Diversity and the act of 
discourse become goods in their own right, and a detached phenomenological 
approach is the epistemological vehicle of choice.  “Comparative religion” 
helps to increase understanding, and the main effect of the dialogue is the 
establishment of a modus vivendi between potentially incommensurable views 
that avoids explicit conflict.82 
 
• Finally, there is the “dialogic” or “mutuality” response, arguably the most 
difficult reaction to a pluralist environment, but perhaps the one yielding the 
greatest epistemological benefit.  It explicitly accepts the challenge of the 
communicative praxis that shapes the public sphere, and feels the greatest 
need to acquire new knowledge.  While the other responses to plurality can get 
along with a minimal degree of gaining new knowledge, just enough to further 
the original own agenda, the truly dialogic response needs the maximum 
possible understanding of the other, to be able to reflect on the own principles 
and adjust them for the next round of dialogue.83 
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 So dialogue obviously is a useful feature of interaction.  Naturally, however, 
both competition and cooperation need to be evident in productive dialogue.  The 
competitive element is present in the acceptance of fundamental differences of belief 
that are not to be swept under the carpet, but highlighted and acknowledged as 
legitimate incompatibility – an agreement to disagree.  Talbi’s description of this state 
of affairs accommodates the “witnessing” of the own faith and the “Greater Jihad” of 
the inner struggle to live a life of faith within a competitive relationship.  “Dissensual 
pluralism” is to keep the competition vigorous but dignified.  “The more one is firm 
about the classical points that divide us, the better we know where we stand, and our 
discussion becomes surprisingly open and fruitful”.  Pluralism enables self-interests 
of the faiths to produce common social values, which in turn enable subjective 
satisfaction within a faith – a translation of socio-economic competition and 
cooperation into the religious realm. 
 In the end, Adam Smith's dictum that competition among sects will lead to 
tolerance in a society, requires both rational choice and spiritual depth evident in 
individuals.  The pragmatism and messiness of the Scottish Enlightenment, rather 
than the starkly illuminated contrasts of the French Enlightenment, are more likely to 
achieve equilibrium in the religious market.84 
 
Religions and Ethnicities 
 
Further explanatory power can be achieved if one expands the horizon from 
purely religious groups that offer affiliation, to ethnic and cultural groups that demand 
affiliation.  While often overlapping with religious categories, ethnic/cultural 
groupings can be independent competitors in the quest to become a primary identity 
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of the individual.  Although they are "inherited" or ascriptive (at least in the eyes of 
those who make these judgments), rather than potentially choice-based as in the case 
of the religious groups, these secular categories are real players in the identity 
market.85 
A recent paper applies this concept of broad religious/cultural competition in a 
pluralistic but rather unstable society to the nexus between religious diversity and 
economic performance in India.86   Diversity is treated as a composite concept, 
embracing the religious pluralism, the ethnic and caste diversity, and the umbrella of 
the secular society enforcing the toleration principle.  The interesting point here is that 
religious diversity and self-regulation may be necessary in a society based on weak 
secular authority that has trouble regulating both secular and religious markets, or 
enforcing laws. Religious, cultural and ethnic identities double as "regulatory tools" in 
economic competition, and vice versa.  Specific occupational groups overlap partially 
with religious and ethnic categories.  Religious family law, applied to adherents of 
each faith in the absence of a strong secular authority, has an impact on economic 
behaviour such as inheritance, property disposal, or commerce.  The Indian urban 
locations examined resemble Sombart's "cosmopolitan towns",87 but lack the wide 
circle of trust in the Fukuyama sense88 that would enable them to embark on sustained 
industrialization.  This urban emphasis gives us an entry point into defining the 
situation at the Cape in the early nineteenth century. 
 
The Urban Edge 
 
 The interaction of economic and religious/cultural variables has been tested 
primarily by using national aggregates.  Both historical and current data are available 
more readily for nation states than for sub-regions of a country.  National statistics 
lend themselves to comparison between countries, resulting in broad classifications of 
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societies as “historically Protestant”, “historically Confucian” etc.89  This is a serious 
restriction, as the neglect of the internal variety of socio-economic and cultural-
religious situations in a country tends to iron out any interesting results that could be 
obtained by focusing on specific local areas.90  The aggregation flaw has been 
recognized by a number of analysts, primarily those looking for the conditions that are 
conducive to economic change.  The key contributions have come from the field of 
urban economics, inspired by the seminal work of Jane Jacobs.91 
 Jacobs’ central argument hinges on the fact that, throughout history, cities 
have been the engines of innovation and economic change, carrying the rural areas of 
the same polity along with a considerable time lag.  Economists since Adam Smith, 
writing at the time of the emergence of the concept of the modern nation state, have 
been tempted to take the easy way of equating an economy to a national political 
structure, thus losing the richness of intra-country diversity.  Cities have been driving 
development based on spontaneous improvisation, say Jacobs and her followers, and 
deserve to be examined as initiators of growth and change.  Furthermore, dynamic 
cities become parts of trading and communication networks that include other, similar 
cities, quite independently of the national states they happen to be part of.  
Historically, ports and entrepot cities have played this role:  the pre-modern 
“transcontinental archipelago” of trading ports from Bruges to Canton, the German 
association of Hanse cities in the North and Baltic Seas, the seaborne empires of the 
Portuguese and the Dutch, the network of British colonial cities, and the modern 
business-based networks of cosmopolitan cities are relevant examples.92  Weber’s 
thesis on the Protestant/Catholic differences in economic performance has been tested 
econometrically for European networks of cities that were primarily of one or the 
other denomination during the early modern centuries, yielding significant 
correlations between religion and economics that have not been achieved for national 
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comparisons.93  The results bear out Taylor's concept of "metageography", the close 
linkage between physical geography and metaphysical paradigms.  Worldviews are 
closely related to geography.94 
 An interesting illustration of this need to focus on urban locations rather than 
merely on national economic aggregates is provided by recent work on Latin 
America.  Contrary to established conventional wisdom about the stagnation of post-
colonial economies of Argentina and Brazil in the early nineteenth century, an 
analysis of wealth and economic performance in two major cities, Buenos Aires and 
Rio de Janeiro, shows that the urban economies appear to have been much more 
dynamic than would have been suggested by merely looking at the newly independent 
nation states.  The evidence shows that "...the focus on the nation state as the unit of 
analysis obscures important trends....that can be profitably explored through a 
comparative analysis of the region's two major capital cities".95  On the other side of 
the South Atlantic, Cape Town can provide similar lessons, albeit with a different 
result. 
 The very nature of the economic and cultural networks that cosmopolitan 
cities are embedded in constitutes the "innovative milieu", it is what makes them 
"cultural crucibles" that drive change.96  To get on this bandwagon, we have to mute 
the orthodox discourse on colonial and post-colonial issues.  The concepts of 
metropole vs. periphery, the Foucauldian notions of domination and power relations 
have to be put aside to get a better understanding of the voluntary nature of 
networks.97  Networks within global empires are not one-way streets but show mutual 
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influences and "circuits of exchange":  the colonial centre changes in a similar way as 
the colonies it networks with.  These are not necessarily institutional networks, but 
often are linkages between individuals who engage in trade, colonial administration, 
religious contacts and cultural communication.  The shared identity of those who are 
communicating make the flow of ideas and views possible and easy.98  Trade 
networks and diasporas have always been centred on urban hubs, enabling the 
merchants to operate as a global community of like-minded individuals, bringing 
about a convergence of worldviews and cultural mixes.99 
 Identities, as discussed with reference to Amartya Sen above, usually are 
multiple ones.  A cosmopolitan location with a number of coexisting identities will 
also develop parallel networks that facilitate the embedding of individuals and groups 
in various global cultures.  The early nineteenth century Cape displayed a number of 
simultaneous identities: the English-speaking merchant and administrative elite took 
their cue from prevailing trends in the British Empire.  So did the Christian 
missionaries of various hues, focusing on different streams of thought.  The remaining 
Dutch elite's lifestyle and worldview were still influenced by the legacy and 
connections of the VOC seaborne empire.  The growing Cape Muslim community 
saw itself as linked to a South-East Asian slave and exile heritage, and to the 
worldwide ummah of believers that connected them to Swahili East Africa, Arabia, 
and Ottoman Turkey.  The freed slaves and other mixed-race individuals aspired to a 
link with the dominant Anglophone imperial network.  In short, a multiplicity of 
networks tied the Cape to the world.  Dubow's analysis of the early nineteenth century 
at the Cape illustrates the strength of such colonial knowledge networks which used 
major strands of thought in the Empire to assert new liberal freedoms, promote 
humanitarian sentiments, and introduce new institutions of learning and research. 
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Merchants and Ports 
 
 One additional feature is more characteristic of urban regions than of national 
averages, thus linking it to the following discussion:  cities embedded in an 
international trading or colonial network are “merchant” locations that attract 
immigrants (forced or voluntary) of varied cultures and backgrounds.  In fact, 
practically all of the inhabitants of early Cape Town were overseas immigrants, 
voluntary or forced.100  The influx of cultures tends to cluster in the urban region 
rather than spreading evenly throughout a country or colony, making the city 
considerably more diverse than its hinterland.  The early nineteenth century Cape is a 
good example of this phenomenon, as the spread of Islam happened primarily in the 
urban area, and the East African "prize negroes" landed at the Cape as a result of the 
capture of non-British slaving ships were assigned to live in or close to the town.   
Urban Cape Town rapidly differentiated itself culturally from its rural hinterland.  
 Significant differences in the pattern of value change and economic 
development are visible between merchant locations and the more hierarchic agrarian 
areas: the latter may show more stability and more steady economic growth, but may 
lack the autonomy, initiative, and innovation characteristic of the former.101  Cities 
that are open to the world develop a “worldview universalism” that facilitates the 
local competition for the validity of diverse worldviews.102  Urban diversity, then, 
matters. 
 Two aspects of merchant-oriented, cosmopolitan cities stand out:  their 
colonial heritage, and their nature as port cities.  Cape Town has this potent 
combination.  The colonial aspect of the city embeds the European, Asian, and 
African immigrants of the urban area in the global imperial framework, and in the 
globalising world trade and communications system.  While the Dutch or British 
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influence in creating the colonial city may appear to be generally secular,103 the 
presence of a vibrant religious diversity in such cities (including both the dominant 
Christian denomination and other denominations and religions that are treated as 
second-class) would indicate that it is a "secularity" in the Charles Taylor sense, i.e. a 
pluralism of both religious and secular discourse.  The day-to-day discussion in such 
locations is imbued with religious language, competing with non-religious argument.  
Practically all participants in the daily life of the colonial city are migrants from 
somewhere else, or their descendants, and have to build their own hierarchies.  All 
relevant population groups, and their institutions, are imported into the colonial urban 
location.  Racial interaction and racial mixing takes place, and new identities have to 
be found.  In the transition of the colonial city from a slave society to a post-slavery 
one, the previously clear social distinctions fade, and residential separation on a racial 
or religious basis becomes necessary to maintain colonial hierarchies.104  
 Many colonial cities started as ports, and this second feature reinforces the 
urban hybridity and diversity.  How much a port function adds to the intensity of the 
cultural mix is difficult to quantify, but the port's very nature as a point of exchange 
radiates into the cultural makeup of the city.  "Port functions, more than anything else, 
make a city cosmopolitan, a word which does not necessarily mean sophisticated, but 
rather hybrid.....Races, cultures, and ideas as well as goods from a variety of places 
jostle, mix, and enrich each other and the life of the city."105 Examples from Asia such 
as Colombo, Makassar, Melaka, Bombay, or Calcutta demonstrate that a vigorous 
religious and ethnic diversity and assembling of cultures took place throughout the 
colonial history of these settlements.106  Islam, Christianity, Hinduism and Buddhism 
coexisted and interacted in an environment of open exchange, regulated by the need 
for public order.  Upward mobility is a hallmark of such port cities, where being an 
arriviste is a badge of honour, allowing people of humbler origin to succeed 
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economically and socially.  The port city becomes "...a cosmopolitan centre of 
ferment, social mobility, innovation and stimulus,...[engaging in] traffic in ideas and 
people as well as in goods."107  Let us remember here that "...trade is not simply a 
movement of goods, it is also a social activity, linking individuals and communities in 
interlocking networks".108 
 A key feature in the functioning of a port city is the existence of a legal order 
that protects private property, contracts, and the increase of wealth.  Legal security of 
this kind is essential in an environment of transient traders, a diversity of cultures and 
ethnicities, and the absence of historically grown and established patterns of 
behaviour.109  Without a clear perception that contracts can be enforced, and that 
property is protected against rogue elements of a hybrid society, the city will not 
develop its potential.  We will see that this feature figures prominently in the society 
of the nineteenth century Cape, and twenty-first century Cape Town. 
 
The Case for Diversity 
 
  Urban communities are prone to modernise and embrace change more easily 
than traditional, static ones characterised by homogeneity and a high premium on 
stability.  The “consensual” traditional paradigm of rural areas is not the 
“competitive” urban one that has to live with heterogeneity and the dynamic 
interaction of cultures.  Under the latter, predictability and stability decline, but 
individual autonomy and the urge to take control of events increase.110  The social 
pattern based on personal relations, rigid hierarchy and security gives way to a more 
anonymous, individualistic and egalitarian one – the social analysis at a very local 
level yields better insights into this process than the conflation of the urban and rural 
structures.111  Horton argues that religion can well become an independent variable in 
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urbanizing locations, influencing the society and economy when individualisation 
breaks down old hierarchies, and modernisation moves the urban population from 
polytheistic to monotheistic worldviews.  In cosmopolitan urban centres, long-
distance trade and economic specialization are associated with a "worldview 
universalism" that favours universalist religions such as Christianity and Islam.  The 
natural competitiveness of a multicultural city enables the local competition among 
worldviews to be seen as normal, in contrast to parochial locations where competition 
is viewed with suspicion, and different worldviews belong to distant aliens.112 
 Anthropology, sociology, religious/cultural studies, and political theory have 
moved a long way along this analytical path, giving birth to the broad academic 
debate on multiculturalism, diversity, pluralism, and the question of identities.  From 
this broad canvas, let us selectively pick out the topics that appear relevant to the 
work at hand.  First, and most fundamentally, the rising importance of the individual 
as autonomous agent that accompanies modernisation and development.  Individuals, 
of course, always are embedded in a social environment – the purist theoretical notion 
of a totally self-contained individual has been abandoned long ago.  But all evidence 
of the process of modernisation indicates that the centre of gravity shifts from 
collective to individual identity construction.113  This emancipation of the individual 
from the collective has been interpreted as a key feature of a “new” modernity, 
distinct from the first push for modernisation that merely carries the society from a 
static traditional to a dynamic secular mode.  What Beck calls the new, “reflexive” 
modernity, empirical sociologists such as Inglehart label “post-modern” features of 
cultural change – the fluid, self-correcting way of individuals to seek self-
expression.114  We do not have to understand this in strictly chronological terms, 
associating the “post-modern” features with contemporary societies only – what 
matters here is the fact that different combinations of “modern” and “post-modern” 
elements of value change can be observed even in historically more distant periods. 
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 Secondly, the question of identity formation by increasingly autonomous 
individuals.  The fluidity injected into a modernising society has been described as 
“liquid modernity”, making identity construction an ongoing task rather than a steady 
state.115  Flexibility and adaptability become key assets, as relatively short-lived 
identities emerge and fade, like the figures parading across the dial in a mediaeval 
clock.  Identity building is constant bricolage, a means-oriented process rather than 
one with a predetermined goal.  Two limits to the freedom of identity choice must, 
however, be recognised:  those inherited by descent, and those imposed by stronger 
members of a community.116  Racial identity, of course, has always been a visible, 
inherited marker that can not easily be jettisoned, unless mixed descent allows a range 
of identifications in a multi-racial society, or renders racial identity irrelevant.  
Cultural and “ethnic” identities ascribed by powerful others to individuals who are in 
no position to protest are similar obstacles that limit choice.  Social weakness limits 
the opportunities for identity bricolage severely.  Identity flexibility, therefore, varies 
along a spectrum ranging from those who have the luxury to re-arrange their set of 
identities at will, and those who have little say in their own identity preferences, being 
pushed into being stereotyped by others.117  Again, the key concept of the freedom of 
choice enters the consideration: human development includes the expansion of choice 
even in identity formation.  This point is driven home forcefully by Sen, who notes 
that the mobilisation and identification of whole social groups on the basis of one 
dominant cultural, religious, or ethnic identity easily leads to violence and exclusivity.  
The simple act of recognising that each individual has a potential plethora of identities 
among which he or she should be able to choose freely according to circumstances, is 
a highly liberating one.  Slipping from one identity into another is the privilege of the 
citizen of an open, egalitarian, liberalising society.118 
 Thirdly, the dialectic between multiculturalism and hybridisation in a 
community.  It is all very well to say that the individual should choose among a wide 
range of identity options.  But two things stand in the way:  the strength of identity-
promoting groups, and the tendency of identities to blend, mix, synthesise and 
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hybridise.  First, the group issue.  The literature on the recognition of diverse cultural 
groups in a society is vast, and has spilled over into everyday social and political 
concerns: who has not participated in a debate about the pros and cons of 
multiculturalism, however it may be defined?  The key issue of relevance in our 
discussion is the extent to which one should focus on group identities and their need 
to be acknowledged as, for instance, separate cultural entities within a dominant 
culture (speaking on behalf of their members), or rather concentrate on how 
individuals navigate the treacherous path between group and personal identities.  Key 
authors such as Will Kymlicka have carefully explored the middle ground, arguing 
that cultural, religious, and ethnic groups exhibiting strong collective identities are a 
reality that can not be ignored in the running of a society, but that universal liberal 
principles require that such groups do not suppress their members’ ability to exit or to 
dissent from the group.119  Others have challenged this even-handed approach, 
claiming that the potential “internal illiberalism” of groups should shift the focus 
towards the needs of the individual.  In this reading, the “mosaic multiculturalism” of 
separate but peacefully coexisting groups is an illusion that ignores the multiple 
identities of individuals.  Rather than searching for a “modus vivendi” between rival 
single-identity groups, one should look for evidence of a “pluralistically enlightened 
ethical universalism” that affords space for individuals to express universal values in 
various cultural idioms.120 
 Finally, the phenomenon of hybridisation and creolisation.  Far from the 
concern with distinct groups imposing dominant identities, this argument states that 
individuals in cosmopolitan, multicultural locations not only switch between multiple 
identities and allegiances, but actually fuse and blend them into new hybrids.  In the 
colonial context, this process has been described as creolisation – the creation of a 
new identity out of fragments of indigenous and imported ones.  Creole cultural 
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fusion as agent of innovation:  this concept is akin to the understanding of creole 
languages as gradually solidified new mother tongues of a culturally mixed 
population.  The literature on the process and results of creolisation is substantial, 
driven by authors involved in the historical cultural fusions in the Caribbean, Brazil, 
West Africa, and South Africa.121  Creole elites tended to aspire to join the dominant 
colonial culture, thus drawing it into the anthropological “long conversation” that 
creolises the society as a whole.  Such elites “believed in the possibility, indeed the 
obligation, of individual advancement through…education and…respectable leisure 
activities”.122 
 Not all cultural interchange and adaptation results in a creole society.  The 
global tension between the colonial centre and the network of empire results in 
innovation and diversity, and cultural hybrids.123  It would be a mistake to look at this 
process only one-dimensionally as “oppression” and coercion:  although inequality 
and social marginalization are key parts of the scene, the cultural arena in which the 
process takes place includes everyday life, the market, customs and rituals, and the 
aspirations of a local elite to become accepted and respectable in the colonial 
setting.124  Taking the definitional cue from linguistics (pace the criticism that this is 
not a sound transfer of analytical tools), the early phases of this process consist of a 
rough imitation and a state of vernacular dependence, a sort of “pidgin” cultural stage 
where local populations adapt by necessity to the dominant colonial cultural features 
but remain loyal to their local roots.  If the process is not sustained, this is where it 
stays, and perhaps fades away after the departure of the colonialists.  There comes, 
however, a threshold:  when it is crossed, the pidgin turns into a creole, a language 
and community that has created a new hybrid cultural form that is self-sustaining.  
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The previous haphazard pidgin vernacular has become the mother tongue of a new 
community, a new cultural entity has been born.125 
 The new community is hybridised in many respects:  it has a new language, 
derived from the dominant colonial one and other sources, that develops its own 
dynamics; it is characterized by racial mixing, including in the new urban community 
not only the descendants of the local population, of Europeans and of imported slaves, 
but a wide spectrum of ethnic identities, held together by the need to communicate 
and to operate a functional society.  It is important to reflect at this point that it is not 
just a defined sub-group of the colonial environment that turns creole:  an entire 
community such as Cape Town takes on the flavour of this new dispensation, as even 
the colonial masters are drawn into the way in which the society now communicates 
and lives together. 
 When this happens, the point of “entanglement” is reached: a point of no 
return after which it is useless to seek a pure past and one has to acknowledge a mixed 
history and multiple roots.  Rather than search for a singular identity, one accepts 
fragmented origins, “returns to the point of entanglement and, from there, puts to 
work the forces of creolisation”.126  Ambiguity is the key word here,127 an 
ambivalence that permeates the creole community, as it contemplates its lack of a 
clear heritage and its origins from the actions of a dominant colonizer, but at the same 
time celebrates its ability to create something coherent from many sources.  Creole 
identities are “the result of a complex dialectical relationship between racialization by 
dominant-class whites and self-definition…where such an identity has to make sense 
to those so described”.128  A creole community understands itself as such, regardless 
of any efforts by authorities to press it into a homogeneous ethnically-based identity.  
Through the creative creolisation by individuals, post-colonial communities with 
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mixed ethnic characteristics can simultaneously engender a traditional sense of 
belonging, and be symbols of cultural fusion in a "post-modern" urban experience.129  
An individual transformation takes place, the changed person can no longer be slotted 
back into one of the original ingredients of the creole persona, Derrida’s differance 
has taken hold.130 
 Creole identities are anti-essentialist by definition, and depend on the context 
of the moment.131  They jockey for pole position in the consciousness of the 
individual, who can assign equal importance to his or her membership of a mixed-race 
group, of a religious community, of an occupational category, of a resistance 
movement, of the fellowship of a leisure activity, or, indeed, to being a member of a 
creole community.  The creole mind “lives across the grain of cultural 
differentiation,…traversing several cultural idioms”.132  The creolised community 
uses the discourse methods of the dominant groups, but “domesticates” them, 
popularises them, and employs irony to mock them.  To type-cast this character in a 
film, central casting could do no better than pick a mixed-race Capetonian. 
 The term "creolisation", of course, is a much-used and much-criticised one in 
a range of disciplines from linguistics to cultural anthropology.  Recent critical 
reviews have stressed that the term, originating in Caribbean studies, has undergone 
an unwarranted inflation, and has been applied inappropriately to any instance of 
cultural mixing and fusion.133  Rather than enter into the raging academic debates on 
whether there is any rigorous theory underlying the concept, or whether the linguistic 
construct is transferable to cultural analysis at all, this work adopts the entirely 
pragmatic definition of creolisation as a proxy expression for the gradual 
hybridisation of coexisting or competing identities in the context of cultural pluralism 
in a defined colonial or post-colonial location. 
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 Given the vast body of literature on cultural identity, creolisation processes, 
and the uses of ethnicity, it is prudent to select a combination of templates that serves 
the topic of Western Cape identities best.  The composite that shows the best fit is one 
that deals explicitly with the interplay between coloniser and colonised, acknowledges 
the emergence of a recognizable hybrid elite and underclass, focuses on the 
emergence of identities of choice such as religious ones, and embeds ethnicity in a 
broader cultural and religious context. 
 The protracted question on how to distinguish between group identity and 
individual identity is the first one that needs to be tackled.  The communitarian 
tendency of the former, and the focus on liberated individualism of the latter are not 
always easily reconciled in a democracy.  How much dissent and fragmentation can 
there be in a group before it becomes meaningless?  How independent of collective 
conditioning can the individual be?134  These abstract questions become clearer when 
seen against the global structural processes that bracket a historical series of cultural 
encounters, from colonialism to the spread of Western tradition and to the global 
information explosion.  Cultural identities, in this context, are closely linked to the 
dynamics of these encounters:  the whole spectrum of identities, whether inherited 
physical ones or those learned in the community, is affected by the meeting and 
mixing of alien cultural elements.  The colonial dynamics place the Western concept 
that individuals have their own cultural identity into the same marketplace of ideas as 
the traditional indigenous concept (say, Khoisan or Xhosa) that it is the group which 
has the primary identity.135  Where local commercialised societies already existed 
prior to the colonial impact (such as in Dutch East India), this precondition is added to 
the mix as a non-traditional but still hierarchically organized mode of thought. 
 Friedman’s typology of cultural identities136 is a useful tool in this context.  It 
is placed along a continuum of societies that range from those with a very light 
“cultural content” in their formal structure, to the holistic traditional ones heavily 
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informed by such content.  In this context, “cultural content” can best be imagined as 
a bundle of concepts of belonging, including ethnicity, religion, language, common 
tradition and history.  The extreme ends of this spectrum (the culture-neutral Western 
state consisting of equal citizens with political interest group identities on the one 
hand, and a simplified archetype of the traditional hierarchical and socially inclusive 
indigenous society on the other hand) do not help us much in the search for the 
identity conundrum in a hybrid Cape Town.  The middle ground is more promising.  
What we find there are two prototype societies, both still within the range of 
“Westernized” cultures: one, designated “ethnic” in the sociologist’s shorthand, tends 
more towards the heavier cultural content and is characterized by an exclusive ethnic 
pluralism in which individuals are seen primarily as parts of defined ethnic groups.  
Ethnic mythology is important, individualism is controlled by informally or formally 
enforced loyalty to the ethnic group, ethnic identity is a prime organizing principle of 
the state and society, and claims to a historical heritage are clothed in racial and ethnic 
essentialism.  South Africa in its twentieth century colonial and apartheid incarnations 
(or, indeed, the totalitarian period in Germany) fits this paradigm reasonably well.  
The other type, more towards the lighter cultural content and higher value of 
individualism, is dubbed the “lifestyle” society where the autonomy of the individual 
creates a cultural pluralism that is not enshrined in fixed ethnic categories, and where 
any existing ethnic identity easily dissolves into creative combinations of identities.  
This category could well describe the ideal type of cultural environment for a Cape 
Town person of mixed heritage who is emerging from a hierarchical paradigm, 
enabling an informed personal choice of the prime locus of belonging. 
 This dichotomy puts its finger on the dilemma that the new South Africa finds 
itself in.   The headlong rush for a “rainbow nation” neglects the key fact that a multi-
cultural society that tries to emerge from an “ethnic” one still maintains several 
distinct ethnic cultures within the same society.  Each one is celebrated as 
homogeneous and valuable, the individual has a dual identity within the ethnic group 
and within the multi-cultural state, and the only difference to the old authoritarian 
ethnic hierarchy is that the ethnic groups now coexist on a democratic footing.137  Not 
a negligible difference, by all means, but the obsession with equal rights for ethnic 
                                                 












groups keeps the individual from breaking free of ethnic loyalties.  This kind of 
liberation is exactly the tonic needed for somebody who can not easily fall back on a 
straightforward ethnic heritage, as is the case for the mixed population of the Cape. 
 
Ethnicity and Identity 
 
 At this point, it is useful to step back and reflect on what the concept of 
“ethnicity” really implies.  It definitely is not limited to race.  While the idea of “race” 
itself has many elements of a political and social construct,138 it is woefully 
inadequate as a biologically-based definition to describe cultural differences.  Staying 
with the Western definition of “ethnicity” as a compartmentalized cultural identity of 
the individual rather than the traditional holistic group identity,139 we can see ethnicity 
as a “perception that a person has of having common ancestry or permanent cultural 
ties with one collection of people, one ethnic group, rather than another or 
others…Ethnicity will be conferred or enhanced by informal or formal education as 
well as by shared activities and symbols”.140  Note that this is not just a physical, 
innate concept but a perception by the individual and the group that there is cultural 
togetherness.  This thread of thinking that collective identities are shaped by 
individual perceptions runs from Max Weber’s notion of common descent and 
culture, through Geertz’ concept of cohesive, holistic cultures shaped by descent and 
custom, to the post-modern idea of ethnicity as a regulator of intra-group social 
relations.  A collective ethnic identity is a “consciously crafted ideological creation”, 
resulting from the “search of the individual for psychological security through group 
membership, not only through individual attainment”.141 
 Combine this with the notion that “identity” is a fleeting thing.  Sociologists 
and historians have arrived at the conviction that cultural identity is multiple and 
unstable, not eternally fixed as would be demanded by the concept of racial identity.  
Identities are polymorphous, contradictory and inconsistent, and “always demand 
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specific and strategic calculation of their effects”.142  They are changeable and have to 
be built in the interplay between the individual and different cultural groups: “The 
construction of identity…involves the construction of opposites and ‘others’ whose 
actuality is always subject to the continuous interpretation…of their differences from 
us”.143  On top of all this, the post-modern paradigm implies that the individual can 
easily be “several things at once”, indulging in a multiplicity of identities 
simultaneously.144  Each one of these layered identities is “one among a number of 
identities which an individual will or can articulate, depending on the 
circumstances”.145  Part individual choice, part circumstance and environment, the 
cultural identity adapts to the life situation as it is experienced.  This cultural 
flexibility is essential for all players in circumstances where a dynamic alien colonial 
presence irrupts into a traditional indigenous society, and at the same time imports 
individuals from third societies, alien to both:  this is the mix experienced at the Cape 
right from the beginning of European settlement. 
 Hybridity, then, appears to be closely related to individualisation and 
innovation.  The individuals in such a society are anathema to Adam Smith's "man of 
system", who "...seems to imagine that he can arrange the different members of a 
great society with as much ease as the hand arranges the different pieces upon a 
chess-board.  He does not consider that...in the great chess-board of human society, 
every single piece has a principle of motion of its own."146  Whether we are talking 
about changeable (in the sense used by Sen) or fused (creole) identities, the thrust of a 
community composed of such flexible individuals may be characterised by change, 
the search for new solutions, risk-taking, and adaptability.  Indeed, arguments have 
been put forward that only this kind of hybridity and multiculturalism at the micro 
level can enable a society to participate fully in global development, and that a 
“schizophrenic” life defines normality for successful individuals in cosmopolitan 
                                                 
142 Soudien, "District Six", 116. 
143 Edward W. Said, Orientalism (NY: Vintage, 1994), 332. 
144 Simon Bekker and Rachel Prinsloo (eds), Identity? (Pretoria: HSRC, 1999), 72. 
145 Shamil Jeppie, "Reclassifications", in Erasmus, Coloured by History, 82. 












locations.147  Not only contemporary societies, but even early modern ones are 
considered to have benefited from these features: Amsterdam and other Dutch cities 
during Holland’s “Golden Age” turn out to have been more hybrid than commonly 
assumed, thus making it possible to attribute the rise of Dutch capitalism not just to 
the “Protestant ethic”, but also to the fact of diversity.148 
 
Diversity and Economy  
 
Some empirical sociological work on the process of change in cultural values 
towards diversity and individual self-expression opines that economic development 
and income security have to precede this kind of “post-modern” manifestation of 
individuality.149  This makes sense in general, as only economically secure 
communities may be able to afford the risk of diversity and cultural/religious 
competition.  However, causality is an elusive thing.  “Post-modern” and 
diversity/hybridity values can creep even into societies that have not reached a 
significant threshold of wealth or “modernisation”, particularly in historical situations 
that throw together cultures and religions in pre-modern but cosmopolitan locations. 
Poly-ethnicity and cultural diversity have been quite normal features of societies 
throughout history before the emergence of the homogeneous nation state,150 and it 
would be surprising if this social structure would not be accompanied by a quite 
distinct set of values and economic thinking. The discussion on the Cape Colony 
below will deal with this in more detail. 
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Attacking the topic from the other direction of causality, econometric analysis 
has tried to establish whether multiculturalism and religious and ethnic diversity have 
an impact on economic performance, with decidedly mixed results.151  Some of the 
results seem to indicate that heterogeneity induces conflict and therefore instability 
and poor economic growth performance, compared to homogeneous societies.  Other 
work yields the conclusion that it is religious and ethnic polarisation and conflict, not 
just diversity, that has a (negative) impact on economic development.  The limited 
enlightenment we obtain from these cross-sectional exercises is that conflict in a 
community, driven by cultural and religious identities, is detrimental to steady socio-
economic development – not a surprising result.  What we do not learn is whether 
diversity always results in damaging communal conflict, or whether there are 
instances when diversity and hybridity take place in a managed environment that 
encourages entrepreneurial behaviour.  Creole locations such as Brazilian examples 
have been identified as exhibiting a constant negotiation of traditional and modernist 
paradigms in the mind of each individual, an ambiguity that mediates everyday 
situations between the personal and the rules-based modes.152   
In a simple shorthand, we can conclude that there are both economic costs and 
benefits associated with cultural and religious diversity.  The costs of a multicultural 
society can be defined as high social and economic transaction costs:  customs and 
languages of the different cultural backgrounds and worldviews make it more difficult 
to transact business than in a homogeneous society.  Misunderstandings and frictions 
are frequent, leading to conflict that raises the cost of everyday exchange.  On the 
other hand, the benefits of a mix of cultures include the efficiency-raising 
complementarity of socio-economic skills in the economy (making a modernising 
division of labour easier), and the tendency to innovate and create new ways of 
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conducting business.153  This is where we need to turn to the case of the Cape, to gain 
more insight into this correlation between diversity and economic performance.
                                                 












Chapter Two: Diversity, Religion, and Economy at the Cape 
 
 At this point, a juxtaposition of the main points of the body of theory and 
empirical evidence discussed above, and the peculiar historical circumstances of the 
Cape Colony is useful.  Putting together the strands of extant work, we find that: 
 
• Human development encompasses both socio-economic and cultural-religious 
features, forming a holistic package of change based on enhancing choice. 
 
• Cultural and religious values matter in defining the path of development, the 
trajectories of change are recognisably shaped by cultural and religious 
heritage.  Discontinuities in the trajectories of individual components of the 
development package are common. 
 
• Religion and economic behaviour are linked in many ways, not least in 
situations of competition for both material and spiritual resources. 
 
• Economic and cultural change happens most easily in urban locations that are 
linked into international trade and colonial networks.  Cosmopolitan cities 
attract a diversity of worldviews. 
 
• Locations that attract a variety of cultures and religions develop into places of 
innovation and experimentation, but also conflict and friction.  Identity 
formation becomes an individual project, based on choice. 
 
• Individual identities in culturally diverse places can be multiple ones, to 
become primary according to circumstances, or hybrid, fused ones that create 
a creole society. 
 
• Diversity and creolisation can generate friction in a community, but can also 
enhance qualities of individualisation and innovation.  Economic behaviour 













1. Early Nineteenth Century Transition and Religion 
 
 How does the peculiar history of the Cape of Good Hope fit into this template?  
And is it relevant?  Let us look at the broad sweep of events over time.  Until the early 
nineteenth century, Cape society under VOC administration and early British rule had 
the recognisable characteristics of a slave society, although with important 
qualifications that set it apart from slave-based societies in the Americas or in the 
Arab world.  A rich literature on the features of the slave and settler society at the 
Cape has developed, identifying unique features such as (a) the unusual variety of 
geographical sources around the Indian Ocean littoral from which slaves were 
imported, (b) the fact that imported slaves, indigenous serfs and masters from a 
variety of ethnic and cultural backgrounds were thrown together in small polyglot 
groups, not in homogeneous plantations or estates, and (c) the reality that Cape Town 
was a colonial trading and resupply station since its inception, while the sparse 
communities in its wide-spread hinterland were leading a quite separate existence.1  
The literature indicates that social position in the spectrum of free persons and slaves 
was the key component of identities, providing a fairly stable hierarchy.  Despite the 
plethora of cultural, ethnic, racial, and religious groupings within the society of the 
port city, including thorough mixing and miscegenation that resulted in a broad 
spectrum of ethnic definitions, a cultural alternative to the social stratification was 
unlikely to be permitted while the society understood itself as slavery-based. 
 The loosening of the informal bondage of the indigenous Khoisan population 
by virtue of Ordinance 50 in 1828, and the formal emancipation of the slaves in 1834-
38 sealed the ongoing transition from a slave society to a more open, egalitarian one, 
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at least de jure.  A window opened for the construction of identities not circumscribed 
only by social status.  Although the de facto status of the previously bonded 
population did not immediately improve perceptibly, the mere opportunity to break 
out of the previous paradigm created a ferment of change.  As all necessary 
ingredients for a cultural melange had been in place for some time, merely awaiting 
the release from the slave-society straitjacket, the way was open for a vigorous shake 
of the kaleidoscope.  The Cape Colony’s 70,000 burghers of primarily European stock 
were now confronted by an amorphous group of 80,000 legally free people, consisting 
of newly freed ex-slaves, indigenous Khoisan aided by missionaries in asserting their 
independence, and mixed-race descendants of all population groups in the Colony.  
The expansion of the number of Christian denominations and the spread of Islam 
accelerated dramatically, taking advantage of the new freedom in the search for 
identity.  Experimentation with new creole identities accelerated in line with the 
fading of the old certainties of social hierarchy: the emergence of a “coloured” set of 
identities was taking shape, taking advantage of the temporary confusion of social 
classification accompanying the emancipation of the underclass.  A society looking 
for workable social distinctions was experimenting with different social techniques, 
without yet casting racial exclusivity in stone.  The expansion of the municipal non-
racial franchise lasted precariously for the second half of the nineteenth century, 
before being submerged in racial restrictions.2 By the end of the century, the window 
of egalitarianism and a liberal order had begun to close, as racial and ethnic 
background began to dominate the discourse.  Schools were segregated by 1905, the 
Coloured franchise in Cape Town was ended by 1910.  But let us look back at the 
basic ingredients for the creation of a hybrid society. 
 
Historical Origins in a Location of Migrants 
 
  Ancestry in a hybrid environment is notoriously difficult to trace.  The pot has 
been stirred, the ingredients have dissolved in the melting pot.  Nevertheless, the sheer 
weight of the historical discourse on what it means to be an inhabitant of the Cape 
demands a mention of origins.  The more than 60,000 slaves imported over time up to 
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the end of the slave trade in 1808 consisted of four about equal segments: those from 
the Indian subcontinent (primarily southern India and Bengal), those from the 
Indonesian archipelago, those from Madagascar, and those from East Africa 
(primarily Mozambique).3  The records of origin, of course, do not specify whether 
the slaves transported from an area actually were locals or whether they were just 
captured, purchased or loaded there.  Nevertheless, about half of the original imported 
slave population had a Southeast Asian background, and a good part of the rest a 
Malgasy one that retained strong elements of Asian heritage and language.  Within 
this Asian-flavoured total, the range and variety of traditions, appearance, and 
language must have been formidable.  Added to this mix was (1) the Cape population 
of indigenous Khoi and San, who by the early 1700s had already lost their traditional 
autochthonous identity under settler pressure and had become a bonded dispersed 
rural labour force; (2) the undesirable resisters of Dutch rule in the East Indies who 
were shipped to the Cape as exiles;  (3)“Prize Negroes” dumped at the Cape after 
being taken from non-British slavers; and (4) the European settlers and adventurers.4 
 Descendants of this mixed underclass took on the status of their mothers, 
resulting in a growing population of Cape-born slaves who had lost the immediate 
link to their origins and identified with their Cape home.  Gradual manumission of 
slaves created a group of urban “free blacks”, relations between Khoi, farm slaves, 
and settlers generated a mixed rural underclass.  Despite this progressive creolisation, 
Cape Town in the eighteenth century and well into the nineteenth must have had a 
distinctly Asian atmosphere, duplicating the Batavian model in the Dutch empire.  
The trademark conical hat of Muslim slaves with Asian heritage was not phased out 
until the mid-nineteenth century when the fez was introduced under Ottoman 
influence.5  Asian cuisine entered Cape eating habits through slave dominance of that 
“crucible of colonial identities – the kitchen”.6  The Asian, or more generally, Indian 
Ocean basin heritage remained a strong cultural marker in the consciousness of the 
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Cape Town population, explaining the resilience of the “Malay” label that was 
casually affixed to all (or, more accurately, to the Muslim) members of the urban 
mixed-race group,7 and existed as a sub-classification through most of the twentieth 
century (rural mixed-race people, where Khoisan heritage was more dominant, were 




 The clash of cultural concepts in the complex colonial situation at the Cape 
was formidable, and cultural flexibility by all parties was necessary for survival.  The 
cultural melange of the European contingent at the Cape during the VOC era already 
included Dutch, German, French, Scandinavian, and southern European ingredients.  
The traditional herder and hunter-gatherer societies of the Khoi and San indigenous 
inhabitants of the Western Cape had to come to terms both with the aggressive 
European presence and with the early introduction of Asian and other Indian Ocean 
slaves from a range of cultural backgrounds.  The beginning of the British period 
added a further European element in the form of British settlers and merchants, as 
well as a stronger interaction with the Nguni-speakers of the East and Northeast.  
Chinese, Arab, and Jewish arrivals added complexity, a kaleidoscope of seamen, 
adventurers, migrants and visitors transformed the port city and its immediate 
hinterland.  As in other teeming colonial cities of the European empires, a process of 
cultural mixing, miscegenation, and improvised identity formation was taking place – 
the origins of a creole society. 
 So how do we put the forces of creolisation to work in unravelling the cultural 
allegiances and everyday behaviour in the Mother City?  It is instructive to review the 
twists and turns of the search for identity after the demise of the VOC paradigm with 
its separation of society into the social groups of administrators, settlers, imported and 
Cape-born slaves, “free blacks”, and bonded indigenous Khoisan labourers.  The 
“coloured” concept has a colourful history, but fits well into the paradigm of a creole 
community where the part of the population with a more visibly mixed heritage feels 
a close cultural kinship with the dominant, less visibly mixed group, but also keenly 
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feels that it is not accepted as kin.  A love-hate relationship envelops the continuum of 
the White/Coloured community, opposition is voiced from the darker end of the 
spectrum but at the same time, aspirations to join the status of the lighter end are 
strong.  Right from the symbolic beginnings of the marriage of the Khoi chief’s 
daughter Eva/Krotoa to one of Jan van Riebeeck’s officials, and the mixed 
European/Indian parentage of governor Simon van der Stel,8 the Cape mixed-heritage 
community has been labouring under the prejudices expressed in the hoary joke that 
“God made the White man, God made the African, but Jan van Riebeeck made the 
Coloured”.9  A sense of embarrassment about past miscegenation, outrage about rape 
and sexual abuse of slave and serf women by settlers, is counterbalanced by the 
knowledge that the culturally closest community remains the white one.  The 
Coloured image is a slightly darker and lower-class version of the White. 
 The early nineteenth century brought with it uncertainty about social status.  
The regulated VOC social system where everyone knew where he or she stood even 
in an increasingly creolised Cape community, was fading away fast.  Already in the 
late eighteenth century, “moments of creolisation” were becoming more frequent, as 
locally born slaves started to outnumber imported ones.10  No clear “slave culture” 
had developed at the Cape as it had on plantations in the Americas – the origins of 
slaves in any given Cape location were too diverse, and the small numbers of slaves in 
any given household or on a farm were below the critical mass.11  Nevertheless, the 
shared experience of bondage had already started to create a feeling of common status 
between enserfed “Hottentots”, formally owned slaves, and manumitted slaves 
struggling to become economically and socially independent.  The coalescing of these 
groups into an ambiguous “Coloured” category was accelerated dramatically by 
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Ordinance 50 of 1828, granting the Khoisan theoretical legal equality with whites and 
freedom of movement, and by the emancipation of slaves throughout the British 
Empire in 1834/38.  In the vacuum left by the dismantled legal hierarchy, the reaction 
by the dominant European-stock elite was to reject the incorporation of this freshly 
independent client population in its circle, and to assign to it the label “Coloured”.  
The label was imposed, but also accepted by the affected groups.12 
 The coloured lower stratum of society was by no means the only one that was 
experiencing changes in identity.  "During the first half of the nineteenth century", 
Kirsten McKenzie summarises her findings on the Cape and Sydney, "colonists 
attempted to re-invent themselves and their society as respectable according to British 
cultural models that were themselves in flux, and to throw off the legacies of slavery 
and convict labour that marred their reputations".13  Indeed, as we shall see later, their 
reputations in Britain were quite poor, putting them in the company of incompetent 
and crude country cousins.  All this took place within the network of British colonial 
cities that was channelling British ideas, goods, and people throughout the empire: 
"The imperial network was above all a network of information.  It was held together 
by the movement of people and paper: publications from throughout the empire, 
private letters and endless official documentation.  What was gossip in Cape Town 
could soon become gossip in Sydney, Calcutta, or London".14  This was not trivial for 
identity formation: members of Cape society at all levels were forced to constantly 
strive for recognition and upward mobility, to avoid being excluded by the layer of 
society they were aspiring to.  Colonists of Dutch and other non-British ancestry were 
attempting to overcome the bias against them that was voiced by the British 
contingent in the society.  Frequent British barbs about the boorish nature of the Cape 
Dutch and their "creolised" Dutch language prodded the urban Dutch community into 
throwing in their lot with the new British dispensation, from building and fashion 
styles, to leisure pursuits and local politics.15  Creolisation moments even within the 
ruling elite proliferated rapidly. 
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 At the time of slave emancipation in 1834-38, an explosion of marriages to 
formalise hitherto informal cohabitation practices of the Cape underclass16 threw into 
sharp relief the high degree of inter-ethnic mixing that was taking place.  Muslim 
marriages took some time to be fully recognised by the authorities, but where the 
newly emancipated had a chance to obtain a Christian marriage, the picture in Cape 
Town was one of a melange of Asian, African and European stock.  The mixing 
reached into the higher levels of society, as slaves during the fading years of slavery 
at the Cape were emboldened to accuse masters of sexual improprieties and to openly 
claim rights for their children allegedly fathered by their owners.  Similarly, members 
of elite families could easily be drawn into the travails of their domestic slaves and 
servants, and thus run the risk of a loss of reputation.  The creation of a public 
scandal, placing respected members of the elite in embarrassing positions they had to 
explain away, drew all segments of the society into the creole melting pot.17 
 It is worthwhile noting here that at the time of slave emancipation, the Nguni-
speaking Xhosa, Sotho/Tswana, and Zulu societies to the East and North of the 
Colony (the "Caffer", "Zoola", "Bechuana", later “Native” or “Bantu” categories in 
the  colonial racial dispensation) were, with a few exceptions, still outside the Cape 
polity.  For purposes of social differentiation within the Cape Colony, “White” and 
“Coloured” was all that was needed to keep ex-slaves, Khoisan and descendants of 
“free blacks” in their place.  “Black” in this context merely meant “non-European”.  
As the Colony and white settlement expanded eastwards and northwards through 
settler encroachment, frontier wars and treks, new indigenous African societies were 
incorporated, but their individual members only slowly found their way to the Cape.  
Similarly, the trickle of “prize Negroes”,  mainly African slaves on non-British 
slaving ships that had been captured by the British navy after the abolition of the slave 
trade in 1808 and settled at the Cape as "apprentices", added to the population mix 
gradually.18  Until the late nineteenth century, neither the Colonial authorities and the 
white establishment, nor the non-white population saw any reason to discard the 
convenient Coloured designation for the non-white underclass.  At the Cape, in 
contrast to the post-Trek Boer republics of the North, the franchise and a role in 
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representative government was granted to this underclass by mid-century, so that for a 
time, racial discrimination was informally social and cultural rather than overtly 
political. Subgroups of the large Coloured population found religious niches, such as 
the fast-growing Muslim community that started to be described as “Malay” in 
remembrance of its slave past,19 or the Christian communities of Khoisan and 
displaced ex-slaves at Moravian and LMS mission stations in the interior.20  During 
this period of the nineteenth century, we can see the beginnings of various creole 
identities taking shape, not necessarily defined strictly by race but also by other 
cultural influences. 
 In fact, race was not a determining marker of social status in early nineteenth 
century Cape Town.  In the transition from the hierarchy of a slave society, where the 
distinctions were clearly between free and slave, the differences were increasingly 
articulated in terms of income and religion.  The all-important status marker of 
morality and marriage was linked primarily to these two variables, making racial 
origin, if not too obvious, a secondary issue.  Innuendo about being "off-colour" did 
not necessarily impede upward mobility for the determined ones who were 
economically successful.  It was until well into the late decades of the nineteenth 
century that Capetonians with a significant non-white heritage could still "pass for 
white" if they could demonstrate cultural affinity, the right marriage, and sufficient 
income: "many people slightly but still unmistakably off-coloured have made their 
way into the higher ranks of society and are freely admitted to respectable situations 
and intermarriage with respectable families".21  While intermarriage between various 
races was primarily a phenomenon of low-income groups in Cape Town (free blacks, 
slaves, poor whites, and indigenous Khoi mixing freely and both legally and 
informally), it was acceptable for persons with a mixed-race heritage but already good 
social status to marry members of the white elite.  Hamilton Ross, an ambitious 
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newly-arrived  British captain who rose to become one of the pre-eminent merchants 
of Cape Town, married Catharina van den Bergh, the great-granddaughter of an 
emancipated slave and member of an established Cape family.22 
  While lifestyle and similar economic status blurred the differences between 
slaves and free citizens at the bottom end of the income ladder, religion created new 
combinations there.  The rise of Islam as an alternative to the dominant Christian 
dispensation (see below) threw together slaves and free, Asian and black in a local 
ummah of believers that provided mutual support in terms of accepted marriage ritual, 
support for the indigent, and a path to education otherwise closed to the underclass.  
Within a decade after 1810, only 86 slaves had been baptized at the Cape despite 
vigorous Christian mission, but more than 1300 slaves had converted to Islam, 
bringing the Muslim population of Cape Town to 3000 in 1822, and to almost 6500 in 
1839, a third of the urban population.23  Muslim slave owners were perceived as more 
benign than Christian ones towards their Muslim slaves, and the chance for 
manumission was greater.  The ownership of slaves, as well as other property such as 
small businesses and real estate, propelled Muslim free blacks into the lower middle 
class of Cape Town, on an equal footing with others.  Similarly, skilled slaves who 
were allowed to hire themselves out could earn the same wages as free white or 
coloured specialists in the same craft.24  
 The creolisation occurring by the rise of Islam counteracted to a certain extent 
the creolisation brought about by similar economic status in the same income group.  
While the work and leisure activities of all lower-income ethnic groups tended to 
converge, alcohol consumption and street entertainment being the common ways to 
relieve the stress of manual work, the Muslim community tried to promote sobriety, 
education, and a pious life.25  The mixed-race slave or free labourer had common 
economic and recreation interests with the white sailor on shore leave, and the Khoi 
rural labourer visiting the town, but as a mixed-race Muslim he adhered to the same 
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principles of the faith community that the "Malay" imam proclaimed.  Multiple 
creolizations and identity formations were taking place in a time of change. 
 
The Power of Language 
 
 At the Cape, the early dominance of the Dutch colonial presence and the 
strong Indian Ocean origins of the slave population determined the birth of a creole 
language par excellence, Afrikaans.  Attempts by purist white linguists of the late 
nineteenth century to cleanse this language of its creole features and re-invent it as a 
quaint Flemish dialect could not disguise the fact that it originated as a lingua franca 
of a polyglot colonial environment, and that it owes its early development primarily to 
slaves.26  It was only in the post-apartheid era, after the white supremacist bias in 
linguistics had been removed, that research into the creole roots of Afrikaans was 
fully recognised.  “True Afrikaans…was the language of the Coloureds in the first 
half of the nineteenth century”,27 the result of a creolisation process that had started 
much earlier.  It takes its place alongside other Dutch-based Creoles, such as the 
Negerhollands or Papiamento of Curacao.28 
 Between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries, a Portuguese-based Creole was 
the common trading language throughout the Portuguese empire, a feature that earned 
it the distinction as a possible common source of all Creoles.  In the Indian Ocean 
littoral, the source of most Cape slaves, it was accompanied by a Malay Creole or 
Melayu, or meshed with it as Malayo-Portuguese. Both were introduced at the Cape 
with slave shipments.29  Specific languages of the Indonesian archipelago (Buginese, 
Macassarese, Javanese) were not of much use for the slaves dispersed in small 
polyglot groups in Cape households and on isolated farms.  The communication 
between master and slaves, and between slaves, had to take place in a medium that 
could be understood by all.  As there was no escape from the situation that all parties 
to the master/slave relationship found themselves in, a distinctive identity, driven by 
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language and social status, was born of necessity among the non-whites.30  From 
fragments of Portuguese Creole, Melayu, Malay dialects, Khoi languages, and the 
household Dutch/German of the masters, a common pidgin language emerged.31  The 
master’s family was drawn into the use of this language by the need to give 
instructions, understand problems, and keep up with the slave household.  This proto-
Afrikaans as pidgin is already recorded around 1700, and had developed fully as an 
independent Creole by the 1750s, spoken as a vernacular across the colour spectrum.32   
 Naturally, High Dutch remained the official language at the Cape up to and 
well into the British era, but apart from official business, the population 
communicated in a range of Creoles, i.e. in High, Country, Malay, Khoi, and Nguni 
versions of Afrikaans.  Kaapse Afrikaans and Oosgrensafrikaans were in evidence 
since the early 1700s, and Oranjerivierafrikaans had reached the northern frontier by 
1800.33  Apart from the blood bonds between settlers, slaves, and indigenous people, a 
linguistic bond had developed that set the whole Cape population apart from the 
colonial centre:  the identity of the creole location was forming.  Typical Malay forms 
of syntax, Khoi-isms in vowel changes, Arabic forms in religious language, and the 
use of Indonesian fable metaphors are evidence of early creolisation of the Dutch 
base.34  The new Creole was useful in reinforcing the identities of sub-groups as well:  
the Muslim community had retained Arabic for the Qu’ran and Malay for religious 
instruction, but as the new creole Afrikaans took over public discourse, it was used to 
translate Arabic and Malay religious texts, and was recorded in Arabic script.  The 
earliest written Afrikaans documents in Arabic script date from around 1800, and are 
frequent around mid-nineteenth century, well before the efforts from the 1860s 
onwards to “clean up” Afrikaans as a white language.35 
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 The memory of slavery and emancipation left a deep mark in popular tradition 
and culture at the Cape.  The slave ancestry was commemorated by ex-slaves and 
their descendants in parades and festivities in December, the time of emancipation.  
Gratitude for the British role in the abolition of slavery expressed itself in 
Anglophilism, the shared memory was a key identity driver that recalled the similar 
social status of slaves, Khoisan, and free blacks.  The New Year celebrations, similar 
symbolic occasions to commemorate the liberation from bondage, grew into a popular 
manifestation of a creole culture that rejoiced in its slave heritage.36  District Six of 
Cape Town, the archetype of the creole location, eventually became the fount of these 
celebrations of a hybrid, cosmopolitan and inclusive outlook on life, recalling the 
marginalized slave past and simultaneously absorbing new entrants into the creole 
mix like a sponge.  It needs to be noted that this was not merely an escape mechanism 
to forget the daily social exclusion from “respectable” Cape society:  it was and again 
is an outward signal that identity formation is going on by popular choice.37  This 
combines elements of racial mixing, syncretism in renegotiating traditions, an 
amalgam of European, African, and Asian heritage, fusion music and fusion cuisine, a 
polyglot patois, and an explicit resistance against imposed identities, expressed by 
puncturing presumptions of superiority.38 
 A good example of the absorptive capacity of the creole community is the 
integration of American “blackface” minstrel entertainment into the Cape Town 
genius loci.  Since 1848, American minstrel groups toured the Cape to much acclaim, 
spawning imitators who eventually metamorphosed into the "Cape Town Coon" clubs 
who became the central part of New Year parades and competitions.  Notwithstanding 
the fact that minstrel shows and the word “coon” itself have long been eliminated 
from acceptable American popular culture as insulting and highly politically 
incorrect, the Cape creole community cheerfully accepted them stripped of their 
historical baggage as a vehicle of identity and pure entertainment.  The original 
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nineteenth-century American caricature of the “coon” as a laughably awkward or 
cunning black slave was not only an insult, but also a deeply ambiguous figure used 
by the black community for self-ridicule and introspection.  The Cape Coon has 
retained some of the ambiguity and self-ridicule, but has also turned the concept into a 
vehicle of pride in own achievement against the odds.39  Music, dance and song have 
been traditional outlets for those in bondage, and at the Cape they served to create 
common identities from the early Khoisan flute players observed by Vasco da Gama 
at Mossel Bay in 1497, through slave orchestras and farm dances of the eighteenth 
century, to the Karoo guitar players and Cape Town jazz virtuosos of today.40  We 
will look in vain for purity:  boeremusiek of the descendants of Dutch settlers is 
related to the krontjong of Java, Cape Muslim “Malay Choirs” in western suit and 
Turkish fez sing old Dutch nederlandseliedjies, punctuated by Asian-inspired karinkel 
vowel modulation, and elements of South Indian and Bengali music and dance are 
discernible in the work of Cape creole ghoema musicians.41  Popular culture shaped 
identities powerfully. 
 Is all of this popular music secular, or does some of it reflect religious roots?  
The elements of Indian music in the Cape kaleidoscope undoubtedly have origins in 
sacred classical music.  Similarly, the Cape Malay choirs saw themselves as informed 
by the Muslim popular tradition of the Cape.  Unscrambling the multiple sources of 
the creole popular culture of Cape Town that was taking shape in the nineteenth 
century may prove to be impossible, but it illustrates the post-Weberian mix of secular 
and religious, disenchanted and re-enchanted culture.  The mere fact of choice and 
syncretism in the culture of the Cape street defined a society in flux, a "secular" 
framework in the Taylor sense that embraces multiple entwined expressions of the 
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Religion in the Mix 
 
 The nineteenth century era of formation of identities in Cape Town, largely 
coinciding with the early Victorian era in British imperial terms, has attracted its share 
of academic attention, focusing on the various manifestations of “coloured” identities 
and how they influenced the Cape society as a whole.42  Much of the literature is 
preoccupied with determining whether “race” or “class” were the dominant drivers of 
this period of social and cultural change.  What has been neglected here to a certain 
extent is the role of religion in the mix.  An understandable omission, perhaps, as the 
Dutch eighteenth century at the Cape was characterised by a relatively insignificant 
role of the monopolistic Dutch Reformed Church, which was restricted to the colonial 
elite and subservient to the VOC.  However, the explosion of Christian missionary 
activity and Islamic conversion from the turn of the century onwards changed the 
cultural environment considerably, to the extent that the South African Commercial 
Advertiser could editorialise in 1836 that “the main distinction in Cape society is 
religious”.43  Around 1840, Cape Town’s 15,000 Dutch Reformed adherents were 
living together with about 9,000 assorted other Protestant denomination members, and 
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with about 6,500 Muslims.44  By mid-century, a sizeable Jewish community had also 
established itself, the first synagogue being built in 1841.  Several authors have 
conceded that work on the nexus between culture/religion and socio-economic 
patterns should be examined more closely, and that focusing on race and class issues 
alone is not enough to provide a fuller picture of the nineteenth century.45 
 The literature that has dealt with the evolution of the pattern of faiths at the 
Cape has mostly concentrated on the narrative of each faith, and on the issue of 
competition in the spiritual market between various flavours of Christianity, Islam, 
and indigenous worldviews. Little is available in the secondary literature on the 
potential relationship between this process and socio-economic development during 
the nineteenth century.46  Given the rapid expansion of various religious allegiances 
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during the early decades of the century, it would be surprising if there were no 
connection between this and other processes of change taking place simultaneously.  
We will note the correlation between religious and economic behaviour when dealing 
with the public discourse at the Cape below. 
 The eighteenth century had prepared the ground for the expansion.  While the 
established Dutch Reformed Church had not seen outreach to the Khoisan and slaves 
as a priority, early Moravian mission work was resurrected at the end of the century, 
and pursued vigorously, soon to be followed by the London Missionary Society 
(LMS) and other non-Dutch-Reformed denominations.  Apart from the establishment 
of mission stations among the rural Khoi and on the eastern frontier of the Colony, the 
LMS and others attempted to penetrate the slave and free black population in Cape 
Town itself.  Here, however, Christian mission efforts met an expanding Muslim 
community that had quietly existed in the circles around the imams exiled from the 
Dutch East Indies, and had built up a critical mass among the non-white population in 
the city. Settler resistance to converting slaves to Christianity was strong, as late 
eighteenth-century regulations implied that Christian slaves could not be resold, an 
incentive for the slave owners to push slaves towards Islam instead.47  The arrivals of 
senior Muslims exiled from the East Indies since the seventeenth century had created 
cells of Islamic knowledge around respected imams such as Sheikh Yusuf around 
1700, or Tuan Guru in the late 1700s, but slave conversions to Islam only started 
taking off around 1800, when the urban concentration of Muslims in the Bo-Kaap 
district necessitated the establishment of an Islamic school and mosque.48  As a result, 
Cape Town in the early 19th century experienced a race for slave and free-black souls, 
acted out in the competition between Muslim and Christian educational institutions.49  
By the 1840s, 25 LMS mission schools were operating in Cape Town, side by side 
with an increasing number of Muslim madaris.  Religious diversity had arrived in 
time to attract the spiritual drifters seeking identity after the threshold decade of 
emancipation 1828-38. 
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 This threshold period set off an influx into the two faiths at the Cape, as the 
destabilized “Coloured” citizenry was seeking cultural identity and spiritual security.  
Islam still had the better image among ex-slaves in the urban area, as there was a 
record of reasonably benign regimes and frequent manumissions by Muslim slave 
owners.  Christian missions outside Cape Town made up for lost ground, however, 
and the rural mission stations became known as havens of dignity that provided some 
protection for the Khoi against rapacious settlers.50  In Cape Town proper, the 
strenuous efforts of the London Mission Society, and the more modest ones of the 
South African Mission Society were countered by strong cohesion in the Muslim 
community, reducing the missionary effort to a “general mission to Coloured people”, 
focusing on East African prize negroes, and heavily relying on educational 
establishments.  By the 1840s, a Coloured LMS congregation was operating in Cape 
Town.51 
  While the rural expansion of Christianity at the Cape had the character of 
planting homogeneous new communities as a single local escape option for the 
indigenous Khoi who had been enserfed by and excluded from the religion of their 
masters, the urban dynamic was quite different.  In Cape Town, a variety of British 
Protestant denominations vied with the surging Muslim community for recruits and 
pupils among the slave and free black population.  This vigorous competition was 
conducted in a quite orderly manner, subject to the oversight of the colonial 
administration.  A number of features of this process make it likely that we are 
dealing with a form of rational choice in religious adherence.  Undoubtedly, the 
nature of the competition between the faiths indicates that the targeted individuals 
were asked to decide rationally which religious affiliation they would choose.  
Secondly, the potential consumers of spiritual benefits were not only looking for 
social comfort, but were also seeking a genuine set of spiritual rewards that would 
ease their difficult lives.52  Third, they were weighing carefully the costs involved in 
joining a faith community, and the benefits that would accrue to them in genuine 
community support in times of hardship:  the Muslim community offered a clearer 
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prospect of active help by their co-religionists than the white-dominated Christian 
denominations.   Education of their children was a strong variable, leading to the 
peculiar phenomenon of a hybrid education, where knowledge of basic secular 
subjects was acquired in secular or Christian schools, after which pupils were 
switched to Muslim religious schools for a cultural finishing education.  The social 
and religious capital that was to be accrued was assessed carefully. 
 The Dutch Reformed Church (NGK), having come to the party rather lately, 
had also had some success in capturing the post-emancipation spiritual drifters, 
starting the future close link between the “Coloured” group and the Dutch Reformed 
tradition.  Nevertheless, it managed to alienate them rapidly, as segregation within the 
church started early.  Separate communion led to separate buildings and services, and 
to the spinning off of the Coloured membership into the “Mission Church” (NGSK) in 
188053.  As the social and political status of “Coloureds” deteriorated at the Cape, the 
NGSK membership, financially and pastorally dependent on the NGK, watched 
helplessly as the NGK became the champion of increasing public segregation.   
 Those who had chosen Islam had no such loyalty problems.  The Muslim 
community thrived on its construction of coinciding identities of faith, Malay 
tradition, slave heritage, and Afrikaans language.  The spiritual and ethnic identities 
had served as mutually reinforcing separatist vehicles, distancing the life of the slave 
and ex-slave from dependence on the white masters’ culture.  There even was the 
quiet satisfaction that the masters’ language was actually shaped by the slaves’ early 
Islamic literature.  The early gains of Islam in the nineteenth century were eventually 
erased by a vigorous Christian mission freed from the association with slavery,54 but 
Islam was in Cape Town to stay.  During the early expansion, unorthodox Muslim 
rituals were used as promotions of Islam among the urban creole population that was 
easily distracted by other identity drivers:  Ratiep (Khalifa), a sword and trance 
dancing ritual to drum rhythms probably derived from Southeast Asian sufi practices, 
and the Rampie-Sny, a ladies’ event of cutting orange leaves in the mosque on the 
birthday of the Prophet, made some impression even on the white urban population, 
but eventually could not reverse the deterioration of an exclusive identity in a creole 
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environment.55  Muslim sobriety had always been valued by slave owners, employers 
and prospective spouses,56 and served to maintain a community spirit that insulated 
the community against the more raucous features of cultural mixing in the Mother 
City. 
 In a creole environment administered by a colonial elite, the choice of 
religious affiliation is of course a socio-political act, as well as one arrived at after 
spiritual reflection.  Choosing Christianity was an “assimilationist” statement, 
expressing the aspiration to join the respectable end of the colonial spectrum, similar 
to the choice of English as main idiom.57  Conversely, choosing Islam can be 
interpreted as a deliberately “non-assimilationist” act that demonstrates the desire to 
differentiate oneself from the colonial masters, as is the continued use of Kaapse 
Afrikaans, derived from the early lingua franca of the slaves.  So was the choice of 
religion just a social strategy for the newly emancipated and enfranchised urban 
underclass?  Not necessarily.  Family traditions, peer influence, and rational 
comparison of the spiritual goods on offer were likely to be other components in 
individual decisions.58  Both the social and spiritual motives probably were at play in 
the conversion competition at the Cape.  In Cape Town itself, the Bo-Kaap, distinct 
from the kaleidoscopic Kanaldorp (later District Six), solidified its self-understanding 
as a Muslim community, dubbed “Malay” by outside observers.  Both religious paths, 
Christian and Muslim, promised some upward social mobility: Islam had potential as 
an asset of a desirably sober and industrious potential spouse or employee, and as a 
cohesive, egalitarian community; a Christian education, whether Dutch Reformed or 
British, could open doors to an improved social standing and to upward mobility in 
Colonial society. 
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Missionaries and Imams 
 
 We need to step back at this point and consider the nature of the religious 
protagonists and their targets in the early nineteenth century Cape.  The fervour of the 
European Christian revivalism of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries 
swept into an unstable spiritual environment, ready for new stimuli.  Informed by the 
Enlightenment, by a reconsideration of basic values of personal Christian belief, by 
the focus on individual liberty and equality emanating from the American and French 
revolutions, and by the globalisation of the Imperial world economy, Protestant 
churches had launched a missionary wave to the colonies.  Where they encountered 
traditional societies that had preserved a modicum of stability and independence (such 
as the Xhosa or the Tswana), the early missionary effort proved to be slow and 
difficult.  In the Western Cape, however, the fading away of the traditional indigenous 
Khoi and San cultures (Khoisan as a handy anthropological shorthand), and the lack 
of a unifying slave culture provided a fertile and receptive ground,59 although 
contested by Islam in the urban area. 
 Within the spectrum of roles that the early Christian missions found 
themselves in, the role as a helping hand to survive in the new environment turned out 
to be the dominant one.  While many missionaries, in the spirit of the times, may have 
pursued their activity driven by the desire to “civilise the natives”, they nevertheless 
managed to equip many Khoisan and post-emancipation slaves with the skills they 
needed to survive in their new world.  Whether deliberately or unwittingly, the 
missionaries enabled the disenfranchised of the Cape to use the missions’ offerings 
wisely, selectively and productively to build a life within the parameters of early 
nineteenth century colonial society.60 
 On the receiving end, the Khoi of the beginning nineteenth century were 
merely a shadow of their former selves.  If not absorbed in the colonist expansion, 
they were pushed to the periphery of the colony, fighting a rearguard action against 
superior adversaries.61  Atomised into settler society as farm labourers, they had lost 
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the spiritual anchor of  traditional religion and community ritual.  Not that their 
religious traditions would have helped them much in the new environment:  the more 
cyclical, nature-driven Khoi and San religion that was well adapted to the ebb and 
flow of seasons, hunting/gathering, and transhumance,62 was no match for the linear, 
eschatological philosophy that drove the colonists.  Recollections of the key elements 
of the Khoi religion (a benevolent supreme being, a devilish counterforce) and San 
beliefs (a trickster god, shamanism) would later make the acceptance of Christianity 
easier.  In the meantime, before the advent of the main mission impact, a spiritual 
void opened up for the uprooted Khoisan community:  although they were casual 
observers of the simple settler Christianity on the farms, they were discouraged from 
penetrating into the community of believers.  Docile and spiritually rootless labour 
was preferable from a master’s point of view. 
 The slaves at the Cape found themselves in a similar spiritual limbo.  Thrown 
together from a wide variety of cultures around the Indian Ocean, and parcelled out 
into units that did not have the critical mass for establishing a common identity, there 
was little opportunity to get spiritual satisfaction before Islam made an impact.  As it 
was not in the interest of masters to encourage a strong spiritual bedrock among the 
slave population, and as it was perceived to be increasingly difficult to sell slaves that 
had been baptized, Christianity made little headway.  Exceptions were master-slave 
sexual relationships that led to baptism and manumission of slave women and the 
children of such unions, and the VOC policy to baptize children of women in its slave 
lodge.  Resentment of their bondage position prevented slaves from embracing the 
master’s religion, and made the emerging force of Islam more attractive.  Large-scale 
and in-depth conversion of slaves to Christianity would have to wait until close to 
emancipation. 
 Off to the side, observing the missionary effort with some apprehension, were 
the established authorities of the day, and the established European colonists.  The 
VOC, and after 1795 the Batavian and British administrations, placed high priority on 
the maintenance of the maximum possible degree of law and order – not an easy task 
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in a colony dominated by a rowdy port of call and by rebellious settlers in both the 
agricultural and ranching sections of the territory.  In trying to subdue the indigenous 
population, the imported slaves, and the more unruly colonists, the authorities 
welcomed assistance from missionaries who preached an obedient and industrious 
life, but looked askance at loose-cannon “turbulent priests” who questioned the 
colonial paradigm of a subservient and disenfranchised local population.   Legitimacy 
and continuity of the established order was also uppermost in the minds of the free 
burghers, who reacted angrily to any challenge to the convenient status quo in labour 
relations.  An illiterate working population without much access to redress of injustice 
appeared to be preferable to any social outreach. 
 
The Roots of Cape Islam 
 
 Two features set Cape Islam aside from the Islam as practiced in Muslim-
majority societies of the Middle East:  (1) the origin of the people and ideas that 
arrived at the Cape in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; and (2) the nature of 
Islam as a minority religion in a diverse urban area.  Both have contributed to a 
flexible, adaptable popular version of Islam that is not burdened by the 
responsibilities of established religion, and that focuses on the spiritual rather than on 
the legal.  First, the origins.  As we have seen above, Islam was carried to the Cape by 
slaves and exiles imported by the Dutch authorities from the Indian Ocean littoral, the 
main sources being the Malay/Indonesian archipelago, Bengal, and the Malabar and 
Coromandel coasts of southern India (collectively, the origin locations of about 50% 
of foreign-born Cape slaves).63  Early leaders of the Cape Muslim tradition such as 
Sheikh Yusuf and Tuan Guru were distinguished imams exiled from the Indonesian 
archipelago.  While this fact, and a backward extrapolation from the nineteenth 
century usually yields the claim that Cape Islam has been built on a predominantly 
Shafi'i basis, the variety of geographical sources suggests that early Cape Islam may 
also have had strong Hanafi and even syncretist components.  Slaves from Bengal, 
later prominent in the Cape Muslim community, may have been formed more by 
                                                 












Hanafi and even Shi'a schools of Islamic thought.64  Diversity seems to have been 
more likely than uniformity. 
 Overall, a strong Sufi flavour imbued Islam at the Cape.  Saints and holy men 
played a big role and their shrines encircling Cape Town are much visited even today.  
Non-political and pietist Sufi orders such as the Chistiyya and Qadariyya had a large 
following, and syncretist mystical rituals were popular.65  The ratiep ritual of trance 
dancing and self-piercing, much commented on by baffled European observers,  has 
its origin in the Indonesian Sufi practice associated with the Rifa'iyyah tariqa.66  The 
geographical origins of Cape Islam explain this.  Indonesian and South Indian Islam 
was built by Arab and north Indian (Gujarati) merchants setting up trading posts in the 
coastal towns of the eastern Indian Ocean from the thirteenth to the sixteenth century, 
not by conquest.67   The time of the expansion coincided with the rise to prominence 
of Sufism in the Muslim world, thus spreading a less austere version of the faith than 
that prevailing in the Muslim heartland.  Travelling traders and Sufi sages could not 
impose an Islamic legal framework on the societies they encountered, but had to 
establish a foothold to practice their religion.  Conversion of local leaders and the 
general population came gradually and voluntarily, not by imposition and authority as 
had happened in northern India conquered by Muslim armies.  This pragmatic 
"merchant religion" was superimposed on a strong Hindu-Buddhist cultural base, 
aided by the readiness of the Sufi tariqas to absorb other mystical traditions.   "In 
Indonesia, Islam did not construct a civilization, it appropriated one".68  In addition, 
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the Islam arriving in the Indonesian archipelago had already been filtered through 
India, acquiring the pragmatic features of the Indian merchant class and a strong Sufi 
flavour.  The indigenous elite combined the Indic tradition with a mystical version of 
Islam, the peasant population incorporated Islam into their long-standing "Southeast 
Asian folk religion", and the multicultural traders in the ports produced an Islam "not 
quite doctrinal enough to be Middle Eastern, and not quite ethereal enough to be 
South Asian".69  In a nutshell, "the Islam of Indonesia has been full of heterodoxy and 
heresy",70 if viewed from the Middle Eastern bastions of orthodoxy.  South Indian 
Muslims in Malaya, as well as the Buginese and Acehnese in the islands (key origin 
areas of Cape Muslims), developed an Islam based on their disciplined and rational 
approach to business, drawing on the Qur'anic injunction that a man who succeeds to 
acquire wealth through honest and diligent effort is favoured by God.  The economic 
ethic was one of striving for success.71  This was the syncretic Islam that arrived at the 
Cape with Indonesian/Malay exiles and slaves on board Dutch ships. 
 In India as well, Sufism was the dominant way of expanding Islam.72  Sufi 
orders such as the Chistiyya tariqa taught a non-established private faith, and Sufi 
mystics promoted a hierarchy of saints and the veneration of their tombs.  The Sufi 
master Ibn al-Arabi's principle of the "unity of being" informed Indian Islam, 
fostering the belief that spiritual attitude trumped laws and practices.  A mixed Hindu-
Muslim culture enveloped the practitioners.  Only by 1600 AD, with the entrenchment 
of  widespread Mughal dominance over northern India, did the syncretist and mystical 
influence recede, to be replaced by the more established and shari'a-minded reign of 
the ulema.  Nevertheless, Sufi features remained important in Indian Islam.  "In India, 
the various forms of ulema scholarship, worship of saints, and reformist tendencies 
remained in open competition with each other,....the legacy of pre-modern Indian 
Islamic organization was not state control of doctrine...nor a history of well-
established schools of law and ulema, but one of numerous autonomous and 
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competitive Muslim religious movements".73  In Bengal, Sufi writers used Hindu 
literature to create a fusion of faiths. 
 It was from these locations of diversity, syncretist beliefs, merchant 
pragmatism, and the awareness of competing worldviews that the pioneers of Cape 
Islam arrived.  The religious principles they handed on to their successors contained 
these same features, giving Cape Islam its unique flavour.74  Shaykh Yusuf, exiled 
from Batavia in the late seventeenth century, introduced the Ash'arite principles of 
predetermination, the will of God trumping the "acquired" human free will, and the 
primacy of personal piety.  This basis enabled the eighteenth and nineteenth century 
Islam at the Cape to survive pragmatically and discreetly in the colonial society it was 
embedded in.  The Ash'arite dogma and Shafi'i legal school were further entrenched at 
the Cape by Tuan Guru of Tidore whose religious texts became standard reading from 
the end of the eighteenth century onwards.  The principles promoted were "rational-
traditionalist" ones, conducive to Islam becoming a private religion of the individual: 
submission and piety were key, man's station in life was predetermined, private 
choice between good and evil was the norm.  Change was to be achieved by an appeal 
to God, not by radical action.  The only resistance to secular authorities that was 
encouraged was against secular rules that would inhibit religious practices.  The Cape 
Muslim community by and large adhered to these rules until the twentieth century.  
 By the early nineteenth century, the Muslim community in Cape Town 
numbered about 6,000 persons, rising to perhaps 12-14,000 by the 1860s.75  In 1822, 
about 85% of free blacks in the urban area, and almost 20% of the slaves, were 
Muslims.  Being the religion of slaves, labourers and skilled craftsmen who did not 
have the means to communicate or travel internationally, Islam at the Cape was 
isolated from the centres of Muslim learning and perpetuated itself by informal 
transfer of knowledge between generations of home-grown imams.  Few of them 
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managed to complete the hajj, the obligatory pilgrimage to Mecca.76  The original 
forms of popular Islam were preserved much as they were imported from South and 
Southeast Asia.  Imams were often only part-time leaders of the community, earning 
their livelihood as craftsmen, fishermen, or small traders, and distinguishing 
themselves by a clearer understanding of Qur'anic learning than others, or by descent 
from earlier imams.  As guides of a minority religious community, and a subservient, 
marginal one at that, the Muslim leaders at the Cape learned to play the colonial 
system to their advantage, sidelining the establishmentarian and legal aspects of 
Islam, and stressing the ethical and moral precepts that would guide believers in the 
colonial environment.  Since the eighteenth century, Cape Islam was a "ceremonial", 
non-political private religion, more an expression of a cultural identity than a formal 
institution.77 
 The insularity of Cape Islam was broken occasionally by contacts with the 
Swahili coast, and by travel to Mecca to perform the hajj for those who could afford 
it.  In 1820, it was reported that "several distinguished Arabs from the island of 
Joanna" (Anjouan island) were visiting Cape Town and received an official welcome 
by the Cape government and by the local Muslim community.  In 1841, the 
newspaper reported that the "sons of Duke Abdallah Abbas of Johanna" were stranded 
at the Cape.  Their father's onward journey had been financed by the Cape 
government, but the paper appealed to the Cape merchants to finance the sons' 
passage to Mauritius. The fact that these dignitaries were Muslims was irrelevant. 78  
 By the 1850s, contacts with the Ottoman empire had increased: de Roubaix, 
the champion of the Muslims in the colonial administration's Legislative Council at 
mid-century, had established good contacts with Istanbul, and arranged not only for 
monetary contributions but also for imam Abu Bakr Effendi to be deployed to Cape 
Town to try to sort out the infighting in the Muslim community.  As a result, the 
Ottoman Sultan enjoyed great popularity among Cape Muslims as guardian of the 
faith and of their interests, and his birthday was celebrated boisterously, city 
employers granting a day off for their Muslim employees.  In return, the Sultan sent 
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word to the Cape that Muslims should "estimate the advantages of British rule under 
which they so happily live".  The Muslims, about half of Cape Town's population at 
mid-century, followed this instruction: they were considered to be highly loyal 
citizens with a "Europeanized" culture, and were praised for having volunteered to 
defend the government of the day (Dutch or British) from the Napoleonic wars to the 
Xhosa wars on the Eastern Frontier.  Muslim weddings and youth initiation 
ceremonies at the mosques were routinely attended by Christians, who also joined in 
the celebrations of the Sultan's birthday.  English girls were happily converting in 
order to marry Muslim spouses.  From the beginning, the Muslims and Christians of 
Cape Town had found a modus vivendi to compete but live side by side.79 
 Pragmatism and flexibility to adapt to the religiously competitive 
circumstances was the order of the day, an approach that was winning converts among 
the Cape underclass rapidly.  A large number of "free blacks" and higher-skilled 
slaves were Muslim, giving the community a higher status than mere labourers.  
Already in the first decade of the1800s, the Cape Town fire brigades were manned 
exclusively by about 350 free Muslims.80  Among the 5,000 or so "prize negroes" 
landed and apprenticed at the Cape after the ban on the slave trade in 1808, Islam fell 
on fertile ground, and by the 1820s they constituted perhaps half of the Muslim 
population of Cape Town.81  Similarly, education in the new madaris, the Qur'an 
schools established by the imams was a strong drawing card for families.  Islam gave 
the Christian missionaries a run for their money, and was significantly more 
successful in proselytizing in the urban area.  The leadership knew where to draw the 
line, however.  When the khalifa rituals came to be seen as a public nuisance and an 
alarmingly exotic feature of Cape Islam by the 1850s, the imams first tried to petition 
the government to allow a continuation.  Negotiations mediated by the ever-present de 
Roubaix, however, resulted in a supremely pragmatic ruling by the imams that the 
ritual was not really an essential part of the faith, and thus could be abandoned.  The 
Sultan conveyed his approval.  Face was saved all around, and everybody could return 
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to the "quiet regularity of life" prized by all Capetonians.82  Islamic orthodoxy, or 
long-established rituals, would not stand in the way of accommodation. 
 
Sources of Christian Mission 
 
Occupying the spiritual market as monopolists since the inception of the 
colony, the Dutch Reformed Church (NGK) saw its primary role as ministering to the 
officials and colonists, rather than in missionary outreach.  However, recent analysis83 
seems to indicate that the NGK practice at the Cape deviated significantly from the 
hypothetical concept of a “rigid Calvinism”, and even from the more relaxed and 
inclusive version practiced in Batavia.  A case can be made that a somewhat 
haphazard and messy interpretation of Calvinist doctrine was prevalent at the Cape, 
resulting in fairly liberal baptismal practice that created token Calvinists among 
whites and non-whites, but restricting proper church membership to a small and 
exclusive fraction of the white population.  Nevertheless, a simplified version of 
traditional Calvinist doctrine prevailed among the colonists, who missed the boat of 
the Continuing Reformation strand of Calvinism in the Netherlands:  this, eventually 
victorious theology allowed for all humankind to be eligible for grace and salvation, if 
personal faith was credibly demonstrated.  In contrast, the Cape populist Calvinism 
stuck to the “thousand-generation covenant” that implied an automatic salvation of an 
original stock of believers and their offspring, and an equally automatic exclusion of 
the local “heathen” population.  This entrenched equivalence of “Christian” and 
“settler” landed the colonists in a dead-end branch of the Dutch Reformed movement, 
and the Khoisan and slaves in the permanent “heathen” category.   
Early attempts at conversion, such as the one of Krotoa/Eva, Van Riebeeck’s 
Khoi intermediary, failed because of this mindset.  NGK outreach was not accepted as 
valid by the settlers, and only half-heartedly pursued by the clergy.  Only towards the 
end of the eighteenth century, individual NGK pastors made an effort to reach out to 
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the local population – earlier NGK behaviour, supported by the establishmentarian-
minded VOC administration, was characterized by a jealous guardianship of its 
limited turf vis-à-vis all comers from other denominations.  However, late eighteenth 
century Cape Town already had a significant number of non-white baptized persons.  
Groenewald's research on illegitimacy during the late VOC period84 has shown that 
Cape Town at the end of the eighteenth century was becoming very different from the 
rest of the colony.  The process of creolisation and cosmopolitisation started to result 
in a less controllable populace with a large component of free black women, more 
anonymity, and consequently a stronger anxiety among white women about the 
maintenance of intact marriages.  This perceived risk, together with the presence of a 
regiment and a steady arrival of sailors in town, led to a surge of "immorality" cases 
before the councils of the Dutch Reformed Church.  Non-white baptized women who 
desired to marry in church or whose lifestyle had been brought to the attention of the 
church elders were questioned more closely about their illegitimate offspring, 
dominating the urban church processes leading to censure. The church records in rural 
districts show a more balanced case load, less focused on illegitimacy. 
In the early days of the colony, the only competition for the Dutch Church had 
come from Huguenots and Lutherans, both operating within the white immigrant 
population and easily co-opted into the Dutch Reformed mainstream as compatible 
philosophies.  Starting in the eighteenth and intensifying in the nineteenth century, 
other competitors proliferated, and performed a quantum jump in targeting the 
hitherto neglected underclass.  Rather than bother with the white population or the 
urban and master-controlled slaves, the European Protestant evangelical movements 
leapfrogged the NGK and went straight to the indigenous population in rural areas 
and at the frontier.  First off the mark were the Moravians (the Unitas Fratrum, or 
Unity of the Brethren), the Protestants with the longest pedigree in Europe.  Under the 
leadership of the pietist Count Zinzendorf, the originally Hussite Unitas Fratrum 
reconstituted itself as the Moravian Church in Herrnhut in Saxony in 1727, and almost 
immediately launched a missionary effort to the West Indies.  The centrality of 
education and global outreach in the Moravian faith ensured that its mandate to 
minister to the “heathen” was almost a given, leading them to be among the first 
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Protestant missionaries in the Americas and Africa.  By 1760, they had sent out 
already more than 200 missionaries, and had stimulated missionary thinking among 
Baptists and Methodists (Bishop Nitschmann crossed the Atlantic in 1736 together 
with John Wesley).  Moravian thinking influenced the formative stages of the London 
Missionary Society.85 
The Moravians stressed hard work, diligence, personal discipline, strong 
personal faith, and self-sufficiency.  This “religion of the heart” earned them the 
nickname “the Saviour’s happy people”, practicing a radical simplicity.  To avoid 
personal biases, many actions and appointments (even marriage partners) were 
decided by lot, a remnant of the Hussite interpretation of biblical texts.  Most of their 
missionaries were artisans of low social status, biasing their work towards the 
building of manual skills in pious communities, but also stressing literacy in the 
Protestant mode of an individual’s direct access to God through scripture.  This 
philosophy appeared non-threatening to the VOC and the NGK, and ensured them an 
early welcome at the Cape.  For a few years around 1740, Georg Schmidt, the first 
Moravian missionary in the Western Cape spread the message of aggressive self-
improvement and personal piety to the Hessequa Khoi from a rural base at 
Baviaanskloof, the later Genadendal mission station.86  He soon ran into the 
roadblocks of local settler resentment and, more importantly, the fervently defended 
but little used baptism monopoly of the NGK, which put an end to his missionary 
activity.  The Moravians were undeterred and, after a decent interval, made a second 
try at Genadendal in 1792.87  This time it stuck, and the enterprise expanded to 
eventually branch out into additional mission stations such as those at Groenekloof 
and Elim.  Genadendal became the prototype for the “mission station” model 
respected by the authorities for its orderliness and discipline, if not by the local 
colonists who saw their Khoisan serfs draining away to the greater dignity and 
personal safety of the station.  Despite their adherence to the introspective, self-
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reforming and skill-building model, the missionaries soon found themselves in the 
role of advocates for and protectors of their resident Khoisan disciples.  The radical 
idea of creating a residential community of Khoisan who discarded both their pre-
colonial pastoral and their colonial forced-labour lifestyles in favour of the European 
village model, brought with it the need to defend this idea against proponents of the 
status quo ante. 
Entering the fray from a different angle with a more deliberate combative 
spirit, the London Missionary Society (LMS) soon was enmeshed in the local politics 
as well.  Deriving their theology from a multi-denominational Protestant background 
in Britain, the leading personalities of the LMS drew heavily on a combination of the 
“Scottish Enlightenment” and the roots of John Knox’ teaching in the sixteenth 
century.  While fundamentally Calvinist in nature, the Knox theology contained the 
theory on the right of commoners to rebel against unsuitable authority. 88  This 
presented a basis for challenging the local policy of Khoisan impoverishment and 
slavery at the Cape, de facto outflanking the NGK Calvinists.  The LMS was able to 
lay claim to a purer Calvinism, in line with the more inclusive “Continuing 
Reformation” strand that the established Cape Calvinists had neglected.  The LMS 
started its activity at the Cape in 1799 with this militant approach, represented by the 
colourful personality of Johannes Van der Kemp, a radical millenarian who used 
Calvinist language skilfully to establish the right of the Khoisan to resist enserfment.  
Moving straight to the turbulent eastern frontier, the LMS plunged into the frictions 
between the colonial administration, the settlers, the remaining Khoi, and the Xhosa.  
In the atmosphere of the 1799-1802 border war, the Khoi clans that were squeezed 
between the advancing colony and the determined Xhosa response were addressed by 
the LMS.  A mix of Gonaqua Khoi, Xhosa-dependent Khoi, "Bastaard-Hottentots", 
and other dispossessed  people responded to this call.  Van der Kemp and his 
collaborators such as James Read linked themselves to the dispossessed by marriage, 
and set out to break the settlers’ monopoly on Christianity, dislodging the automatic 
equation between “settler” and “Christian”.   Taking their cue from the Moravians at 
Genadendal, the LMS used mission stations such as Bethelsdorp to create refugia for 
the Khoisan, in which they could park their families and livestock, acquire skills, and 
                                                 












get legal protection by the missionaries in charge.  More than the generally aquiescent 
and reactive Moravians, the early LMS missionaries engaged in deliberate and 
proactive confrontation with the settlers and the colonial administration, agitating for 
Khoisan equal rights.  Although toned down and less radical later, constant LMS 
pressure at the Cape and in London contributed to the promulgation of Ordinance 50 
that liberated the Khoisan, and to the implementation of slave emancipation 1834-38. 
Not surprisingly, this challenge to orthodoxy generated a strong backlash, 
particularly among the settlers who recognized a challenge to their absolute authority 
when they saw one.  Even around peaceful Genadendal, settlers threatened their Khoi 
servants and confiscated their stock when they wished to move to the mission station, 
and lobbied the authorities to stop the missionaries.  Similar tactics were employed 
against LMS stations, ranging from the spreading of rumours to outright attack and 
sabotage.   Interestingly, the mission stations were also attacked by resistance-minded 
Khoisan, who saw the Westernized station culture as a sell-out to colonial interests.  
Despite the difficulties, the LMS succeeded in attracting a significant following of 
Khoisan, and used Khoisan intermediaries and lay preachers liberally to spread the 
word.  The first converts and intermediaries tended to be outsiders in both colonial 
and Khoisan societies, such as women, and people in subservient client situations.  
Eventually, the mission stations attracted the mainstream Khoisan population to an 
extent that a Xhosa description of the Khoisan in the 1830s labeled them “the people 
brought to life by the word of God”.  After the initial high, the LMS experienced 
some disarray until the arrival of John Philip at the Cape, a Congregationalist imbued 
by the Scottish Enlightenment, philanthropic sentiment, and by liberal economics, 
who was determined to generate social uplift among the Khoisan by acculturating 
them as rapidly as possible, and make them rational economic and social actors in a 
Western sense.  This was to empower them to hold their own and be taken seriously 
in colonial society.  While there may have been only partial success in turning the 
Khoisan and emancipated slaves into members of a free labor force in the nineteenth 
century liberal mode, the LMS effort helped to create a level playing field, and a 
corpus of legal rights to resort to.89  Philip became a dominant, albeit controversial 
figure in the colony and a first stop for all new missionary groups. 
                                                 












Mission outreach to the Western Cape urban slaves proved more difficult than 
the establishment of the rural Khoisan missions, explaining the early missionaries’ 
preference to bypass Cape Town and start in the more promising rural areas, where 
things were clearer than in the confusing urban secular and disjointed subculture.  The 
latter was hard to penetrate, and the masters’ legally sanctioned direct control over all 
aspects of the lives of the slaves stood in the way.  Most importantly, Islam had 
started to attract significant numbers of urban converts among slaves and free blacks 
in Cape Town.  Philip succeeded in establishing the Union Chapel in Cape Town as a 
centre and service point of the LMS missionary effort throughout the colony, but the 
city itself remained largely outside the main sphere of LMS proselytising.  Partly, this 
was because vigorous intra-Christian competition in the town. 
To counteract the Islamic competition in urban areas, the South African 
Missionary Society (SAMS) had started work in Cape Town in 1799 (later also in 
Stellenbosch and Paarl), stimulated by Van der Kemp’s arrival at the Cape, and had 
its first, somewhat dubious, marketing success after lobbying the British 
Administration to pass legislation in 1812 that made clear that slave owners were not 
required to manumit baptized slaves.90  Despite this official boost, mission in Cape 
Town was an uphill battle in the first decades of the nineteenth century, Islam 
registering most converts.  Slave owners and apprentices' masters feared that religious 
instruction and conversion may lead to de facto emancipation of their charges, and 
make them into illiquid, non-tradable assets.  We will return to a more detailed review 
of the public discourse at the Cape on this issue below.  In this difficult market, the 
early LMS effort in Cape Town, led at first by the Presbyterian George Thom, 
encountered  the resistance of the Dutch Reformed-dominated SAMS which claimed 
its right to compete for the non-white population, and by the Anglican clergy guarding 
its British flock.  The SAMS was particularly insistent on monopolising the Dutch-
language conversions, which effectively limited Thom to a negligible anglophone 
audience and excluded him and the LMS from access to mass conversions.91   
Slave emancipation in the 1830s brought a boost in conversions, as the 
missions were able to cater to a pent-up demand for baptisms among slaves newly 
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empowered to make their own spiritual decisions.   Nevertheless, the hopes of Philip 
and Read of the LMS to make significant inroads into the market of more than 5,000 
newly freed urban slaves were not fulfilled: Islam proved more resilient and nimble 
than expected.92 The poor overall Christian record in urban conversions can partly be 
attributed to the early participation of the NGK in the SAMS, which introduced the 
ambivalent approach to mission of the Dutch Reformed movement, although the 
growing involvement of other Protestant denominations gave the SAMS a more 
egalitarian and inclusive flavour later.   
From 1829 onwards, the second wave of pietist German missionaries reached 
the shores of the Cape.  In contrast to the humbler artisan origins of the Moravians, 
the missionaries of societies such as the Rhenish Mission Society and Berlin Mission 
Society  (Rheinische Missionsgesellschaft, and Berliner Missionsgesellschaft) were 
men of standing in an increasingly assertive Prussian society.  This is not without 
importance, as a paternalistic streak and desire for a well-ordered society would bias 
the missionaries towards acquiescence with the established order.  Notably, the RMS 
precursors were influenced by Moravian thinking since the 1780s, and the mission 
impetus came from contacts with the LMS in 1799.93   From this time, the various 
strands of mission emphasis began to merge, as the early differences between pietists 
and radical reformers started to blur in an environment of increasing respectability 
and status of mission work.  The early RMS, however, still clearly distanced itself 
from John Philip, whose activist approach to liberation of indigenous people appeared 
too aggressive to the cautious pietists.  They sought their niche in the northwest of the 
colony, founding the mission stations of Wupperthal (led by Leipoldt) and 
Ebenhaezer, and ministering in outstations of the towns of Stellenbosch, Tulbagh and 
Worcester.  Their approach to mission was a gradualist one, not rushing into 
conversions but patiently teaching, building skills and habits, and leading by example.  
In parallel with the regime on Moravian mission stations, discipline and a Christian 
way of life was mandatory, neat housing was to be maintained (a fact approvingly 
noted by official observers, but deplored as absent at the LMS’ Bethelsdorp base), and 
gardening and craft skills had to be developed.  The role that knife production had 
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played at Genadendal in establishing a reputation for quality craftsmanship, was filled 
by leather shoe production at Wupperthal.  What this represented was a kind of 
“hands-on acculturation”, clearly distinct from the legal and political battles for 
equality conducted by the LMS.  The eventual integration of the South African RMS 
mission stations into the Dutch Reformed mainstream was relatively unproblematic. 
An early attempt at making inroads into the conversion of urban slaves and 
free blacks was made by the young Presbyterian Church at the Cape.94  Since 1813, an 
anglophone "Calvinist Society" was catering to the spiritual needs of Scottish soldiers 
stationed at the Cape, using the SAMS chapel in Long Street.  After John Philip had 
transformed the loose association of Reformed faith communities into a 
Congregationalist-dominated institution in Union Chapel in the 1820s, the new, 
purely Presbyterian, Scottish Church of St. Andrew's was established in Cape Town 
in 1829.  During the apprenticeship period of the slave emancipation 1834-38, the 
Presbyterians realized the potential for converts in the one third of the town's 
population that was being released into freedom.  St. Andrew's was the first church in 
Cape Town to admit non-whites as full members, although services for them were 
held separately and in Dutch.  One of the motives for the effort was to stem the 
advance of Islam in the town:  the reverend James Adamson, the leader of the 
Presbyterian community 1828-41, was keen to report to the Governor about the 
church contributing to the "...establishment of of a steadfast and almost unexpected 
barrier to the prevalence of Mohammedanism among the emancipated slaves".95  The 
number of communicants at St. Andrew's rose from 45, all whites, in 1838 to 202 in 
1841, of whom 140 were non-whites.96  Most of these new recruits, however, were 
freed slaves who had not had any religious affiliation before, not converts from Islam. 
The urban mission effort became more ecumenical over time, as NGK and 
Lutheran ministers joined the mission outreach, drawing about 1,000 adults into 
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attending the services.  After 1842, this broader effort had split off from the core St. 
Andrew's congregation after clashes between strong clerical personalities, and the 
coloured, mainly Dutch-speaking members had formed the new St. Stephen's church 
which later integrated into the NGK.  St. Andrew's continued its own mission to Cape 
Town's non-whites, operating parallel congregations for white anglophone and 
coloured Dutch groups, until the coloured component split off again after 1848. 
Competition between the Reformed churches in Cape Town was every bit as vigorous 
as that between Christian denominations and Islam. 
Looking askance at the efforts of the Reformed churches were the adherents of 
the Church of England, enjoying the status of imperial established church after the 
British takeover of the colony.  Anglican mission society efforts had increased 
throughout the empire since the end of the eighteenth century, dividing the enterprise 
between the older Society for the Propagation of the Gospel (SPG), focused on 
establishing ecclesiastical structures and hierarchies in the colonies, and the more 
evangelical Church Missionary Society (CMS), concentrating on individual 
conversions.97  The first Anglican church in Cape Town was erected with private 
contributions and pew rentals in 1830, and its urban mission outreach model was 
patterned on the British domestic urban missions to the underclass, based on a parish 
template.  Observers in the 1830s noted wryly that the operation of St. George's 
Church was a businesslike affair:  "Jews and atheists" were included in the group of 
shareholders, drawing dividends from the offerings.98 As in the case of the other 
Christian denominations, the Anglican urban missionaries' main preoccupation was 
the resilience of the "Mahometan religion" in town.  They blamed this partly on the 
maltreatment of slaves by Dutch owners, partly on deep-seated prejudices against 
inferior races, and partly on the attractiveness of a faith entirely uncoupled from the 
dominant European paradigm.  The tendency to split congregations when disgruntled 
members felt that their concerns were not addressed was also evident in the English 
Church: in 1846, white members of St. George's church left to found the Holy Trinity 
congregation.  The arrival of Bishop Gray in Cape Town in 1848 brought a burst of 
renewed Anglican mission efforts to the urban Muslims with dedicated new staff, an 
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area of prime concern for the bishop.  But it was an uphill struggle, and very few 
Muslim converts could be notched up by the missionaries who had to be content to 
convert the "heathen", i.e. non-Muslim non-whites. 
Numerous other mission groups entered into missionary activity in the colony 
in the early 1800s, among them the Baptist Missionary Society, the American Board 
of Commissions for Foreign Missions, the Wesleyan Methodist Society, the Societe 
des Missions Evangeliques, and many others.  Overt participation in politics was 
avoided, expectations were modest, horizons were long.  Gaining social independence 
through education was the long-term aim.  The mission stations were ready to expand 
in response to external events such as slave emancipation:  by 1848, 22% of the 
Western Cape “coloured” population was to be found on the mission stations, with 
more dependents linked loosely to them.99   
 
 
Urban Religious Exceptionalism 
 
While the rural areas of the colony saw the influx of  dispossessed Khoi and 
emancipated slaves into Moravian, LMS and other mission stations to form 
religiously inspired collectives, the urban development in Cape Town was 
characterised by a more individual search for a social and spiritual location.  Urban 
slaves and free blacks, fusing after emancipation into a fluid “coloured” population, 
had already engaged individually in artisanal and commercial activities before the 
1834-38 abolition period, and were selecting Christian or Muslim forms of religious 
adherence.  The trends of British economic, political, and religious thinking may have 
influenced the Cape white elite more directly, but they created the environment for the 
non-white population to establish an economic and social presence.  The socio-
economic and religious schools of thought may have nicely reinforced each other:  on 
the one hand, the British liberal-commercial philosophy encouraged a merchant, 
entrepreneurial attitude of a “society of striving individualists” in Bayly's diction; on 
the other hand, the religions that had assembled at the Cape contributed to a similar 
individualising and entrepreneurial trend.  The Dutch Reformed denomination 
                                                 












displayed some of Weber’s “worldly asceticism”;  the Congregationalist, 
Presbyterian, Anglican, Methodist and other Protestant traditions brought with them 
the pragmatism and individualism of the commercially oriented mother country;  as 
we have seen above, Islam in Cape Town was derived from South and Southeast 
Asian traditions that were strong on Sufi elements of individual spirituality, had been 
spread to Asia originally by merchants rather than by conquest, and did not carry the 
pre-Islamic Arab cultural baggage that contributed to the eventual rigidity of Islamic 
orthodoxy.  All had to contend with the fact that other worldviews were on offer to an 
audience of determined individualists within a compact urban space. 
In Cape Town proper, it was Islam that dominated the market in providing a 
spiritual home to thousands of newly emancipated lower-income people.100  The 
immediate groundwork had been laid by Tuan Guru (imam Abdullah ibn Qadi Abdus 
Salaam) at the end of the 18th century.  The exiled scholar and prince from Tidore 
authored the main textbooks that were used to systematise Cape Islam, providing 
guidelines for the life and belief of Muslims, and a theological defence against 
Christian mission.  Education was the competitive tool of choice.  In 1793, the first 
Muslim school (associated with an early mosque) was established as the Dorp Street 
Madrasah, enabling slaves and free blacks to bypass the Christian establishment while 
extending their knowledge, and immersion in Islam.  The early British administrators 
at the Cape noticed with alarm that almost 400 students assembled regularly at the 
school, and urged the Christian missionaries to increase their efforts.  In response, the 
SAMS established a competing Christian school in Dorp Street where both secular 
subjects and religion were taught.  As both Christian schools and Muslim madaris 
proliferated in the first half of the nineteenth century, the competition was vigorous, 
but early successes of the Christian mission, particularly immediately following the 
emancipation years of 1834-38, were more than matched by the Muslim efforts.  In 
1848, the new Anglican bishop of Cape Town rushed to persuade the Governor not to 
provide subsidies to Muslim schools, an equal-access policy sought by the Muslim 
leadership that would have been unobjectionable to the secular authorities.101  The 
Presbyterian elementary day school for coloured children reported about 80 or 90 
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children from Muslim families in their total attendance of about 350.102  A successful 
Muslim strategy allowed the participation of children in the Christian "infant" 
(elementary) schools, to acquire secular skills, then switched them to the madaris 
rather than the Christian "juvenile" schools in order to focus on Islamic studies and 
not be lost to the Muslim community.  The hopes of the Christian missionaries that 
early exposure of children of Muslim families to Christian education would snowball 
into adult conversions were not realised. 
It is noteworthy that this competition between religious communities was 
conducted rationally and peacefully, under the watchful eye of the British authorities.  
The Christian and Muslim missionary efforts in Cape Town acted in what they both 
saw as a promising market, not as a battlefield, the martial missionary language 
notwithstanding.  Both religious communities had an interest in not alienating the 
other one too much, to preserve the right to proselytize freely and to prevent a heavy-
handed official intervention by the colonial authorities.  It is perhaps typical that the 
most contentious early nineteenth century issue in the race for souls, only emerging in 
1847, was one of the use of language in recruiting students.  The Dorp and Barrack 
Street Christian schools introduced evening classes in Arabic and Melayu, including 
the reading of Christian scripture in these languages, in order to attract more students 
from the Muslim community who may not have been fluent in Dutch.  While Muslim 
leaders discouraged their flock from attending these classes, they later imitated this 
strategy by establishing classes in secular subjects, and the teaching in Dutch and 
English, in the Muslim schools.103  A good marketing strategy soon spread to all 
participants.  Combined with other attractive features of Cape Islam compared to 
Christianity, such as the better social reception by their co-religionists enjoyed by 
lower-class members of the faith, and the better chances at manumission for a Muslim 
slave of a Muslim owner, the education thrust of Islam gained adherents.104  
Pragmatism triumphed in the Cape Town competitive environment. 
The pragmatism and the playing down of parts of the faith doctrine that may 
have damaged the mission outreach had its other side in the phenomenon that the 
main controversies between and within religions were acted out as personality 
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clashes.  Strong leaders in the Christian and Muslim camps had difficulty in tolerating 
other strong personalities in their own flock of believers.  Splits were the common 
result:  Presbyterians under George Thom and his successors preferred to be separate 
from the SAMS and the Congregationalists of Read and Philip, coloured 
Presbyterians followed the reverend Stegman in seceding from St. Andrew's, and a 
bitter dispute about who was to be the rightful successor to Tuan Guru to lead the 
mosque split the Muslim community.105  The proliferation of competing places of 
worship, conversion and religious education, led by ambitious individuals, 
characterized the religious environment of Cape Town. 
As the religions actively on offer were primarily versions of Nonconformist 
Christianity or Islam, a striking difference between the rural hinterland and Cape 
Town becomes evident.  Both religions were focused on deriving legitimacy 
exclusively from their scripture, either the Bible or the Qur'an and Hadith (Anglicans 
and Roman Catholics, less active in the early stages of mission, were more contextual 
and intermediating through ecclesiastical structures).  The individual's direct interface 
with God was stressed as paramount.  Where only one of the scripturalist religions 
had the local field to itself, such as Reformed Christianity in the rural areas where 
mission stations for the Khoi farm labourers were established from scratch, the 
exclusivity of the scripture-focused truth was not challenged by competitors, 
providing a fertile ground for a communitarian and exclusivist view of society.  Cape 
Islam remained an urban phenomenon.  In contrast, the competitive atmosphere of the 
urban environment placed the concept of exclusive truth in doubt: both religions had 
to step back from being "trapped in scripture", and become more pragmatic in dealing 
with individual choice.   While the rural mission stations created a more collectivist, 
ascriptive "bonding social capital", the urban competitive environment forced the 
religions to create "bridging social capital" that catered to the proclivity for individual 
choice of association.106  Creativity, autonomy, and individualism were the hallmarks 
of the urban worldview that militated against a strong collective identity and favoured 
the maintenance of bridges between different individual identities. 
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A comparison between the predominant cultural paradigms in typical rural 
mission stations107 and in Cape Town illustrates the different structures of identity 
formation.  The Moravian station of Genadendal and its offshoots were organised on a 
patriarchal basis where members of the community were to obey the set rules of 
behaviour and activity, and discipline was dispensed by the authority of the 
missionaries.  Economic activity was planned to be craft-based, supplemented by 
farm labour, and conducted in a corporate manner.  Small individual production of 
poultry and dairy products was incidental to supply the local market.  The 
missionaries monitored the commodity prices available for cash crop production, and 
tried to maximise the autarky of the station.108  The identity formed was primarily that 
of a member of a homogeneous religious community.  In comparison, LMS stations 
such as Bethelsdorp were organised more loosely in a more egalitarian way, and 
derived their internal solidarity from an effort to assert themselves against hostile 
settlers and colonial administrators.  The identity of the members was primarily that 
of a group struggling jointly against the ever-present danger of individual enserfment.  
Both types of rural mission stations were largely insulated from the larger economy 
and from long-distance trade, trying to be self-supporting communities or "closed 
settlements", where the retailing of goods was in the hands of the station 
administrators.  Until the later nineteenth century, periodic debates erupted on 
whether individual land title was to be granted to the inhabitants, or whether to 
maintain all land ownership in the hands of the missionaries.109  In contrast, Cape 
Town was exposed to cheap imports and an open market in goods and services, and 
real estate was either held through individual title or rented.  Urban crafts, retail trade 
and wage labour had to compete vigorously against both local and international 
competitors.  Economic and religious competition promoted individualisation and a 
relaxed attitude towards multiple identities. 
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Socio-Economic Impact of Missions 
 
What was the net result of all these strenuous efforts in competitive mission, 
both in Cape Town and in its rural hinterland?  Let us consider the counterfactual.  
Projecting the socio-economic trend evident by the early nineteenth century, one 
would expect that the dispossessed population, deprived of education and status in the 
interest of white colonial society, would be forced to adopt aspects of the dominant 
culture haphazardly. As full integration was out of the question, and the higher-quality 
aspects of the European cultural spectrum were closed to Khoisan, slaves, and most 
descendants of mixed unions, the parts of the dominant culture adopted by them 
would have been the less desirable ones.  As was already evident at the close of the 
eighteenth century, the adoption of alcoholism, a culture of domestic violence, and 
bigotry had pushed the underprivileged into a “proletarian” existence, with no release 
except risky escape, crime, drink, or sullen submission and petty sabotage.  Small 
local rebellions were easily subdued.110  The members of the non-white subculture 
who chose peaceful co-existence, soon ran into the glass ceiling of social exclusion.  
The vicious circle was likely to continue, as the “insolent” image of the non-whites 
would have been confirmed by passive and active resistance.  It is difficult to imagine 
an alternative deus ex machina that would have turned this around.  A change could 
have come simply through economic transformation, as the new global economy 
brought with it the need to compete within an expanding trading zone in the wake of 
the British imperial drive.  All inhabitants of the Cape, white and non-white, would 
increasingly be subjected to making themselves more competitive individually, and as 
communities.  Economic transformation alone, however, although perhaps being the 
rising tide that floated all ships, would not have mitigated the vast social and income 
differentials that existed.   
This is where both Islam and mission Christianity filled a gap, providing self-
esteem, identity, and skills.  Whether they intended to have this effect or not, the 
missionaries recognized that a clinging to the vanishing indigenous cultures would not 
help the Khoisan and slaves to survive efficiently in the inevitable new imperial world 
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order, and thus set out to acculturate their disciples into the dominant mode of social 
and economic behaviour.  The Moravian and other German pietists were motivated by 
lifting the converts from what they saw as morally and spiritually inferior lifestyles to 
a superior, Christian plateau – in the process, they managed to enable them to use new 
skills, modes of behaviour, and literacy to establish themselves as independent actors 
in a monetary market economy.  The LMS, despite its periodic romantic efforts to 
restore Khoisan culture in a Christian context, mainly focused on empowering its 
clients legally and economically, aiming to make them participants in a free labour 
force and in small enterprise. Muslim leaders encouraged social cohesion of a lower-
class community in a socially and economically competitive environment, and the 
skills to survive in the colonial context.   
On the whole then, the discipline and education inculcated at the mission 
stations and in urban religious schools, although often patronizing and based on the 
European background of the missionaries, or informed by the Southeast Asian 
orientation of Cape Islam, had a number of  positive effects.  Far from creating 
gullible victims of "cultural imperialism",111 the moves to Christian and Muslim 
worldviews were: 
 
• Enabling the hitherto excluded and despised groups to deal 
with the dominant society on its own terms, teaching modes of 
behaviour and social discourse that would at least guarantee 
them a hearing and a chance to regain respect as recognisable 
members of a Europeanised society; 
 
• Providing artisan, farming, and entrepreneurial skills that 
would offer the opportunity to participate in the modern market 
economy that was emerging; 
 
• Encouraging initiative in a competitive society, through the 
vehicles of lay preaching, small enterprise etc. 
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• Establishing a private sphere with its inherent dignity and pride, 
which was lacking in slave and serf relationships, and fostering 
the stability of private lives through the concept of the nuclear 
family in its own house; 
 
• Regaining a lost spiritual anchor, which enabled Khoisan and 
slaves to reconnect with the destroyed religious component of 
their lives; 
 
• Establishing cultural pride and easier access by “indigenising” 
religious texts, i.e. translating them into the Creole versions of 
European languages spoken by Khoisan and slaves, and into 
selected indigenous languages; Bible translation into the 
vernacular, and the rendering of Muslim texts in the proto-
Afrikaans of the early nineteenth century was an important 
component of destigmatising the remaining aspects of an 
indigenous culture, and establishing cultural self-
understanding; 
 
• Finally, protecting the converts against official and private 
abuse, by offering reasonably safe refugia, recognised religious 
leaders as spokesmen, and some legal redress. 
 
In important ways, the contest for the ownership of Christianity between the 
dominant white population and the missionary-supported underclass had been won 
decisively by the latter by the mid-nineteenth century.  Although this was not 
immediately obvious in social relationships, an important principle had been 
established:  full membership in a Christian community was an equal right of all 
inhabitants of the colony, a concept that had been strenuously denied before the onset 
of mission activity.  It leveled the playing field, at least in theory, prevented a 
complete slide into a proletarian existence, and helped to prepare non-whites for the 












believers that felt comfortable as a self-sustaining faith in the midst of a Christian 
colonial environment.  The religions had been successfully "creolised".  Bible 
translations into the vernacular had contributed significantly to the creation of 
ownership of religion among the converted, as had the early renderings of Muslim 
texts into Malayo-Portuguese and proto-Afrikaans.  The Nonconformist evangelical 
missions were particularly adept at "inculturating" Christian texts, including not only 
the Bible but also supporting literature such as the enormously popular "Pilgrim's 
Progress" by John Bunyan.  The very translatability of Bunyan into other cultures and 
the universality of the story made it a key text for mission, as the figure of the striving 
pilgrim could be embraced and identified with by the pool of potential converts.  In 
Isabel Hofmeyr's terms, Bunyan became "portable" throughout the empire, spreading 
the idea of the pious individual overcoming doubt and difficulty to achieve salvation 
and character improvement.112  The Muslim equivalent, used to make the same point, 
may well have been al-Ghazali’s story of a journey through the Seven Valleys on the 
way to paradise.113  Texts such as these were instrumental in implanting and 
"indigenizing" different religious traditions at the Cape simultaneously. 
  Religious diversity and a degree of choice in religious affiliation, then, were 
facts of life in early nineteenth century Cape Town.  Among the various identities 
available to a creole population, the religious ones were important, and had 
significance well beyond the aspect of personal spirituality.  Did this matter, beyond 
trivia such as the fact that the editor of the influential Commercial Advertiser was the 
son-in-law of John Philip, the towering Congregationalist missionary figure of the 
time?114  There is a stronger nexus between this market of worldviews and the pattern 
of socio-economic development in this cosmopolitan community.  We need to 
examine the impact of this local diversity on the way the Cape economy was 
developing, in relation to the global fact that Cape Town was a cog in the machinery 
of Empire, linked to a network of multicultural cities and entrepots.  This feature is 
what we turn to now. 
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2. Imperial Impact 
 
A City in the Empire 
 
Following the settlements at the Congress of Vienna in 1815 (including the 
final agreement on Britain's ownership of the Cape colony), enough international 
political stability was established to allow a long-term expansion of trade and 
commerce, and a burst of international mission activity of the strengthening 
evangelical movements.  Britain, as earliest industrialising nation and pre-eminent 
trader, drove these processes and focused the trade expansion on commodities and 
manufactures, radically diminishing the previously important slave trade which was 
outlawed by Britain unilaterally in 1807.  By the mid-century, international trade was 
expanding rapidly, customs tariffs were falling, transport costs decreased, and the first 
commercial globalisation was under way.  Colonial cities such as Cape Town were 
swept along by these trends, absorbing the philosophy of free trade, the pragmatic 
liberalism of the Scottish Enlightenment, the abolitionist concerns for the liberation of 
slaves and enserfed locals, and the evangelical fervour for atonement and salvation 
through the creation of the “industrious individual”. 
The early nineteenth century fell into the period commonly described as the 
"birth of the modern world", the transformational time between the 1780s and the 
1850s.  Moreover, the 1820s and 1830s can be considered to be the key period when 
attitudes, politics, economic thought, and religious-cultural views were shaped into 
the beginning of the "Victorian" age, well before the accession of Queen Victoria in 
1837.115  This amalgam of political, economic, and cultural change marked the 
transition from the eighteenth-century societies based on status and caste to societies 
which formed new identities and social networks.  The transitional period started to 
solidify in the later nineteenth century, when nationalism, racial differentiation, and 
class thinking took over.  In between, the ferment of modernisation, innovation, 
industrialisation, urbanisation, and religious mission drove the "first globalisation" of 
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the modern world.  By mid-century, the basis for the first liberal international 
economic order was in place that was to last until the World Wars of the twentieth 
century.116   
This surge of free trade and globalisation was in marked contrast to the pre-
1815 imperial attitude towards trade:  until then, a narrow mercantilist and 
protectionist approach was typical for trade policy, a view that was vigorously 
attacked by Adam Smith and his disciples for being counterproductive to British 
economic interests.117  The Corn Laws were protecting British agriculture, the 
Navigation Acts reserved colonial trade for British ships and limited manufacture in 
the colonies.  European trade policy was heavily protectionist.  By the 1820s, 
however, David Ricardo and Richard Malthus had published extensively, and were 
turning the tide of official policy. The emergence of Britain as the dominant power 
after its early industrialisation and its victory after the Napoleonic wars had made it 
unnecessary to resort to protectionism to secure global dominance.  On the contrary, 
free trade and an open global economy were the best guarantees to maintain Britain's 
leading position.118  In the 1820s, skilled British workers were allowed to emigrate for 
the first time since 1719, a fact that would become significant for the settler society at 
the Cape.119  By mid-century, the agricultural protectionist interests had been 
defeated, Cobden had succeeded in having the Corn Laws repealed, and the 
Navigation Acts had been abolished.  Free trade had established itself as the primary 
principle of the international economic order.  During the sustained trade boom, 
Britain's trade needs drove the transport of cotton from Egypt and Bombay, wool 
from Australia (and later from the Cape), wine from the Cape, and palm oil from 
West Africa.  British dominance of global trade extended well beyond the formal 
colonies: after Latin America had achieved its independence in the 1820s, it absorbed 
a significant proportion of British exports, giving rise to what has been called the 
"informal empire" that enabled Britain to intervene occasionally with armed force to 
keep the trade channels open, without actually claiming colonial outposts.  Buenos 
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Aires and Montevideo were temporarily occupied early in the nineteenth century, 
Britain intervened in the disputes about the Parana, and brokered a settlement between 
Argentina and Brazil.120  We will see below that the concept of a global political and 
economic interest of the empire slowly penetrated the discourse at the Cape, and 
moved it from a parochial to a global one. 
In this environment of rapidly increasing international trade, port cities thrived 
worldwide.  While the old aristocratic inland cities were losing importance, the new 
cosmopolitan coastal centres of exchange and trade mushroomed, becoming hybrid 
locations in the process.  A network of port cities encompassed the European and 
American Atlantic gateways, Alexandria and Beirut, Bombay and Calcutta, Shanghai,  
Buenos Aires, and Cape Town.  Commercial growth, not only industrialisation, drove 
the development of these cities in the early decades of the nineteenth century.121 
From the 1830s onwards, steam navigation made freight and passenger 
transport significantly more efficient and reliable, and the telegraph was patented, 
contributing to the perception that "distance could be dissolved" and the Empire 
would become a homogeneous unit.122  By 1820, British waterways had quadrupled in 
length since 1750, cutting transport cost to less than half that of road transport.  
Transatlantic steamer service was introduced in 1838, providing fast transport for 
passengers and high-value goods, while Asian trade around the Cape was still 
dominated by sail.  Starting around 1840, international shipping freight rates fell 
continuously, making it ever cheaper to trade internationally.  The rotary steam press 
and the reformed British postal service made it easier for the colonial populations to 
benefit from the faster information flow between Britain and the colonies.  Colonial 
networks could operate far more efficiently in the new environment, and the political 
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and economic discussions in Britain could be followed and participated in by the 
colonists. 
The globalising effect of transport and communication advances was the 
signal for settler colonies in Australia, Canada and South Africa to become more 
politically aware of political debate in Britain, and to participate actively in the 
discussion on self-rule in the colonies.  They observed liberalising change in Britain, 
while colonial administration was still conducted in an authoritarian mode.  This was 
no longer limited to the colonial elite, but triggered a rise of the middle class 
paralleling the developments in Britain.  Increased literacy of the emerging 
bourgeoisie, better affordable housing and clothing, and the proliferation of small 
businesses, libraries and civic associations boosted the self-confidence of the middle 
class and encouraged the move to a broader franchise.  The British Reform Act of 
1832 enfranchised a wider spectrum of the population, and brought politics closer to a 
representative democratic model.  This "wave of political modernisation" included the 
Poor Law Act in 1834, the Municipal Corporations Act in 1835, and, importantly, the 
full Catholic Emancipation by 1829.  The impact of these changes reverberated in the 
colonies, giving rise to heated debate and raising expectations.  For the slave-holding 
parts of the empire, the act to emancipate the slaves in 1833, leading to the 
apprenticeship period 1834-38 and full abolition of slavery, was a key event that 
triggered drawn-out resistance among settlers in the Caribbean, and an exodus of 
Afrikaner colonists from the Cape colony.123 
While the ferment of change visible in Britain did not fully penetrate into 
continental Europe until the revolutions of 1848, the Ottoman Empire experienced a 
similar burst of reformist activity.  Importantly for the later impact on Cape Muslims, 
the Tanzimat, the administrative reform process of the 1830s initiated by the Ottoman 
authorities, was patterned on Western reform models and accompanied the emergence 
of a commercial middle class in Turkey and its dominions.124  The ideas brought to 
Cape Town from Istanbul at mid-nineteenth century by Abu Bakr Effendi, the imam 
requested by the Cape Muslim community to straighten out their internal disputes, 
were informed by the reformist environment he came from. 
                                                 













To disseminate the knowledge about the economic and political change taking 
place in Britain, the networks of empire served a vital purpose.  As mentioned earlier, 
the Cape benefited from a multiplicity of parallel networks, but the ones extending to 
the new colonial power were the most vibrant.  In political terms, the British officers 
involved in the peninsular campaign during the Napoleonic wars maintained an esprit 
de corps as they were deployed as administrators throughout the empire.  Merchants 
worked their international trade connections to good advantage, and the businessmen 
at the Cape understood the value of having good contacts in Britain and in other 
colonies that could smooth their transactions.  Political and economic behaviour 
converged as a consequence:  as recent literature has pointed out, "the co-ethnic 
networks spawned by the empire were a powerful engine of convergence, and worked 
with rather than against the grain of the globalising forces in politics, economics and 
culture".125   The networks facilitated interdependence between the spread-out parts of 
the empire, led to shared lifestyles and consumption habits, diffused knowledge 
efficiently, fostered international entrepreneurship and risk-taking, and created 
international "virtual communities" that could relate better within their orbit than with 
the locations their members found themselves in.  Capetonians had more in common 
with their international network counterparts than with the rural parts of the colony.  
In the course of the nineteenth century, more books were shipped to the Cape from 
Britain than to anywhere else in the Empire.  By the late nineteenth century, there was 
a network of cosmopolitan imperial cities around the littoral of the Indian Ocean, 
forming an "Indian Ocean public sphere" and engaging in cultural and knowledge 
exchange.126 The addition of cultural to the political and economic networks is 
significant for the exploration of the Cape discourse, as it was the impact of the 
"humanitarian network" that made a strong impression during the early decades of the 
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Religion, Ethics, and Empire 
 
 Being a port city in the imperial network did not have only economic and 
political consequences for Cape Town.  Perhaps more importantly, the interwoven 
strands of philosophical, religious and socio-economic thought that emanated from 
Britain and circulated through the imperial networks had a profound impact on the 
discourse at the Cape.  Before 1800, the predominant pattern of thought throughout 
the empire had been focused on social hierarchies and established status.  After the 
Napoleonic wars, the focus shifted to a moral, evangelical and more liberal discourse, 
driven by a belief in social and economic progress, in the move towards equality by 
education and conversion, and in the abolition of slavery and serfdom.  The liberal 
and humanitarian "colonial reformers" envisaged settlers to establish liberal societies 
in the colonies, mixing with and thus "civilising" the locals, and creating a federal, 
locally self-governed empire.  By the mid-nineteenth century, disillusionment with 
egalitarianism and liberalism had started to set in, as colonial rebellions in India, the 
Caribbean and the eastern frontier of the Cape Colony dented the optimism about the 
subject peoples, and scientific racism appeared.  Towards the end of the century, 
racial and ethnic prejudice had become important, and the industrial and mining 
development in the colonies had brought the issue of class to the fore.  We are 
primarily concerned here with the transitional period of the first half of the century, 
when economic and knowledge globalisation channelled the reforming ferment in 
Britain through the empire, generating change in all locations touched by it. 
 The change was perceptibly rapid.  Starting in the 1820s and 1830s, economic 
development, technological progress and population growth accelerated, and cultural 
transformation became visible to the contemporary observer.  Britain's population 
doubled between 1800 and 1850, an unprecedented change.  "We have been living the 
life of three hundred years in thirty", noted Thomas Arnold, the headmaster of Rugby 
School in 1832.  John Stuart Mill observed in 1831 that the "spirit of the age" was 
only perceivable because change was taking place so fast127  This consciousness that 
things were changing, and should be doing so, informed the discourse of the early 
Victorians in Britain and at the Cape. 
                                                 












 An important feature of this period was the synthesis between British identity, 
progress, and evangelical piety,128 a linkage that will occupy us below when exploring 
the concept of "Christian political economy".   The essence of Britishness was 
considered to be a basic pragmatic social decency based on the rule of law, 
parliamentary government, civil rights, and individualism, bolstered by the ethics of 
Protestant Christianity that was ready to spread the gospel and the British worldview 
throughout the world.  The process of "civilization" would inculturate these desirable 
features in all societies, encompassing technological progress, cultural refinement, 
lawful governance, and a high degree of self-discipline and ethical behaviour.129  On 
the whole, the foundation for this holistic paradigm had been laid very early in the 
century, by "founding fathers of the Victorian age" such as Walter Scott, Jeremy 
Bentham, William Wilberforce, Coleridge, and Cobbett, covering different aspects of 
the multifaceted and often contradictory Victorian worldview.130  By the 1830s, the 
picture had settled into a recognizable pattern. 
 It should not be overlooked that the British Empire during the first half of the 
century was also subject to the Zeitgeist of Romanticism, dominating European 
thought at the time.  German and French versions of this mindset that melded the 
"mind and the heart"131 may have been more pronounced, but Britain did not escape 
its reach.  Moving on from the pure rationality promoted by many of the previous 
century's Enlightenment thinkers (Adam Smith being an exception), the concepts of 
passion, love, compassion, feeling, and awe were re-integrated into the human 
condition as acceptable, indeed desirable key elements.  Philosophy, literature, 
religion, and social thought became imbued with the celebration of feeling.  French 
thinking followed Rousseau, while in Germany the emerging romantic literature of 
Goethe and Schiller made its impact.  Schleiermacher popularised the notion that 
religious feeling was an intensely introspective and individual effort, giving rise to 
pietism and the Christian sense of individual obligation to help others see religion in 
this way.  The evangelical wave of the urge to share intense individual religious 
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experience with others was gaining speed. The Byronic hero of tragedy and passion 
became an ideal to be admired.132  In Britain, reform movements informed by 
romanticism pushed prison reform and Benthamite improvements of criminal law, 
improvements of female and child labour conditions, the humanisation of orphan 
houses and of the administration of the Poor Laws.  Benevolent societies to help the 
helpless were blossoming.  Driven by romanticist notions of compassion and fairness, 
and by religious outrage at social inequality, major legislative reform works were 
achieved, culminating in the emancipation of slaves throughout the Empire in 1834-
38.  Hegelian Idealism and a sense of history as steady progress via a struggle of ideas 
had gained currency in Britain as elsewhere.  
 Friction between the emerging liberal humanitarianism and a romantic 
nostalgia for tradition was inevitable, and was reflected in the discourse of the time.  
A romantic belief in the civilizing process, an open economy, and the power of moral 
argument to liberalize society clashed with an equally romantic conviction that both 
evangelical Christianity and the industrializing liberal economy were liabilities that 
needed to be overcome in favour of a less pietist impersonal deism and a return to 
more heroic, less economic principles of public life.  Carlyle represents the traditional 
Tory backlash against the alliance of evangelical fervour and industrial modernity,133 
extolling instead the virtues of heroic leadership in the classic aristocratic mould.  
Others took up the other side of the debate with gusto.  The wave of Whig radicals 
calling for liberalization and emancipation at all levels of public life included 
towering figures such as Sydney Smith, the founder of the Edinburgh Review, 
followed later by Walter Bagehot, backbone of The Economist.  Liberal magazines 
such as these helped to spread the thought of reform and eventually contributed to the 
decline of traditional Toryism.134   Hesitantly, the Tories in the new mode of "liberal 
Toryism" embraced the free market and a more open society of personal choice, 
although the nostalgia for a traditionally ordered world lingered.135 
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 This continuing strand of traditionalist thought preserved itself in the 
perpetuation and evolution of British paternalism.  Although markets were opening up 
and political emancipation and civil liberties were making progress, the underlying 
social concept of a benign authoritarian order informed the thinking of reformers and 
traditional Tories alike, albeit to different degrees.  Tempered by the achievements of 
civil liberty and independent courts, paternal authority was naturally assumed to be 
exercised by the elite when dealing with the lower orders of society who could not be 
assumed to be able to make decisions as rationally as their superiors.  The 
unquestioned authority of the Victorian pater familias demanded obedience, but also 
carried with it obligations towards those under its rule.  The duties of those in 
authority included the care for the welfare of the subjects, and efforts to improve the 
moral and social soundness of their lives.  Children, the poor, law-breakers, and 
"inferior races" were to be guided, educated, and helped to lift themselves out of a 
benighted existence.136  This feature of paternalism, the responsibility to elevate the 
less fortunate, drove the thinking of missionaries and liberal reformers, who gave rise 
to what became known as "patronizing British liberalism".137  On the other hand, the 
obligation of the ruled was to exercise discipline and deference to authority. This 
more static element of paternalism, stressing hierarchy, the prevention of social 
mobility and the preservation of a traditional social structure, inspired the opponents 
of the reformers and liberals.  The British debate was mirrored faithfully in the urban, 
well-connected part of the Cape, where the forces of tradition under Lord Somerset 
clashed with the reformers eager to liberalise.  Both, however, stood on the common 
cultural platform of a paternalistic view of society. 
 The improvement of the lower orders, however, was not only to be 
accomplished through a top-down, paternalistic policy.  A bottom-up approach was 
evolving through the self-help movement among those of humble origins aspiring to 
upward social mobility.  Although pursued collectively in the form of membership in 
"mutual improvement societies", this was an essentially individualistic endeavour.  
Mass magazines promoted the idea that "every individual, as individual, could both 
consume and produce knowledge", implying the right to the "universal accessibility of 
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a mental culture".138  The voluntary societies of young men often were formed as 
subgroups of church congregations, looking for a combination of intellectual 
achievement and moral uplift, and as a way to set oneself apart from the less 
ambitious members of the working class.  Eventually, the training in social interaction 
and debate inculcated in such societies created a wider pool of participants in civil 
society.139  As a later echo, this self-help philosophy and focus on individual 
development in a market economy are visible in the Pentecostalist and charismatic 
church groups active at the Cape from the late 20th century onwards.  
 
The Evangelical-Abolitionist Axis 
 
 Of particular importance for the Cape Colony was the emergence in Britain of 
Abolitionism and Evangelicalism, twin aspects of the faith-fuelled urge to improve 
the lives of individuals that became integral parts of the humanitarian wave of thought 
lapping against the shores of the colonies.  The first half of the nineteenth century, 
commonly known as the "age of improvement", has also been described as the "age of 
atonement".  Improvement and progress, viewed through the religious lens, had to be 
understood as only one of many experimental paths towards salvation.140  In certain 
ways, a Weberian inner-worldly asceticism permeated the mentality, seeing the 
rational pursuit of material success and probity as efforts to distinguish oneself as 
suitable for salvation.  Human nature was not an asset but a liability, and 
eschatological pessimism about the misery of earthly life demanded that atonement 
and deep inner conversion were necessary to prepare humankind for the future 
kingdom.  We have seen above how this mindset drove the explosion of missionary 
activity by Protestant groups throughout the empire, including the Cape.  How did it 
inform the outlook on life in general?   
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 Fervent evangelicalism, manifested in proselytizing Nonconformist preachers 
and domestic mission activity among the poor, had graduated from the suspicious 
subversive activity of the eighteenth century to an established part of the life of the 
middle classes.  The heirs of Wesleyan Methodism and revivalism had made scripture 
the guiding principle of their private and public lives without offending the authority 
of the day.  Still viewed with some apprehension by aristocratic and traditional 
Anglican circles, the evangelical movement provided a spiritual underpinning for an 
ordered society in a period of rapid change.  The removal of Nonconformist civil 
disabilities brought Dissent and evangelicalism into the mainstream, leading to a 
"synthesis of religion, politics, and social attitudes along with an unprecedented 
influence on national culture" from the 1830s onwards.141  Established Anglicans and 
Scottish Presbyterians made evangelicalism respectable, and turned it into a 
philosophy of the upper middle classes that were achieving political and economic 
importance at the time.  Middle-class piety combined with public morality, 
humanitarian instincts, frugality, and financial rectitude to bring forth such forceful 
personalities as William Wilberforce and the rest of the Clapham Sect, or Thomas 
Chalmers, who shaped public discourse for decades.142  The evangelical emphasis on 
individual salvation infected other parts of life, and Samuel Smiley could preach the 
gospel of self-help and self-improvement of the lower orders with considerable 
success.  The individualising tendency of evangelicalism reached the Cape exactly 
during the period when new post-slavery identities were being formed. 
 Abolitionism was a powerful offshoot of the new piety and of the mindset that 
every human being had a right to the pursuit of individual salvation.    A humanitarian 
network of missionaries in the field and anti-slavery lobbies in Britain had developed 
significant clout since the late eighteenth century.  With the onset of rapid economic, 
political and cultural change in Britain, this alliance found the opening for its 
argument that slavery was no longer acceptable for a society and an empire that was 
transforming itself into a more open and liberal mode.  An international network of 
evangelicals, missionaries and other religious groups became efficient in promoting 
abolition:  English Nonconformists and international Quakers and Baptists conducted 
a lively exchange.  Between 1800 and the 1830s, a rapid rise in Methodist, 
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Congregational and Baptist membership coincided with an equally steep increase in 
anti-slavery petitions in the Anglo-American sphere.  By the 1830s, more than half of 
abolitionist petitions were sponsored by evangelicals.143  The concept of slavery as sin 
gained ground, and carried the day against the slave-owning lobby in the 1830s.  
Evangelical humanitarianism promoted the image of the converted non-white slave, 
being raised from a benighted heathen existence to become a moral, Christian and 
industrious individual.   As in the case of the domestic poor and the Irish Catholic 
peasantry, humanitarianism advocated a gradual education and uplifting process for 
colonial slaves and enserfed indigenous populations that would slowly bring them 
closer to the standards of civilization enjoyed by the British elite and rising middle 
class.  While paternalistic, this approach was often diametrically opposed to the 
colonial settler interests who would have preferred the maintenance of the status 
quo.144   
 This conflict played itself out in parallel in the Cape Colony, where 
missionary spokesmen like Philip and van der Kemp, and secular liberals like 
Fairbairn and Pringle confronted the interests of the governing aristocracy allied with 
the rural agricultural settlers.  Cape Town merchants with colonial business interests 
associated themselves with the humanitarians, as the new liberal economic order 
called for the free movement of labour rather than the old static system of slaves 
being tied to masters.  The global humanitarian/evangelical thrust had linked up with 
the new globalizing economy to create what came to be called the "Cape liberal 
tradition".145  We will return to this below. 
 Did this necessarily imply a simple conflict between missionary/commercial 
and imperial agendas?  The engagement seems to have been more complex than that.  
In the British settler colonies, missionaries, liberals and humanitarians (all three 
features often combined in single persons), treaded a fine line between opposing the 
autocratic colonial administration of the day and the agricultural settlers intent on 
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keeping labour captive on the one hand, and cooperating to maintain their rights to 
proselytise and increase local self-rule on the other hand.  They were trapped in the 
"liberal's dilemma".  Andrew Porter notes that liberal missionaries often were moved 
to oppose the local independence of settler communities in order to preserve rights of 
the indigenous populations, calling for imperial intervention to control unruly settlers' 
subjugation of the "natives".  Colonial alliances shifted and changed, as colonial 
liberals joined settlers in pushing for self-rule and freedom from the heavy hand of 
imperial administration, but at the same time promoted abolition and a better 
treatment of the natives in concert with missionary humanitarians.146 As we have 
noted in the specific case of the Cape above, the argument that the missionary effort 
had the beneficial effect of preparing indigenous people for a participation in the 
inevitable integration into a globalising market economy also holds in general for the 
imperial context as a whole.  The recipients of the missionary effort had an interest in 
expanding their spiritual portfolio, for a variety of motives.  In the sense of Robin 
Horton and John Edwin Mason, conversions to both Christianity and Islam at the 
Cape were driven by the felt need for a more efficient spiritual anchor in a 
modernising society, and by the perception that there was a social gain involved in the 
action.  The cultural exchange between proselytisers and the converted reshaped them 
both, supporting the transformation of a traditionalist, hierarchical society into a 
developing, market-oriented one with a modicum of social mobility.147 
 Urban commercial interests in the empire tended to align themselves with the 
mission civilisatrice and with the spread of Christianity, in order to promote a broadly 
open society of citizens who were able to participate in commercial progress and 
support international trade.  Conversely, the international missionary network 
considered the improvement of all rights of subservient populations to include the 
right to participate freely in a market economy:  a key basis for such participation was 
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to be the introduction of secure rights to own land, and the acquisition of land titles.  
At the Cape, John Philip's international network to promote these goals included not 
only British missionary societies, but also American, German and French ones, an 
ecumenical lobby for counteracting any collusion between authoritarian colonial 
government and local settlers.148  This alliance between commerce and mission 
reflected the mindset of the emerging "Christian political economy" in Britain. 
 
Christian Political Economy 
 
Even while Britain was engaged in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, 
two distinct schools of thought on the new subject of “political economy” emerged.  
Building on the Scottish Enlightenment thought of David Hume and Adam Smith, 
later continuously refined in the Edinburgh Review, both strands promoted free trade 
and open markets, either as principle of the new science of economics, or as a moral 
principle grounded in Christianity.  One, following Ricardo (building on the 
pragmatic, rationalist aspect of the Enlightenment) and promoted in the Westminster 
Review, asserted the classical liberal position of free markets and individual liberty 
leading to a division of labour and subsequent economic and income growth.  The 
other, taking its cue from Malthus and his perceived “limits to growth” (informed by 
the Romanticist movement), took the path of Christian concerns about over-
indulgence and over-investment, seeking atonement for sinful greed.  Paradoxically, 
both ended up endorsing free trade:  the Ricardian school as a vehicle for growth, the 
Christian/Malthusian school as an instrument of reining in a protected, monopolistic 
“excessive production”.  Secular political economy relied on the argument of 
enlightened self-interest; religious political economy employed self-discipline against 
the danger of avarice.  The result of this double-action push was the promotion of a 
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liberal order, abolitionism, and an egalitarianism of free individuals, pursued within 
Britain and in the colonies.149 
The progress-promoting school of secular economics adopted a positive, 
growth-oriented outlook, and saw competition and free markets leading to growing 
demand, a division of labour, and increasing prosperity by "growing the pie".  In 
contrast, the Malthusian school was beset by anxieties about the limits to growth, and 
about the frailties of a human nature prone to excess and exploitation of others: a 
"zero-sum" outlook.   Both schools were represented at the Cape, and it is worthwhile 
to examine the roots of the Christian one that added a peculiarly early-Victorian twist 
to an economic discourse otherwise dominated by the secular antagonism between 
free trade and protectionism. 
In response to the optimism of the Christian utilitarian William Paley, the 
evangelical pessimism about human nature was expressed in the key texts of William 
Wilberforce (A Practical View of Christianity) and Malthus (Essay on the Principles 
of Population) in the last years of the eighteenth century.  Sin and human weakness 
featured strongly in this outlook, redemption to be achieved by a clear individual turn 
to Christ, the exercise of self-denial and restraint, moderation and abstinence.  
Speculative activity was to be avoided, and the moral uplift of the underclass was to 
be promoted by example and guidance.  Contrary to the Tory traditionalists such as 
Coleridge and Carlyle, Christian political economists did not dismiss the new science 
of economics but merely questioned its secular and optimistic mode.  Chalmers and 
Whately brought this line of thinking into the mainstream in the 1820s, adding virtue 
and harmony to the competitive spirit in order to reconcile profit-oriented economics 
with the concepts of the Christian virtuous life and of divine purpose and grace.  
Competition was interpreted as inadvertent cooperation for the common good, and 
thus embedded in a religiously sound framework.  Economic growth, including the 
mercantilist obsession with export growth, was thought unnecessary, as a society 
would be happiest in a static state of balance.  The concept of wasteful "oversupply" 
was considered to belong to the mindset of speculation and excessive production for 
                                                 












anticipated growth, and was to be avoided by resorting to free and open markets that 
would prevent the over-investment likely to happen in a protected market.150 
The alliance of Christian theology and political economy only lasted for the 
first half of the nineteenth century, until the remnants of the eighteenth-century 
hierarchical society were removed, and the theoretical yoking together was no longer 
necessary to achieve the transition.151  As soon as the theory alliance had achieved its 
goal of defeating the old hierarchical order, the secular and religious components 
parted ways again to pursue their own paths as secular economic science on the one 
hand, and Christian theology and social thought on the other.  After mid-century, 
Christian social movements focused on the moral aspects of economic life and the 
protection of the weak, and were no longer inclined to use the toolkit of classical 
economics to make their point.  Catching up after having ignored the secular Chartist 
movement in Britain, social consciousness and empathy were the tools of choice for 
Christian theoreticians, and competition and self-interest became anathema.152 
What is of particular interest here is that this temporary transformational 
alliance in Britain coincides with the period of profound change at the Cape that we 
are concerned with.  It injected a religious component into the economic discourse, 
and infused Christian thinking with ideas about the benefits of competition and free 
markets, as we will see below in the discussion of the predominant discourse at the 
Cape.  The early Victorian mindset of the Christian political economist articulated by 
the influential Thomas Chalmers in the 1820s combined moral paternalism with 
economic individualism and laissez-faire, a combination quite distinct from those 
including economic paternalism or moral libertarianism.153  Superimposed on the 
individualising culture at the Cape, where individuals were fending for themselves 
while seeking spiritual homes, this contributed to the compatibility of religious and 
economic behaviour.  The alliance of economic individualism and evangelical fervour 
uncannily resembles the role of Pentecostalism in contemporary South Africa. 
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The overlapping cultural currents of early nineteenth-century Britain thus 
included a heady mix of orthodox and liberal theology, secular political economy, 
philosophical radicalism, whiggism, and romanticism.  Christian political economy 
found its temporary place in this kaleidoscope as a combination of economics, 
religion, and liberal Whig thought,154 and was reflected in the literature of the time.  
Readers of novels and educational tracts, circulating in the empire, were treated to 
representations of the intersection of economic and ethical concepts, exploring their 
compatibility or conflict.  No author was more single-minded in the pursuit of 
popularising the new economics than Harriet Martineau.  Building on the work of 
Adam Smith, Malthus, and James Mill, Martineau translated the principles of political 
economy into narrative form, and promoted her Illustrations of Political Economy as 
texts for the layman throughout the empire in the 1830s.  Embedded in the period's 
conventional wisdom of the existence of a ladder of development for "inferior races" 
towards civilization, her novellas set in colonial and British environments are didactic 
tools to explain principles of economics.  The complementarity of labour and capital, 
the disadvantages of monopoly and the benefits of competition, are illustrated in 
works of fiction.  Martineau's promotion of political economy as a significant tool for 
understanding society was pitted against traditionalist sceptics such as Carlyle, and 
against social reformers who focused on the poor condition of industrial labour.155  
Strong voices criticizing the darker sides of the emerging British industrial 
economy were also coming from the Tory side of literature.  Charlotte Elizabeth 
Tonna, editor of the Christian Lady's Magazine in the 1830s and 1840s, and author of 
novels dealing with the plight of working women and children, applied her pre-
millenarian evangelical background to economic issues.  Spiritual urgency, related to 
the expectation of an early coming of Christ, informed her literary campaigns for 
improvements in factory conditions and for a general recognition of social crises.  The 
traditionalist Tory anti-capitalism of writers such as Tonna was engaged in constant 
debate with the promoters of the new political economy, secular or Christian.  The 
reformist policies of Whig and "liberal Tory" governments were attacked by the 
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traditionalists, and supported by the political economists.156  From another angle, 
Victorian fiction authors explored the interface between gift exchange and 
commercial exchange, anticipating the twentieth-century academic discussion on this 
subject initiated by Marcel Mauss.  In George Eliot's mid-Victorian novels, the 
conundrum of generosity and obligation versus economic action plays out in the 
conflicts between the traditional gift economy and the new commercial economy.157  
Her writing uses the Victorian ambiguity between valuing business success and 
criticizing ruthless profit-taking, striving for the ideal figure of the "honourable 
merchant" implicit in Adam Smith's twin concepts of benign self-interest (in the 
Wealth of Nations) and moral virtue (in the Theory of Moral Sentiments).  The fiction 
writing exposes the blurred boundaries between gifts and market transactions, and 
makes clear that both contain elements of reciprocity, trust, irrationality, control, and 
symbolism. 
 
Imperial Impact on the Cape 
 
Much of this mix of religious, ethical, and economic discourse that 
characterized the economic transition in Britain reached the Cape, as it reached other 
parts of the empire.  How much of this was really absorbed by an informed reading 
public in a colony that had been known during the Dutch period as not prone to 
intellectual discourse?  During much of the eighteenth century, the few individuals at 
the Cape who could boast of book learning were the ministers of the Dutch Reformed 
church, who mostly used their access to intellectual capital to keep it from others, and 
to defend the status quo.   It was only in the 1780s that the increasingly pietist 
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background of newly arriving Dutch Reformed ministers allowed them to recognise 
the value of a widespread reading culture, thus preparing the ground at the Cape for 
the reception of the avalanche of British written ideas in the early nineteenth century, 
and for the diversity of thought that came with it.158  
Knowledge flooding in from the Empire was absorbed into a rapidly changing 
society.  Saul Dubow notes that "..from the 1820s to the early 1850s, ...knowledge and 
knowledge-based institutions formed part of a drive to establish a middle-class civic 
order at the Cape that resisted autocratic colonial rule and asserted the rights owing to 
respectable citizens of a British colony of settlement", before settling into a mode of 
self-government later in the century.159  Participating in the universal progress of 
scientific and other knowledge was a desirable feature of the self-improving, educated 
citizen.  In the 1820s and 1830s, the knowledge pumped out throughout the Empire by 
the "Colonial Reformers" had a strongly liberal and humanitarian tinge, spreading a 
"positive" view that liberal societies were to be established wherever settlers arrived, 
and that self-government within a global civilizing confederation was a worthy aim.  
Even marrying the colonized locals was frequently seen as part of the civilizing 
mission, as the LMS missionaries demonstrated in practice at the Cape.  From the 
middle of the century onwards, rebellions in Jamaica and India, and the interminable 
Xhosa wars on the eastern Cape frontier tipped this optimism into disillusionment and 
a more "negative" view that dissent had to be suppressed in the colonies.  The 
European revolutions of 1848 also served as a sobering reminder that the rank and file 
of the citizenry could not be trusted with the business of governance.  Straight settler 
colonies with negligible indigenous population content could continue to indulge in 
liberal experiments, but others were to be kept in their place by authoritarian means.  
At that time, Cobden even worried that the authoritarianism in the colonies would 
feed back into British society.  But before this period of disillusionment, the early 
nineteenth century flow of ideas from the imperial network into Cape Town was a 
liberal one. 
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 In general, the Cape was not actively driving the imperial discourse, but was a 
taker of ideas and follower of events that were at best marginally related to local 
conditions.  More important parts of the Empire, such as the Caribbean plantation 
colonies, the Australian convict colonies, India, or Canada were providing the issues 
of the day, and influenced policies.  The abolition movement in the Empire was 
driven by the conditions on the sugar plantations of the Caribbean, making the Cape a 
"free rider" in the resulting system of financial compensation to slave owners.  The 
energy of the evangelical revival and the mission efforts emanated from Britain.  The 
issue of emigration to the settler colonies was focused on Australia and Canada, rather 
than on the Cape.  Liberal ideas were spread by the British reformers and the reform 
acts, including the Catholic emancipation, the Irish settlements, and the lobby against 
the Corn Laws, all transported to the Cape through enlightened administrators, 
literature, and commerce.  British settlers in the 1820s and 1830s brought with them a 
sense of upward mobility and the rise of a middle class of merchants and 
entrepreneurs, transforming a previously static colony of administrators with an 
agrarian hinterland.  Significant numbers of British colonial administrators and 
military officers serving in India spent long periods of recreational leave at the Cape 
(choosing this as a temperate location where they could still draw colonial pay), 
earning themselves the local sobriquet of "Nabobs" and "Hindoos", or simply 
"Indians", indicating their spending power and good connections with the Cape 
colonial authorities, and injecting broader imperial views into the local discourse. 
"Indians" financed worthy local causes, and were consulted by the governors of the 
day.  The British commission of inquiry of 1822, probing into the governor's 
autocratic style of governing the colony, succeeded in triggering a change of regime at 
the Cape that was in line with the transition from mercantilism to liberal free 
enterprise, and from authoritarian rule to liberal governance with an independent 
judiciary.160  Clearly, the imperial dog was wagging the Cape tail in many respects, as 
events at the Cape closely followed the trends in Britain and the Empire between 1820 
and the second half of the century. 
 An example of a policy that was not home-grown, but introduced into the 
Cape by the rotation of colonial administrators within the Empire, was that of using 
                                                 












convict labour for public works.161  In the early 1840s, a new colonial secretary in 
Cape Town, John Montagu, brought with him the system of using convicts for 
construction work from his previous posting in Van Diemen's Land.  Although this 
coincided with a long local public discussion in Cape Town about an alleged "labour 
shortage" in the colony after slave emancipation (see the discussion about Cape 
economic discourse below), it was a straightforward transfer of administrative method 
from another colony.  Furthermore, it had to be seen to be benign and humanitarian 
because of the omnipresence of British religious, humanitarian and liberal lobby 
groups that monitored the humane treatment of convicts.  The policy's success almost 
turned the Cape Colony into a destination for transporting convicts, avoided at the 
eleventh hour only by a popular uprising by the irate citizenry of Cape Town in 
1849/50. 
 Key personalities that shaped the Cape discourse were primarily those who 
arrived at the Cape during this time of transition, bringing with them the strands of 
thought that were informing the Empire.  The reverend Philip was the main carrier of 
the message of evangelical mission, uplift of the indigenous population, and 
abolitionism.  Thomas Pringle and John Fairbairn, creators of the Cape print media 
tradition, arrived with the heritage of the Scottish Enlightenment, Whig liberalism, 
local democracy and the concept of a free press as the forum of public opinion.  
William Porter, the long-serving attorney general of the time, injected Irish liberalism, 
humanitarianism, tolerance, and a Unitarian sense of religious freedom.  Lord 
Somerset, the long-term governor of the colony in the early 1800s, represented the old 
guard of unreconstructed authoritarian Toryism, but kick-started some of the 
economic innovations at the Cape.  Newly arrived British merchants such as Ebden, 
Pillans, and Ross became mainstays of the emerging commercial elite of the town, 
with close ties to the rest of the Empire.   Thomas Bowler, a self-made artist and art 
instructor, established a niche for the upwardly mobile lower middle class.  The influx 
of innovative thought was channelled through the arrival of new individuals. 
 A clear trend is observable running from the 1820s to the 1840s:  while the 
public discourse at the Cape at the beginning of the period is still dominated by local 
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news, local issues and local opinion, the end of the period is characterized by a heavy 
focus on news from the Empire as a whole, international issues, editorials on global 
matters, and a relative neglect of the parochial matters that occupied much of the early 
debate.  The imperial issues of local government, convict and poor youth 
transportation, and matters of international diplomatic and military conflict dominated 
the news read in Cape Town in the late stages of the transitional period. 
 By being compelled to participate in the “Great Experiment”, slave 
emancipation in the British Empire during the early decades of the nineteenth century, 
the Cape Colony reaffirmed its nature as a part of the global reach of British imperial 
policy.  By the 1830s, the time of accession of Queen Victoria, Cape Town was 
turning itself into an integral part of the network of British imperial cities, being 
pulled along by ideas, trade, customs and habits emanating from London.  Both the 
liberal ideas of free trade, free speech and civil liberties, and the resistance to this 
trend by traditional aristocratic interests, were copied from the British colonial centre.  
The British Victorian preoccupations with the dangers of an unruly urban underclass 
and with the improvement of moral and social standards of the populace found their 
equivalents in early Victorian Cape Town.  The dynamics of change in the city were 
reinforced by its nature as port of call for a variety of merchants, sailors, soldiers, and 
transients, all following the flows of trade and politics within the global Empire.  
London-based as well as Cape-based merchant families emerged, founding their 
fortunes on imperial trade.  Professional and occupational diversity mirrored that of 
the colonial metropolis.  The eighteenth-century status of Cape Town as a hinge 
between Holland and Batavia had been expanded to that of a cosmopolitan British 
colonial city strategically located between the British domains of the Atlantic and the 
Indian Ocean.162 
 Cape Town itself was increasingly becoming different from its rural 
hinterland.  In the thinly settled countryside and small communities, local hierarchies 
and cultural monopolies perpetuated a traditional worldview.  At the urban Cape, as in 
other British settler colonies of the time and in Britain itself, a middle class was rising 
that aspired to literacy and education, better housing, small commerce development, 
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and franchise expansion and home rule.  The evangelical flavour of British society 
injected a sense of morality and mission to improve the lot of others, and of uplifting 
“inferior” races and orders of society.  In early 1841, a group of Australian Quakers 
who had just completed an eighteen-month tour of the mission stations of the Cape 
colony, issued an extensive report that highlighted the differences between urban 
centres and the rural areas.163  They noted with approval the impressive "stage of 
civilization" achieved at the rural mission stations, praising not only the Moravians 
and the LMS, but also the Wesleyans, the Dutch Reformed and the French efforts.  As 
they observed, the missionaries "...must forget the colour of their own skins, and look 
upon those among whom they laboured as their fellow creatures,...and that therefore 
no one distinction should be made respecting them in spiritual things".  On the other 
hand, they deplored the situation in the urban areas of Cape Town and Grahamstown, 
where alcoholism was rampant among the underclass, driven by the "dop system" of 
labourers' wages being partly paid in liquor.  Both British and Dutch urban employers 
resorted to this practice, the former apparently even more readily than the latter.  The 
urban social fabric was much less stable than the rural one. 
 
The Window of Cape Liberalism 
 
   An interesting dialectic played out during the first half of the century, the 
British settlers being torn between liberal/egalitarian principles that called for home 
rule with a broad non-racial franchise (echoing British representative government of 
1832) plus free commerce, and their self-interest in preserving social status and 
political dominance vis-à-vis the non-white population of the colony.  “Christian 
economics” and “orthodox liberal economics” overlapped to a certain extent, but the 
Christian evangelical mission entered into a complex engagement with the imperial 
authorities and the local settler interests.  Liberal humanitarians at the Cape such as 
John Philip and John Fairbairn were practicing the same delicate balance as their 
contemporaries in other settler colonies, supporting local political rights and 
independence, but also realising that a strengthening of home rule would mean less 
                                                 












imperial protection for the indigenous population.  We will observe this conundrum 
when dealing with the political and social public discourse below. 
But what exactly was the basis for this dance between "Cape liberalism" and 
paternalism that flavoured the debate during the early decades of the nineteenth 
century?   This question has been researched to a significant extent by Andrew Bank, 
Stanley Trapido, Lalou Meltzer and others, and we do not need to delve into it more 
than necessary for our purposes here. 164 The British strand of secular thought that 
continued the tradition of liberal and utilitarian thinking influenced Cape Town at the 
same time as the humanitarian and evangelical strand of Christian thought did.  Both 
focused on fairness, justice, and equal rights, rather than on democracy and self-rule.  
On the other hand, the line of argument that promoted local self-rule and democratic 
independence from a colonial centre did not necessarily imply that all inhabitants of 
the local jurisdiction were equal before the law: on the contrary, the franchise and 
therefore the power to participate in decisions was to be reserved to the more 
politically mature members of society, defined by having accumulated a minimum 
amount of assets.  Others were to be guided gradually towards social and political 
maturity by education and religious discipline, over a long period of a civilizing 
process.  Unsurprisingly, those professing adherence to both liberal humanitarianism 
and to democratic self-government were in a quandary, in the same way as British 
liberal democrats who had to contend with how to deal with the Irish and labouring 
underclass. 
For some time, the fragile equilibrium in the minds of the decision-makers at 
the Cape could be sustained with a distinctly liberal flavour.  This window coincides 
with the first decades of the nineteenth century British period, the time of transition 
we are concerned with.  By 1836, Cape Town had acquired a non-racial municipal 
franchise, based on the relatively modest wealth threshold of ₤ 25, and by 1853 this 
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kind of franchise was extended to the colony's self-government as a whole.  This, 
however, proved to be the high point of the convergence between egalitarianism and 
self-rule.  As increasing numbers of non-white populations were incorporated into the 
colony with the steady advance of the eastern frontier into heavily settled Xhosa 
areas, white liberals who valued self-government more than equal rights parted 
company with those whose primary interest was to protect the rights of indigenous 
people.  Secular autonomists pointed to the mid-century rebellions in the Empire, and 
to the experience of Chartist insurrection in Britain, and succeeded in pushing the 
franchise threshold up to £ 75, including a literacy requirement, by the late nineteenth 
century.  The evangelical humanitarians pursued a course of championing and 
uplifting the underclass, even if that meant undermining colonial self-rule by the elite.  
Missionaries, at the Cape as in other settler colonies, would oppose movements 
towards settler independence that may damage indigenous rights, and would call for 
imperial intervention on the side of the natives to control the ambitions of the 
settlers.165  Many disillusioned liberal humanitarians, Christian and secular alike, 
adopted a harder, more paternalistic attitude towards the indigenous and freed slave 
population.  After mid-century, the window of convergence between non-racial 
egalitarianism and local democratic self-government had closed, and overlapping 
racial and economic stratification was taking hold. 
 Nevertheless, the short-lived period of convergence provided a heady mix of 
liberalism and change that shaped Cape Town culture deeply.  Identities were being 
formed rapidly, and socio-political transformation was aided by the emerging 
independent journalism of the day, radical evangelism, and indigenous activists.  
Long-serving liberal government officials such as William Porter, the Attorney 
General, put an official stamp on the liberal mindset: in Porter's case, informed by 
Irish Enlightenment and a benign Unitarianism.  Most importantly, new arrivals in the 
colony introduced the idea of an independent press and a printed forum for public 
opinion.  Thomas Pringle arrived with the 1820 British settlers at the eastern frontier, 
but soon drifted into Cape Town, where the cultural and religious ferment was felt 
more keenly: British merchants were increasing their influence and established the 
Commercial Exchange as a symbol of the importance of trade and commerce; 
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churches were being built, and the mission efforts were taking off; and, despite his 
generally reactionary instincts, the governor Lord Somerset had taken initiatives to 
bring about change, such as introducing sheep and horse breeding, pushing English as 
official language, putting master/slave relations on a more formal footing, starting 
schools, and introducing Scottish ministers into the Dutch Reformed church.  Allied 
with other pupils of the Scottish Enlightenment such as George Greig and John 
Fairbairn, Pringle confronted the official resistance to independent publishing and 
engaged in several years of infighting with the governor about the need for a free 
press.  The actual arrival of the freedom of the press at the Cape had to wait until 
1827, after the removal of Lord Somerset.166 
 Importantly, the divergence between Cape Town and the rural areas of the 
colony became more pronounced.  Cape Town absorbed the innovations of imperial 
thought into its new Anglophone and established but anglicizing Dutch elite, and the 
upwardly mobile Muslim community.  Concepts of socio-political liberalism, the free 
market, free wage labour, and competition among individuals were taking hold.  In 
comparison, the hinterland, dominated by traditional Dutch settlers and the dependent 
Khoi, practiced socio-political conservatism and an effort to preserve old hierarchies.  
Coercion was more prevalent than wage contracting, and competition manifested 
itself as conflicts between cultural collectives, not individuals.167  The Cape liberal 
window, with all its effects on Cape identities, was mostly evident in the urban area. 
The set of ideas circulating in the empire superimposed itself on the increasing 
religious and cultural diversity of the Cape Colony, and on the urban economy that 
was integrating into global trade.  The latter is what we turn our attention to next. 
 
3. The Cape Urban Economy 
 
The Economy in Transition 
 
"Good Hope" for this good land yet, 
If we would but dare and do, 
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If we would but stand with ready hand, 
To grasp ere the blessings go. 
"Good Hope" for this good land yet, 
If we would but cease to hope 
That the rain will drop and bring a crop, 
While we idly sit and mope. 
"Good Hope" for this good land yet, 
If we work e'en while we wait, 
For the sun and rain to ripen grain, 
We have sown, then left to fate.168 
 
The chief clog to any government at the Cape always has been – and probably will long 
remain – the numerous mixed races with which it has to deal.169 
 
For the poor Cape, left to its own resources, it is a very sad condition, a slovenly, sleepy, 
retrograding place, no steamers, no Indians, no nothing...170 
 
 Comments such as these, despairing of the willingness and ability of the Cape 
citizenry to pull itself together to generate political, economic, and social progress,   
were typical of the nineteenth century.  By 1841, an editorial noted sadly that there 
seemed to be no shortage of capital in the colony for consumption purposes, but: "It is 
only in things useful, in things solid and lasting, in things that require foresight, public 
spirit and combination, that a want of capital is felt.  There is abundance of capital, 
but it is diffused and inert.  The real want in this respect is a want of real objects on 
which capital may be concentrated and employed for the capitalist.  Great public 
works, for instance, in which capitalists, great and small, can by the purchase or sale 
of shares employ or withdraw their capital at pleasure."171  Modern theorists of 
development could not have put it better: short-term thinking trumped the long-term 
view. 
 The mid-Victorian era, the “great plateau bounded on either side by deep 
ravines and dangerous precipices”, the "age of equipoise", was the platform for the 
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pax Britannica and a global expansion of a liberal economy.172  Self-confidence and a 
belief in progress propelled industrialisation and economic growth, along with the 
conviction that a linear path to development had to culminate in a British-style 
society.  Some of this dynamism rubbed off on Cape Town and its hinterland, but 
perhaps not as intensively as one might expect.  Banks and merchant houses were 
established, and the international transport infrastructure improved dramatically, but 
the traditional patterns of trade through the city, in wine, wool and grain, were 
changing only slowly.  Rather than showing accelerated industrialisation in the wake 
of the injection of slave compensation capital in the late 1830s, the city economy 
remained dominated by artisans and small workshops, complemented by investors 
focusing on trading, construction, or mining.  Economic fragmentation seemed to 
prevent vigorous participation in the Victorian economic boom, as well as any 
industrial investment to compensate for weakening commodity prices under free 
trade.173  
 The first two decades of British rule at the Cape after the second and 
permanent occupation in 1806 may have injected a significant political and social 
stimulus into Cape Town society, but appeared to have left the stagnating economy to 
its own devices.174  Catering to passing ships and their passengers, supporting military 
                                                 
172 Asa Briggs quoted in W.E. Mosse, Liberal Europe – The Age of Bourgeois realism 1848-75 
(London: Thames & Hudson, 1974); see also the substantial body of literature on the British Empire in 
the mid-Victorian era, such as Niall Ferguson, Empire (NY: Basic Books, 2004); or E. J. Hobsbawm, 
The Age of Capital 1848-75 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1975). 
173 See the discussions in Charles H. Feinstein, An Economic History of South Africa (Cambridge: 
Cambridge Univ. Press, 2005); and in numerous contributions by Stanley Trapido, Nigel Worden, 
Vivian Bickford-Smith, Alan Mabin, and Robert Ross in edited volumes such as James and Simons, 
The Angry Divide, and Shula Marks and Anthony Atmore (eds), Economy and Society in Pre-Industrial 
South Africa (London: Longman, 1980).  See also the general discussion in Worden et al, Cape Town, 
159-170, and Denis Judd, Empire (London: HarperCollins, 1996), 112/113. 
174 The following discussion draws on the body of economic historiography of South Africa, including 
John Iliffe, "The South African Economy 1652-1997", in Economic History Review, Vol. 7, No. 1 
(1999),  87-103; A. Atmore and S. Marks, "The Imperial Factor in South Africa in the Nineteenth 
Century", in Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 3 (1973-75), 105-139; Lalou 
Meltzer, "Emancipation, Commerce and the Role of John Fairbairn's Advertiser"; and Robert Ross, 
"Rather Mental than Physical – Emancipations and the Cape Economy", both in Worden and Crais, 












units stationed at the Cape, and trading in the grain and wine produced in the 
immediate hinterland provided sustenance to a low-growth urban economy.  A brief 
boom in wine exports to Britain, driven by British tariff concessions, fizzled after the 
concessions were withdrawn again.  What revitalised the commercial life of the town 
was the windfall of British government compensation money that accrued to Cape 
slave owners after the formal emancipation of their human assets 1834-38.  
Mortgages with slaves as collateral could be repaid, and additional capital was 
available for investment.  About £ 1.2 million, minus the hefty discounts charged by 
London and Cape financial agents to repatriate the funds to the Cape, constituted a 
huge injection of capital for a small economy.  Alas, no lasting productive value was 
created by the windfall.  The funds were invested primarily in Cape real estate, often 
designed to provide cheap rental housing for the emerging coloured underclass that 
made Cape Town its home after being freed from bondage.  Apart from the slowly 
growing wool export trade generated by the introduction of Merino sheep farming on 
the Eastern frontier, commercial activity in Cape Town remained structurally what it 
had been before the windfall. 
  Consequently, Cape Town business by mid-century was still dominated by a 
wide spectrum of wholesale and retail merchants, who constituted the main drivers of 
the urban economy.  The spectrum ranged from the mercantile elite, strongly British 
oriented with commercial networks in the empire and the Cape administration, and 
focusing on international trade in wine and wool plus imports of consumer goods, 
through the growing group of local white merchants of both British and Dutch stock 
with interests in the local retail economy and property market, to the large group of 
coloured (both “Malay” and other) small traders, fishermen, and artisans.  All were 
engaged in the wholesale or retail trade of commodities, consumer goods or services, 
the longer-term focus of investment being limited to real estate.  The rapid 
industrialisation characteristic of the home country of the empire was largely missing, 
as investment at the Cape was not channelled into sustainable industrial production.  
Only part of this phenomenon can be explained by the sheer economic weight of the 
imperial centre, and the marginality of the Cape Colony in the imperial scheme of 
things, forcing the colony into mere commodity supply – Canadian, Australian, and 
Indian cities picked up industrialisation faster.  Artisanal and commercial skills were 












Before the minerals boom of the 1870s and 1880s, the Cape Colony was the 
“Cinderella” of the empire,175 known for its diversity-driven individualism and 
fractious society. 
 
Population and Economy 
 
 Within this economically stagnant colony, the urban centre of Cape Town 
showed even less dynamism.  While the colony's population more than doubled from 
about 60,000 in 1800 to 150,000 in 1840, Cape Town grew only from 17,000 
inhabitants in 1805 to 21,000 in 1840.176  Rather than attracting a growing labour 
force by generating new economic activities as urban theory would lead us to believe, 
the town remained an administrative and commercial centre without significant 
growth potential.  Statistics in 1841 still showed only 2,500 houses in Cape Town, 
despite the upheavals of the slave emancipation aftermath after 1838.  The town's 
population structure, however, remained similar to that of the colony as a whole: the 
colony in 1800 had about two non-whites (slave or free) for each white inhabitant; by 
1840, the proportions were almost equal, as the white population increased faster 
through immigration and reproduction, while the natural growth of the slave 
population had been slower.  Cape Town showed a similar structural change over the 
same period, indicating that no significant labour influx from the hinterland had taken 
place that would have boosted the non-white population.177  The town remained a 
service economy, with a proliferation of retail establishments, and a large number of 
skilled craftsmen.  Even when excluding the slaves in an 1820 survey of occupations, 
the significant numbers of carpenters, masons, tailors, fishermen, embroiderers, 
seamstresses, cobblers, coopers, or laundresses would have guaranteed a keen 
competitive atmosphere in a smallish town.  Room hire and wine sales were of course 
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among the prime business models in the "tavern of the seas".178  After slave 
emancipation in the 1830s, the numbers of independent skilled craftsmen and 
unskilled labourers would have swelled even more, all trying to make a living in a 
limited and only slowly growing economy.   
 Rather than using the potential for economies of scale, individuals tried to 
make a living in a crowded market.  Any manufacturing tended to be small-scale, and 
catered to the needs of the urban population.  A steam mill was in operation since 
1818.  In the 1820s, a pottery kiln and several silversmith and copper/tinsmith 
operations were established.  During the 1830s, iron foundries appeared, and joined 
water mills, two steam mills, tanning operations, breweries, candle makers, snuff 
producers, one hat and one soap manufacturer, brick kilns and whale fisheries.  More 
sophisticated equipment and consumer goods were imported, and sold at auctions and 
special sales coinciding with the arrival of ships.179 
 An economy of this kind did not loom large in the trade flows of the empire.  
Compared to the volumes of trade with the West Indies and other colonies, the share 
of the Cape in imperial trade was minuscule, well under 1% of British imports.  
Nevertheless, trade volumes in and out of Cape Town grew rapidly from a low base, 
as the city integrated itself into the British imperial network.  Between the 1820s and 
the 1850s, exports grew from about £ 200,000 per year to about £ 1.7 million, the 
growth being mainly driven by raw materials such as the newly introduced wool 
business.  Imports grew at a similar pace.  However, the structural impact on the 
urban area was small, compared to the hinterland.  The exodus from the colony of 
about 12,000 mostly Dutch farmers in the 1830s and 1840s in the wake of the 
emancipation of forced labour changed the countryside significantly, bringing in 
British and German replacement settlers, the wool industry, and new growth areas in 
the Eastern Cape and Natal.  Wool gradually replaced wine as main export 
commodity, after the preferential British tariffs for Cape wine were abolished.  Much 
of the export growth was due to re-exports through Cape Town, acting as an entrepot 
centre for the Cape trade route, and channelling trade to Mauritius and Reunion.180   
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 We seem to be observing a paradox, where the urban area was not the one that 
led the economic change, but followed the changes in the rural areas.  Cape Town was 
catering to the changing trade flows and hinterland trends, using the flexibility of its 
competitive and entrepreneurial individuals, but not generating new business models 
that would create employment beyond the needs of the urban area. 
 
The Commercial Exchange 
 
  One of the most successful business models that suited the circumstances of 
Cape Town in the early British period was that of the wholesale merchant with 
international connections.  As merchandise trade through Cape Town was growing 
robustly, this was a potentially lucrative enterprise with relatively modest investment 
and manpower needs, and sufficient flexibility to switch between traded goods if the 
market changed.  The trading houses that had sprung up in the first decades of British 
rule at the Cape did well out of wine exports, but had no trouble shifting their 
attention to wool exports as demand for Cape wine plummeted in Britain.  A steady 
demand for consumer goods at the Cape provided a regular profit base from imports, 
and transhipment of goods in Cape Town for re-export continued regardless of the 
local demand and supply situation.  Risk was diversified, and financial commitments 
were linked to predictable trade patterns.181  
 The symbol of the importance of this business was the Commercial Exchange.  
From the small beginnings of a "commercial coffee house" under the first British 
occupation of the Cape, and the "Kamer van Commercie" under Batavian rule, the 
Cape Town merchants succeeded in gathering enough subscriptions to lay the 
foundation stone of an impressive building in the centre of town in 1819, which 
should become the hub of commercial and public discourse known as the Commercial 
Exchange.  The names of Hamilton Ross, Ebden, Pillans, Thomson, Bergh, Christian, 
Chiappini, Rutherfoord, Hertz, Murray, Collison and a number of others, prominent 
merchants at the Cape and involved in the early days of the Exchange, occur with 
regularity in the commercial, social, and political annals of the colony.  They were the 
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voices driving much of the discourse, the raisers of funds for a variety of charitable 
causes, schools and private infrastructure , and the initiators of petitions and 
representations to the colonial government.  Eventually, they would be well 
represented on the first councils that led to self-rule at the Cape.182  
 The Exchange grew into a centre of information and knowledge for the 
commercial elite, where journals, newspapers and books could be consulted that had 
been obtained from passing ships, and public discourse could take place that was 
relatively independent of the government of the day.  During the 1830s, a division of 
labour developed between the Exchange and the newly established knowledge 
institutions of the South African Library and Museum, the Exchange focusing on 
more current published material that was of relevance to the business at hand.  
Similarly, the emergence in the late 1820s of a free press in the form of the South 
African Commercial Advertiser, the culmination of the efforts of Greig, Pringle and 
Fairbairn, took over much of the functions of the public forum.183 
 
Competition and Monopoly 
 
 While imbued by the spirit of free enterprise, free markets and competition, 
the merchants were not beyond lobbying for their own interests even if this meant a 
possible curtailment of competition.  We will see below how the public debate about 
removing the Far Eastern trade monopoly of the East India Company was conducted 
in high free-market dudgeon, while at the same time numerous petitions were fired off 
to ask for a restoration of the preferential tariffs for Cape wine.  On the whole, the 
Cape merchants certainly favoured a sweeping away of monopolies in the interest of 
the growth of free trade, in line with the principles of political economy emanating 
from Britain.  Nevertheless, when established privileges were threatened, 
protectionism was tolerated.  High principles were put aside with pragmatic ease, in 
order to ensure the smooth continuation of business. 
 The dispute about the East India Company's formal monopoly in the empire's 
trade with China and other eastern sources of goods occupied much of the Cape 
merchants' time.  The trade in tea was the focal point, as this was a highly visible item 
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consumed at the Cape.  Since the early 1820s, the merchants who were to form the 
core of the Exchange argued that the Company's monopoly was making tea much 
more expensive than necessary, and that supplies were deliberately limited to keep 
prices high.  Similarly, they petitioned the Cape and British governments to allow 
non-Company merchants to trade freely between China and Britain, without having to 
seek permission from the Company.  Using their imperial networks and their London 
champions, the Cape of Good Hope Trade Society, the merchants lobbied the British 
government vigorously.  It was only during the 1830s, however, that Cape merchants 
were first allowed to use a loophole in the Company's charter, and import tea from 
England independently.  The remaining privileges of the East India Company were 
eventually removed, but well into the 1840s, the Cape's potentially lucrative entrepot 
trade in Far Eastern and non-Empire goods was limited by British trading restrictions.  
Despite the best efforts of the independent merchants, a more open trade regime had 
to wait for the more comprehensive liberalisation in the empire around mid-century, 
enabling Cape Town to act as a free port.184 
 Despite the free-trade tenor of the political economy discourse of the time, 
much echoed at the Cape, the commercial realities of trade were much more limiting, 
hampered by protectionist regulations.  Taking their cue from the trade theorists, 
however, the Cape Town traders used the arguments of the free-traders to chip away 
at the edifice of protectionism.  Small successes were pocketed pragmatically, 
loopholes were accepted as reasonable second-best solutions. 
 
Banking on Commerce 
 
 Given the heavy reliance of the Cape Town economy on trade and commerce, 
both wholesale and retail, the availability of credit was of paramount importance.  The 
absence of private banking at the beginning of the nineteenth century hampered not 
only the commercial activities of Cape Town merchants and retailers, but also the 
businesses of the wine and grain farmers in the hinterland.  Adding to the transaction 
costs in the colony was the fact that at the beginning of the century it was a multi-
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currency economy: apart from the gradually appearing pound sterling, transactions 
were conducted or accounted for in the prevalent basic Dutch colonial rixdollars, 
schillings and stuyvers; Indian rupees and "star pagoda" coins; Dutch guilders; 
Spanish dollars ("pieces of eight"); and Portuguese money.  Exchange rates between 
these currencies varied over time, and merchants and consumers were kept on their 
toes to identify whether they were paying and receiving correct amounts.  Lady Anne 
Barnard's shopping records for her extensive household and entertainment at the Cape 
are instructive.  A purchase of 246 lbs of meat from a local supplier was quoted at 2 
Dutch schillings per lb, billed for a total of £ 24/12s/0d, and paid in 98.5 Spanish 
dollars.   460 bottles of claret were imported for a total cost of £ 50.  As no bank 
credit was available for such bulk purchases, customers ran up credit with the supplier 
until they obtained currency to settle.  Lady Anne's account ran for five years before it 
was settled.185 
 To address the shortage of credit and of money in circulation, the Dutch 
authorities had already established a government-owned Lombard Bank before the 
turn of the century, providing mortgaged credits.  It was succeeded by a Lombard and 
Discount Bank in 1808, still government-owned, which took deposits from the public 
at 5% and discounted bills at 6%, issuing paper money.  An inflation of paper 
rixdollars ensued, leading to a weakening of the rixdollar exchange rate against the 
pound sterling from the original 4s to 1s 6d in 1825.  The lack of credibility of the 
government bank lending, and the difficulty of obtaining bills of exchange, led to a 
boom in private lending by local individuals, commonly backed by assets of the 
debtor.   For the first four decades of the century, until the first private bank was 
opened in 1837, the window for private lending entrepreneurs was lucrative.186 
  The van der Poel family was representative of this type of lender.  Starting in 
1804 as the widow of a wealthy burgher, Susanna van der Poel used her inherited 
estate of more than 112,000 Dutch guilders (about 37,000 rixdollars, or over £ 9,000) 
to provide long-term financing at 6% per annum against collateral.  With inflation at 
2% at the time, a real interest rate of 4% constituted useful income for a widow.  By 
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the 1840s, her son administered her estate of about 450 outstanding loans, ranging 
from 5,000 to 35,000 guilders equivalent.  Loans were extended mostly to members of 
Cape Town's Dutch community, many for mortgages with real estate as collateral.187 
 Not all loans by private lenders were backed by real estate:  slaves were a 
useful asset for collateral, and could be sold when liquidity was required.  At the 
beginning of the century, Mirza Abu Taleb Khan sold his slave for 500 rixdollars, 
approximately comparable to the going rate of £ 125 for an average slave as reported 
by Khan's aquaintance Lady Anne.  By 1823, more than 4,000 slaves were mortgaged, 
and by the time of emancipation half the slave population of the colony was alleged to 
have been used as collateral.188 
 Work by Meltzer and others has established that urban private lenders, 
primarily the major merchants of Cape Town, exhibited different creditor strategies 
than rural lenders or the government bank.  Real estate and slaves, offered as 
collateral by agricultural debtors, apparently was too cumbersome for the urban 
merchants.  Recovery of the collateral in the case of default may not have offered the 
speed and flexibility needed for the urban economy.  Only the urban wine merchants, 
closely linked to the Cape wine industry, joined large farmers and government 
agencies in providing loans secured by land or slaves.  Merchant lenders tended to 
extend credit on the basis of bills of exchange, although some private creditors, such 
as the van der Poel family, preferred real estate as security.189 
 By the 1840s, the era of independent private lenders was coming to an end.  
The Cape of Good Hope Savings Bank was established in 1831, taking deposits from 
the public.  In 1837, the first joint stock bank, the Cape of Good Hope Bank, was 
launched by a group of merchant shareholders to smooth the provision of commercial 
credit and liquidity, followed later by the South African Bank and several others.  We 
will see below how competition manifested itself in the taking of different positions 
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Abolition Compensation and Its Uses 
 
 The Cape squandered its big opportunity to use a financial windfall wisely.  
The compensation money for the loss of human assets through slave emancipation, 
worth more than £ 1 million in London, found its way to Cape slave owners during 
the late 1830s.  Rather than looking for long-term productive investment, the Cape 
recipients of the compensation for the loss of their slaves poured the windfall funds 
into repayment of debts, consumption, and real estate.  Bankruptcies declined during 
the years of the influx of the compensation money after 1834, and imports jumped 
dramatically.  Merchants were accepting compensation claims in lieu of payment for 
imports.  Conversions of land held in long-term leases into freehold land rose 
significantly, indicating that much of the compensation money went into land. The 
sudden glut in the money supply depressed interest rates, as the government bank 
could not identify enough demand for the financing of major investments.  
Nevertheless, it did not seem to have led to significant inflation: beef in 1800 was 
reported to cost 2.5-4p per pound, but was still listed at 3p per pound in 1852.  
Unskilled labour wages in Cape Town in 1800 averaged 1s 6p per day, and a 
comparable 43s 9p per month in 1847.  Skilled tradesmen were paid 3s per day in 
1800, and a range of 2s 6p to 7s 6p in 1847.190 
 The only observable rise in production activity was in the construction of 
housing: the number of brick kilns more than doubled within a few years, and urban 
and suburban plots were subdivided to allow the construction of small-scale houses 
for the newly freed labourers and craftsmen.  On the whole, the compensation 
windfall brought about a temporary boom in consumption and real estate 
development, without leaving a legacy of productive investment that would sustain 
long-term growth.191 
 This short-lived boom at the Cape stands in stark contrast to the world 
economy of the time.  From the 1820s onwards, until the acceleration of global 
economic growth around 1870, the world economy showed slow but steady growth, 
driven by Europe, Latin America, and particularly the British settler colonies other 
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than the Cape.  The settler colonies, including the by then independent USA, 
benefited not only from a strong rise in population due to immigration, but also from a 
significant increase in output per capita.  The latter could only come about as the 
result of sustained investment with a long time horizon, something that seems to have 
been absent at the Cape.  Global foreign trade 1820-1870 rose four times as fast as 
economic output, reflecting the liberalisation of world trade under British pressure, 
and the rapid integration of the world economy into the first global system.  
Compared to this trajectory, the Cape shows a strong increase of foreign trade over 
the period, much of it due to the increased wool exports after the successful 
introduction of Merino sheep, but indicates stagnating output in other production after 
reaching a kind of natural limit of the absorption of its own agricultural products after 
the 1820s.  The steady growth of output per capita seen in other settler colonies is not 
evident, indicating a lack of significant manufacturing investment.192 
 
The Infrastructure Conundrum 
 
 One of the obstacles to investment was the chronically poor infrastructure at 
the Cape.  During the first half of the nineteenth century, it was by no means clear that 
government had an obligation to invest in major infrastructure works.  Although 
flagged as one of the basic functions of the state by Adam Smith much earlier, the 
discussion was still in progress during the early 1800s: roads were established and 
maintained by those over whose land they passed, urban water supply was private or 
cooperative at best, and urban lighting was up to individual initiative.  We will see 
below how vigorous the public discourse was on this matter in Cape Town.   
 Among the reasons of the government's reluctance to get involved, besides the 
issue of principle, was the tenuous financial situation of the public purse.  During 
most of the period examined here, up to the 1840s, the colonial administration could 
barely cover recurrent expenditures, mainly government salaries, from its budget.   In 
1830, only 6% of public expenditure in the colony were spent on capital projects, 
while the rest went for recurrent spending.  Three quarters of the budget were devoted 
                                                 
192 Angus Maddison, Monitoring the World Economy 1820-1992 (Paris: OECD, 1995), 61-64;  the 












to the salaries of the civil service.193 Large amounts of debt were incurred just to stay 
afloat; considerations of major capital expenditure, excepting public buildings, were 
out of the question.  The continuing issue of paper rixdollars depreciated the Cape 
currency against sterling, and sterling loans had to be obtained from Britain.  It was 
not until the 1840s, under the colonial Secretary Montagu, that a concerted effort was 
made to reduce the colony's huge debt burden.  Selling of government land, collection 
of tax arrears, selling convict labour, and the imposition of stamp duties helped to 
stabilize the colony's public finances.194 
 The first public sector infrastructure entity, apart from military investments in 
roads and harbours, was the Central Board of Commissioners of Public Roads that 
was established in 1834, the year in which a Legislative Council that included 
colonists and senior officials to advise the governor, was created.  But it was not 
before the 1840s that government investment in roads and passes took off, making 
transport and travel between Cape Town, Stellenbosch and the communities beyond 
the encircling mountain chains less risky and more efficient.  Only from the 1860s 
onwards, the government started to invest in harbour and railway infrastructure. 195 
The first water supply pipes and public fountains for the urban population of Cape 
Town were constructed during the first British decades, but had to be supplemented 
by the establishment of private bath facilities in the 1830s.  In 1840, shortages became 
severe, and the control of the water supply was handed over to the municipality.  A 
private water supply company was formed, but failed.  Eventually, in the 1850s, the 
municipality managed to finance and construct the first reservoirs to maintain a steady 
supply.196 
 During the early decades of the 1800s, infrastructure investment was a matter 
of collecting funding pledges from private investors until enough resources were 
committed to start the construction of a road or a jetty, which had to promise a return 
to the investors.  Putting together these consortia for project finance was tedious, as 
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the public discourse demonstrates.  The obstacles encountered in raising funds for 
infrastructure projects were the same as those for collecting funds for schools, 
hospitals, and churches, exacerbated by the need to guarantee a return.  Nevertheless, 
small projects could be implemented in this manner, and the optimists were 
envisaging opportunities for private financing of major transport links to make the 
Cape economy more competitive internationally.  After a petition in the 1820s by 
merchants to ease the timber shortage in Cape Town by dedicating a government ship 
to the transport of timber from the Eastern Cape was denied, the private Good Hope 
Steam Navigation Company was established in 1836.  A ship was purchased and used 
profitably, and was replaced after it sunk in 1840.197  This was by no means unusual at 
the time:  public/private partnerships, or fully privately financed infrastructure 
projects were imperial realities during the first half of the nineteenth century.  
Government matching funds often were available if enough private funding had been 
committed.  Much acrimonious public discussion and negotiation preceded such 
projects, a fact that brings us back to the nature of the debate at the Cape, explored 
below. 
 The harbour of Cape Town is a good case in point.  Table Bay and its 
approaches are vulnerable to sudden storms, and the creation of a protected harbour 
was constantly under discussion.  As public funds were scarce, repeated efforts were 
made since the beginning of the century to put together financing for a breakwater or 
stone pier project.  In 1833, one was started but abandoned because of bickering 
between the Council and the investors.  Instead, several "dwarf jetties" at significantly 
lower cost were constructed as public/private partnerships.  The public construction of 
a breakwater to create a protected harbour had to wait until the 1860s, finally reducing 
the high volume of shipwrecks in Table Bay.  Gas street lighting, which had been 
introduced in London around 1800, did not appear in Cape Town until the 1840s, 
when Baron von Ludwig established a private Gas Light Company which gradually 




                                                 
197 Laidler, The Growth and Government, 263/4. 














 In an urban space such as the early nineteenth-century Cape, the centrifugal 
forces of individualisation militated against the maintenance of an orderly 
municipality.  Observers during the first two decades of British rule after 1806 noted 
the "lax manner in which powers were used", and directions were carried out.  A 
rudimentary policing service was in existence since 1819, the first building codes and 
regulations appeared in the 1820s, dealing primarily with proper residential 
construction standards to avoid fire hazards.  A proper municipal administration, 
however, had to wait until the late 1830s: in 1836, permission was granted to form 
municipalities by meetings of householders with a minimum rental or tax payment 
record.  The householders were to elect municipal commissioners to administer the 
community, and wardmasters (an already existing local office) to monitor the 
neighbourhoods.    In 1839, Cape Town as seat of government was created as a 
municipality by ordinance, drawing its main revenue from property taxes.199 
 The main concerns of the urban administrators were the maintenance of order 
and cleanliness, the control of commercial anarchy, and the apprehension of 
criminals.  Maintenance of the few public amenities was attempted valiantly: public 
water furrows running along the streets were kept clear, footbridges over them were 
constructed, and the canal walls were repaired.  Residents crushing the water furrows 
by driving coaches over them into their driveways were a constant source of concern.  
So was the state of the Roggebaai beach in Table Bay, focus of the small fisheries 
business, after a new butchers' shambles was approved to be located there in 1821 and 
promptly polluted the entire beach area.  Wealthier residents moved further out to 
Green Point to escape the filth accumulating on the beach.  By 1840, the canals and 
ditches in town were covered to improve sanitation and appearances. 
 The police force was improved gradually, and after much discussion.  From 
the early simple watchman service, the force expanded and acquired a police 
superintendent (also responsible for fire-fighting).  By the 1840s, a dispute had 
erupted about the whether the jurisdiction of the police was to include the monitoring 
of the steadily deteriorating urban cleanliness and sanitary standards.  Complaints 
                                                 












about the inefficiency of coordination between the municipal administration and the 
police proliferated, as did concerns about the safety of the Grand Parade square. 
 Having reviewed the confluence of the Empire-driven religious, cultural, 
political, social, and economic transitions at the Cape, let us turn to the public 
discourse dealing with these matters, to validate the linkages between religious 












   
 
Chapter Three: The Cape Public Discourse, 1820-1850 
 
 Whether looking at the developments in the religious/cultural sphere, or in the 
social/economic one, the importance of public debate in settling just about anything in 
Cape Town at this time of transition is glaringly obvious.  A community of 
individualists seeking their identities and their positions in the social tapestry needed 
the public sphere to air grievances and arrive at workable solutions.  The voice of a 
weak civil authority with limited financial resources was drowned by the clamour of a 
myriad competing interests. 
 Starting in the late 1820s, the emergence of a free press and the increasing 
assertiveness of the Cape Town educated population created a growing public space 
of discourse.  The concerns and arguments of the community came into the open, and 
the platforms of newspapers and public meetings increased the circle of participants in 
the debate.  Political, economic, social and cultural decisions by the authorities and by 
institutions became subject to public scrutiny and criticism.  It is this public discourse 
which we will now examine for indicators of any correlation between religious and 
socio-economic mode of argument.  The attitudes that emerge in the observed public 
debate contain value judgments and cultural premises that are relevant to the question 
at hand: namely, whether the urban diversity of religions and ethnicities, flavoured by 
the British imperial strands of thought and economic realities, indicates a particular 
path of development at the Cape. 
 The cultural paradigm that underlies the stream of public opinion can be read 
in relation to a set of yardsticks that are drawn in simplified form from the much more 
detailed survey questions of the World Values Surveys designed by Inglehart and his 
co-authors.  The assessment where on the spectrum of values the gist of public 
discourse is located is a qualitative one:  it is sufficient to record, for example, 
whether the confidence in religious institutions is high or low, or whether respect for 
authority is pronounced or weak, or whether trust in dealing with unrelated people 
exists to a significant extent or not.  The values help to locate the Cape Town urban 
society of the early nineteenth century on the Inglehartian cultural map in which one 












dynamic secularity, and the other axis defines the place between communitarian 
survivalist solidarity and individualist self-expression.  They serve as rough guide to 
the location of the society on a development path that meanders within the 
coordinates of the traditional/secular-modernist and the collective-survival/self-
expression axes.  What this location tells us is what kind of socio-economic 
development is correlated with the diversity-driven religious/cultural environment at 
the Cape. 
 The time period examined starts with the first major transition from serfdom to 
personal independence, Ordinance 50 in 1828 (coinciding with the introduction of a 
free press as public forum of opinion at the Cape), and runs through to circa 1840/41, 
the years immediately following the slave emancipation period 1834-38.  This 
transformational period is characterised by rapid social change, a mass search for new 
identities, integration into the British global economy, and the injection of evolving 
British religious, social and economic thought into the colony.  While the public 
discourse of the time naturally includes the concerns of the whole colony, we focus 
here primarily on the attitudes expressed by Capetonians, and relating to matters of 
urban interest.  Nevertheless, the broader issues of rural mission, Eastern Frontier 
conflict and British settlement there, and the economy of the colony as a whole 
feature in Cape Town public opinion, and illustrate the prevalent views of society.  
Values and attitudes were derived from (1) reported news items, (2) detailed 
renderings of public meetings and court proceedings, (3) editorials, and (4) letters to 
the editor or open letters printed in the press.  The main forum of public debate and 
publication of record from the late 1820s onwards was Fairbairn's newspaper, the 
"South African Commercial Advertiser" (SACA).  These findings were checked 
selectively by reference to contemporary descriptions, diaries, and narratives, and 
archival records. 
 
1. Discourse on Religion 
 
Christians, Muslims, and Heathens 
 
 The emancipation of the Khoi and Free Blacks to a theoretically equal status 












Muslims in Cape Town.  Although the open and formal practice of Islam had been 
tolerated by Batavian and British authorities since 1804, editorial opinion in 1828 
noted that "an industrious and peaceable class of inhabitants whom an enlightened 
policy would have cherished and perfected, were up to 3 July 1828 treated with the 
utmost harshness and ignominy....They could not hold landed property nor remain in 
the Colony, though born there, without special permission and ample security....They 
were liable to arrest without warrant – and yet they were taxed up to the lips, like the 
other free inhabitants.  Since their Emancipation, their conduct has been most 
exemplary....Many of them are men of the most estimable character, inoffensive in 
their demeanour and humane and generous in their dispositions."1  Evidently, a 
reservoir of humanitarian and liberal tolerance had been tapped that coincided with 
the conviction that all taxpayers should be treated equally.  The fact that these solid 
citizens were votaries of "Mohammedanism" was beside the point for the editorialist. 
 This relaxed attitude towards the presence of Muslims in the midst of the Cape 
society had been building for some time.  At the beginning of the century, an 
apparently well-to-do Indian Muslim traveller published his recollections of a stay at 
the Cape before continuing his journey to England.2  Carrying sufficient funds and 
saleable assets such as muslin and a "Negro slave", he was able to afford to abandon a 
poorly captained ship, and pay for lodgings and board at the Cape for a considerable 
time until a higher-quality means of transport became available.  Lady Anne Barnard 
was among his acquaintances, a name he did not neglect to drop in his report.  A keen 
cultural observer, Khan noted the rudeness and avarice of Dutch, Scottish and English 
landlords in Simonstown and Cape Town, the susceptibility of local Dutch ladies to 
the charms and presents of the English newcomers, and the brutality of Dutch masters 
towards their slaves.  More importantly for our purposes, he noted the high incidence 
and visibility of Muslims in the urban area, and reported on the economic situation of 
the strongly Muslim lower orders.  Slaves were being hired out for one to four 
Rixdollars per day, and a slave tailor was able to accumulate enough money to 
purchase  his and his wife's freedom.  Khan mentioned approvingly that the Muslim 
landlord he eventually rented from turned out to be a most pleasant change from his 
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former non-Muslim ones.  Apparently, Muslims were to be found also among the 
better-off members of society: Khan notes the presence of wealthy Muslim merchants 
and landlords, and of recent immigrants such as a Sheikh Abdulla who had arrived 
from Mecca, married a local "Malay" woman and settled in Cape Town.  Khan moved 
comfortably in these circles, and eventually was able to sell his slave and other 
valuables to purchase his onward passage.  The presence of Muslims, both rich and 
poor, was perceived as an unexceptional fact already at the turn of the century. 
 Pragmatic attitudes towards the Cape Town Muslims were not limited to 
economic and civil rights issues.  Newspaper debate dealt with the fact that court 
proceedings required the administering of oaths to Muslim witnesses.  As Muslims 
frequently appeared in Cape courts, the standard Christian oath was not available to 
bind witnesses to the truth, and a Muslim version had to be used.  Imams ("Malay 
Priests" in the diction of the day) were needed as the witnesses would not swear an 
oath without the imam's guidance.  The problem arose that imams had to spend 
inordinately long times attending court cases, not an easy thing to do for a part-time 
religious leader who had a regular commercial occupation.  Helpful letters to the 
editor suggested to institute a reimbursement system to compensate the imams for the 
productive time lost.3 
 The legal pragmatism extended to other groups that were not Christian.  An 
editorial in 1830 noted that the court practice of routinely dismissing cases brought by 
plaintiffs who could not answer theological questions coherently was discriminatory.  
Strong criticism was directed at the hypocrisy of the courts that deprived cases of the 
testimony by "unbelievers" while tolerating that the 30,000 slaves and 34,000 Khoi in 
the colony were not receiving the legally mandated religious instruction.  Poorly 
educated plaintiffs who were abused by owners and masters thus were unable to make 
their case in court.  In general, it was noted that many witnesses of good character and 
with honourable service were excluded on the grounds of the ignorance of religious 
matters, and not being able to take the oath.  A fair application of justice to all was 
seen as still in the distant future.4 
 To remedy the widespread lack of religious education for the underclass, 
public opinion did not limit itself to the promotion of the Christian faith.  A letter to 
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the editor noted that the "Malay" Muslim community of Cape Town was an important 
contributor to society, but suffered from under-education.  The solution proposed was 
to subsidise the printing and wide distribution of the Qur'an ("their prayer book") in 
Arabic, English and Dutch to facilitate the educational uplift of Muslims.  Given that 
the letter writers and readers of the newspaper were overwhelmingly Christian, this 
was an astonishingly tolerant and realistic position.5 
 However, the pragmatism was tempered by a felt need to protect the 
proselytising efforts of the Christian missions.  The urban missions were struggling in 
1829, and were constantly short of funds.  The Wesleyan mission was forced to close 
its "Day School for the Heathen" because of low attendance.  It is noteworthy that the 
Wesleyans did not seem to have the same problem in rural areas, where new mission 
found ready recruits.  The SAMS, on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of its project 
for "instruction of the coloured population in town", reported that it was in debt to the 
tune of 1,000 Rixdollars, and was short of donations.  Letters to the editor noted with 
concern that the law that required the indentured children of "prize negroes" to receive 
schooling and religious instruction was being routinely flouted by white masters, thus 
opening the door to conversions to Islam.  An indignant white citizen wrote in pursuit 
of this matter on behalf of a "prize negro" woman.  The same complaints surfaced 
with respect to the religious instruction of slaves: the rules called for children of 
Christian slaves to be baptized, and for all Christian owners to ensure that slave 
children in their care were to be schooled up to age 10.  The rules were ignored, and 
the vacuum was filled by Muslim education.  Editorial opinion castigated slave 
owners for their hypocritical descriptions of slaves as heathens, and placed the blame 
for slaves' lack of education and moral instruction on the owners.  It noted that slaves 
had an excellent record of law obedience, 99% of slave convictions being for "petty 
insubordination", and that education and moral uplift would help to eliminate these 
petty offenses.  Owners who neglected religious instruction and secular education 
were "destroying the basis of skill building and morality", were inhibiting the 
"civilisatory process", and deserved to be severely punished for their neglect.6 
 Not only the slaves whose education had been neglected by owners were 
caught in the Muslim safety net.  Indentured British labourers and craftsmen had been 
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imported privately in the 1820s by Cape entrepreneurs who hoped to hire them out in 
the colony.  As this business could not take off because of lack of demand, the 
importers were ruined, labourers drifted into the underclass, and many turned to 
alcohol.  Their children were reported to have been rejected by Christian society but 
accepted by the "Malay community" of Cape Town, and to be growing up as 
Muslims.7  Where one faith failed to capture drifting souls, the other one stepped in 
promptly. 
 The question of having formal title to land was a recurring concern of the 
commentators of the time, reflecting the premise of classical political economy that 
secure private property was a key ingredient in a thriving economy.  Ordinance 50 
was seen to be the opening to establish this principle as valid for the Khoi and Free 
Blacks.  In the same vein as the above promotion of land title for tax-paying Muslims, 
an 1829 account of a Khoi squatter in the Cederberg area made the same point.  The 
Khoi farmer had informally occupied an unused area of over 50 acres and had 
improved the land to allow the cultivation of cash crops such as wheat, tobacco and 
fruit, and livestock.  Newly arrived Irish settlers then claimed the land for themselves, 
but were prevented by the authorities from evicting the Khoi farmer on the basis of 
rights acquired under Ordinance 50.  Similar cases were reported elsewhere.  Editorial 
opinion supported the colonial authorities against the land grab by the settlers on the 
basis of the argument that individual merit, initiative and industry should be rewarded 
with formal property rights.  Land title was to be the key to motivate people to 
become sedentary and productive.  At the same time, the editorialist emphasised the 
liberal view that the Khoi "differ only in the colour of their skin" from Europeans, and 
are just as prone to respond to economic incentives to settle and farm as anybody else.  
The editorial  takes the opportunity to debunk the conventional wisdom that saw the 
Khoi as having a "racial instinct" and "necessary habit" to be nomadic, and notes that 
this is a result of an arid climate and the lack of markets, which changes when land is 
irrigated and markets are within reach. The support of the property rights of the Khoi 
and Free Blacks, and the encouragement of their accumulation of further property was 
seen to be an important cause to push in the wake of Ordinance 50, to prevent a 
backlash from the white community.8 
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Cooperation and Competition 
 
 While Cape Town Christian missionaries were struggling, their upcountry 
counterparts enjoyed a privileged position.  Without local competitors, the mission 
stations established themselves and thrived.  Wesleyan outposts such as the one at 
Camiesberg had no trouble collecting funds for the establishment of an auxiliary 
society (a local branch), including from many local "native speakers".  In the LMS 
station at Zuurbraak, an authoritarian missionary, Mr. Seidenfaden, who had abused 
his position for six years, could only be removed after mass petitions by the captive 
inhabitants.  Only mass action could effect change in the local monopoly.  On a more 
positive note, a visit of Philip and Fairbairn to the Bethelsdorp LMS station resulted 
in a glowing report on the advances since the beginning of the century: the Khoi 
inhabitants were industrious and clean, had developed artisan skills, attended church 
in large numbers, and largely abstained from consuming alcohol.  The reporters noted 
with satisfaction that moral elevation was working well there among the natives who 
were still oppressed in the surrounding area.  They took the opportunity to stress that 
liberation from oppression and the inculcation of a "moral culture" are civilizing 
processes that create free citizens.  At the 1830 annual meeting of the LMS, the 
missionaries reported good cooperation between denominations in the field, noting 
that "success for one mission is success for all", although they wondered why some 
denominations were absent from the meeting.  Even in the field, cooperation was not 
universal.  The annual meeting confirmed that education was the primary target of the 
LMS, but that there was no question of giving land title to individuals, even 
indirectly.  The mission stations were to retain their corporate land use title, justifying 
it by the still widespread image of the "natural roving nature of the Hottentot".  
Despite the best efforts of the liberals, old racial concepts lingered.  On the whole, 
however, the missionaries were persuading the urban elite that their work was 
worthwhile:  a Cape Town merchant, writing to the editor, conceded that he had 
changed his mind about the usefulness of mission work, now considering the evident 
change in the lifestyle of the underclass to the better as being "good for business".9 
                                                 












 Cooperation between denominations as observed in the rural areas was far 
from evident in Cape Town proper.  Bickering and competitive church building were 
commonplace.  A letter to the editor noted the "jealousies between religious sects" 
disapprovingly.  In 1829, a fundraising drive started to build an Anglican church, felt 
to be necessary as the established church of the colonial power had less formal 
worship space than dissenting denominations.  A society was formed to seek 
subscriptions and shareholders, and to secure pew rentals, under the name of "St. 
George's Church".  Shortly thereafter, the foundation stone for the Wesleyan Chapel 
in Burg Street was laid.  The progress on St. George's, however, was more halting.  In 
early 1830, a newspaper reader submitted a poem: 
 
For shame! For shame! Episcopalians! 
Outdone by other pious battalions! 
Chapels, Conventicles, and Public Places 
Round Cape Town raise their shining faces, 
Whilst your poor, dear old Mother Church 
Is left completely in the lurch – 
What is the reason that she stands so still? 
The reason's plain – Committee want the will. 
 
 Further blame was placed on the church building committee by letter writers 
reporting that it had been arguing endlessly, not coming to any decisions or 
agreements.  In the meantime, more Reformed churches, including the Presbyterian 
one, were being erected.  By April 1830, the foundation stone for St. George's was 
finally laid, after 5,000 pounds sterling had been collected in subscriptions.  Other 
subscribers and donors, however, were pouring money into competing churches.  Mr. 
Hoets provided a new organ for the Dutch Reformed church, Messrs Melck and 
Matfield, among other subscribers, financed the repairs to the 50-year-old Lutheran 
church in town, and the SAMS, Roman Catholics, and Presbyterians benefited from 
subscriptions to build their chapels.  Much private money was available at this time 
for religious and educational purposes: a listing of public-spirited donations for the 
years up to 1830 included the above contributions to churches, buildings for religious 
instruction, an orphan house, the new South African College, and contributions to 












freedom of slave children.10  The public spirit did not extend to investments in 
infrastructure facilities that would serve the community as a whole.  We will return to 
this below. 
 The availability of subscriptions was no guarantee of success for a venture, 
however.  Fractious committees delayed or thwarted the purpose, to the annoyance of 
the citizens of the town.  Newspaper reports traced the sad story of the Church 
Missionary Society in Cape Town, established in March 1837 with the support of the 
full urban elite, including the Anglican and Reformed churches, the Governor, 
lawyers and merchants.  Subscriptions were collected to enable the new society to 
redouble the missionary effort in the city.  Two years later, the committee of 
dignitaries had not reported or achieved anything, and there was no accounting of the 
subscribed funds.  An editorial opined that all that had been achieved was to "elicit 
the scorn and sneer of the infidel", and that obviously it had been a mistake to place 
prominent citizens with many other priorities on the committee rather than entrust it 
to devoted missionaries.  The Muslim community had weathered another competitive 
challenge.11 
 Muslims at the Cape, however, survived because of their competitors' discord, 
not because of their own unity.  On the contrary, the small community was tearing 
itself apart in leadership rivalries after the death of Tuan Guru.  Rather than do this 
behind closed doors, however, the dispute was conducted in the forum of public 
opinion, just as the Christian denominations practiced it.  In 1836, the infighting broke 
into the open in a series of open letters printed in the Commercial Advertiser.  The 
parties of imam Achmat and imam Asnoun (Jan van Bougies) each were adamant that 
their champions deserved to lead the Cape Muslim community after the death of Tuan 
Guru ("Prince Imam Abdoela").  Achmat and his supporters claimed verbal 
instructions provided by the late undisputed leader that, during a series of short-lived 
imamates by elderly followers of Tuan Guru, Achmat was to be groomed for the 
position.  Disputing this vigorously, Jan van Bougies and his supporters claimed 
seniority in the community, and denied that a decision on designating a chief imam 
could be made without consultation with the elders of the community.  Representing 
themselves, for the benefit of the reading public, as "priests" of "Mohammedan 
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churches", both sides invoked legitimacy from tradition, or from designated 
succession.  At this time, several mosques and madaris were operating in Cape Town, 
with an active congregation population of over 6,000 instructed by ten imams.  By 
1840, about half of the population of worshippers and students were under the 
leadership of imam Achmat, who had won the argument, supported by the son of 
Prince Abdoela, Prince Abdol Roove (Abdul Rauf).12 
 This was by no means the end of the matter.  Constant friction about 
legitimate succession to the imamate was to be a hallmark of nineteenth-century Cape 
Islam.  By the 1860s, the 12-14,000 Muslims of Cape Town were still embroiled in 
argument.  In 1867, a dispute over who should be the imam of the Long Street 
mosque erupted in disturbances and riots, which had to be settled by outside 
mediation.  Luckily, the Cape Muslim community had a patron in a member of the 
Legislative Council during the 1850s and 60s, Mr. de Roubaix, who supported 
Muslim causes, engaged in charitable efforts for the Muslim community, facilitated 
the integration of new Muslim arrivals from the Indian Ocean littoral, and acted as the 
consul general of the Sublime Porte in Cape Town.  De Roubaix successfully 
mediated the disputes that flared up with some regularity.13 
 Roman Catholics at the Cape, benefiting from the Catholic Relief Bill in 
Britain in 1829, also enjoyed somewhat increased room for manoeuvre.  In 1830, 
Ordinance 68 for the "Relief of H.M. Roman Catholic Subjects in this Colony" 
enabled Catholics to immigrate to the colony and practice their religion, provided that 
they swear an oath of allegiance to the King, and that they register with the authorities 
at their place of residence.  Editorial comment, however, pointed out that the 
restrictions imposed on Catholics were needlessly repressive and that they reflected 
an attempt to govern by fear rather than by incentive.  "Oppression is the strongest 
bond of union", warned the editorial writer, and added for good measure that 
"poverty, ignorance and vice....compose the gunpowder of sedition".  Catholics were 
not to be angered unduly by arbitrary restrictions, just as the poor were to be kept 
from causing trouble by education and religious instruction, not by repression.14 
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 In general, public secular neutrality between religions was promoting a 
reasonably level playing field, and prevented individual faiths from achieving too 
much at the expense of others.  An 1830 ordinance to regulate Sunday business and 
the treatment of slaves in the colony triggered lively debate.  It banned Sunday 
markets except for perishable goods, prohibited slave work on Sundays except for 
domestic work, and provided numerous safeguards for the treatment of slaves.  
Editorial opinion took umbrage at the strong restrictions on Sunday work, claiming 
that these were not of much relevance in the generally relaxed work environment at 
the Cape, and that this was an obvious case where the Cape was suffering needless 
restrictions as result of abuses in the Caribbean.  Citing the example of India, a colony 
of many faiths where Christians were a small minority, the editor made the point that 
there was no sense in imposing additional rest days on Hindus and Muslims just 
because the colonial power had a Christian heritage.  The explicit recommendation 
was to refrain from using religiously motivated rules to interfere in multicultural 
societies.15  The most pronounced public debate on this matter occurred in the context 
of the new South African College. 
 
The South African College Debate 
 
 On October 1, 1829, formal inauguration ceremonies were held for the newly 
established South African College in Cape Town.  This was a momentous occasion 
for the town, as it marked the culmination of the efforts of the urban elite to finance 
and staff an institution of secondary learning that would meet European standards, a 
novelty for a town that was poorly equipped with higher-level educational facilities.  
The hope was that the sons of the local bourgeoisie could be prepared for British 
universities locally rather than being sent away.  This was to be a beacon of 
enlightened learning, a vehicle to spread scientific and humanist knowledge in the 
spirit of the times.  The inaugural sermon made it clear that the spread of scientific 
knowledge would not detract in any way from faith.  On the contrary, it was stressed 
that icons of secular knowledge such as Bacon, Hoyle, Locke, Descartes and Leibniz 
had successfully reconciled faith and science.  The "sober-minded exercise of 
                                                 












intellectual faculty and its range of inquiry and speculation are perfectly compatible 
with a sincere and humble piety", the homily intoned.  In fact, Christian charity 
demanded that the knowledge of science, literature and philosophy was spread to 
others.16  Sophisticated secular education had been introduced with the blessing of 
religious leaders. 
 Alas, the goodwill did not last long.  Barely six months later, a meeting of the 
College's shareholders was asked to consider a motion to mandate that "weekly 
catechetical lectures [are] to be given to the pupils of the several denominations of the 
Christians....by the professors or ministers of the respective colonial churches".  This 
potential time bomb triggered a remarkable and highly confrontational debate in 
which the shareholders, all solidly Christian gentlemen, tore into each other by 
invoking principles of moral philosophy and faith.17  The proceedings were covered 
prominently and almost verbatim by the newspaper of record, indicating the 
importance of the issue.  The party that introduced the motion, including top legal 
dignitaries such as Sir John Truter, Justice Burton, and advocate Cloete argued that 
the elite school of a Christian society ought to provide religious instruction in addition 
to the subjects of science and the classics, in order to strengthen the moral fibre of 
youth.  The opposition, also led by legal minds such as advocates de Wet and Brand, 
maintained that this school had been designed as a secular place of learning in the 
Enlightenment tradition, and that the founding shareholders had specifically excluded 
religious instruction by including only science and literature in the original charter of 
the school.  The proponents remained adamant. 
 A main point of discussion revolved around the fact that there was a diversity 
of denominations to consider.  In response to the argument of the proponents that 
secondary schools in Holland invariably offer religious instruction, the opposition 
replied that there was only one dominant denomination in Holland and that this 
rendered a comparison irrelevant.  A speaker for the opposition posed the provocative 
question why the Roman Catholic faith was excluded from the mention of "colonial 
churches", and added for good measure that there was no mention of the Muslim faith 
either although there was a significant population of votaries of that religion.  He 
opined that the College probably would not admit a Muslim any more than it would 
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admit a Roman Catholic, and recommended that it is better not to have any religious 
instruction than have an arbitrary selection of religions providing it.  A second 
diversity point raised by the opposition was that there was too much suspicion 
between faiths and denominations to allow a smooth implementation of such a 
program.  A situation where ministers of all denominations would teach their 
catechisms simultaneously at the College was considered a nightmare scenario, 
triggering internal religious strife and the utter confusion of students.  A speaker 
reminded the meeting of the cautionary tale of the prudent fox, who observes the 
tracks of other animals leading only into the den of the allegedly ill lion, but not out 
again, and decides to stay outside.  Once religious strife would be ensconced in this 
den, prudent people would not even enter. 
 Moderates in the meeting mediated between the opposing sides, arguing that a 
liberal College of this kind would naturally admit "every Christian pupil", and that 
classes opened with a generic prayer and Bible reading anyway, not to speak of the 
fact that many professors at the College were ministers.  As the Lutheran and 
Reformed churches already had established sessions in religious and catechetic 
instruction on their church premises, this was a good basis to build on.  An ingenious 
compromise was proposed that defined the College not as a building but as a body of 
students, who can be encouraged to receive religious instruction anywhere.  This 
would not exclude religion from the curriculum, but only prohibit specific 
denominational catechism instruction on the premises.  The College would "...offer 
religious instruction, but not within the walls of the South African College, [and 
would] make arrangements for having lectures in different churches".  The 
compromise was carried, but at the cost of the resignation of key shareholders such as 
Justice Burton, who withdrew his subscription. 
 This vigorous debate anticipated a similar one in Britain in 1839, which was 
reported extensively at the Cape.  The argument revolved around the same issues that 
were aired in the South African debate: how could the teaching of "generic 
Christianity" in schools be reconciled with catechism in the parishes, without 
confusing the students?  Should only the catechism of the Established Church be 
taught?  Moderates promoted exactly the same solution as that reached at the Cape: 












student would go to his church or synagogue to receive religious education, without 
direct involvement of the school.18 
 The Commercial Advertiser editorialised in 1830 that the compromise 
resolution was a good one, as there was no need to introduce more than science and 
the classics as core curriculum in a secondary school.  Not being a university, it did 
not provide for education in medicine and law either.  Once it would reach that stage 
in the future, subscribers would be free to endow a chair of theology.19  As new 
churches of all denominations were sprouting in Cape Town, there was no shortage of 
appropriate premises for the teaching of a variety of catechisms.  Letters to the editor 
suggested that a principle of voluntarism would be desirable, as students could choose 
between religious education at their family church or at the College.  Five months 
later, an editorial reviewed the results of the implementation of the compromise.  It 
noted approvingly that the exclusion of "catechisms" from the curriculum had worked 
well, the Bible was read in class, and students were receiving catechetic instruction at 
their churches.  The twin goals of having the College operating on a generic 
"Christian" basis, and of leaving denominational quarrels outside, had been achieved, 
and the College did not have to deal with "catechisms containing the peculiar 
doctrines of certain churches, often at open war, long at open enmity, and still in 
avowed opposition to each other".  A tongue-in-cheek letter to the editor20 suggested 
that all catechism teachers advertise commercially like other providers of services, 
enabling the consuming public to choose between "Anglicans, Scottish, Dutch 
Reformed, Lutherans, Roman Catholics, Ranters, Newlights, Swedenborgians, 
Muslims etc".  Intended as satire, the letter nevertheless revealed how closely 
connected commercial and religious issues were in the mind of the writer, and how 
easily the Capetonian mind slipped back and forth between the two, applying the 
same market paradigm.   
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 The principle established in the South African College debate carried through 
to the education reform introduced by Governor Sir George Napier in the late 1830s.  
The primary education provided by the state schools was to include "one hour of Holy 
Scripture reading per day", but any catechetic education specific to individual 
denominations was to be left to the clergy.21  As so often in the history of the Cape, 
competing principles had been aired vigorously, and a pragmatic and somewhat 
fuzzy, but quite stable compromise had emerged to clear the market.  The ability to 
find a workable compromise would stand the Cape citizens in good stead when 
dealing with the social transition triggered by the abolition of slavery. 
 
Competing for Emancipated Slave Souls 
 
 In the build-up towards slave emancipation throughout the British Empire, the 
humanitarian and economic arguments employed globally also were mirrored 
faithfully at the Cape.  Contributions in the Commercial Advertiser22 repeatedly went 
over the ground of why slavery had to be ended for liberal humanitarian and ethical 
reasons, invoking biblical principles of equality before God, but how this could not be 
done by simply expropriating the slave owners, as that would constitute an illiberal 
grab for assets that were still legal property under current law.  This was the core of 
the "liberal dilemma" we examined above.  The costs of rectifying past injustices 
inflicted on enslaved populations would have to be borne by the Empire as a whole, 
particularly as the Cape elite did not feel that they had as much to answer for as the 
slave owners in the abusive Caribbean plantation system.  Owners would have to be 
compensated in tradable debentures in order to accomplish this de-facto expropriation 
of their human assets within an orderly market context.  The editorials made it clear 
that slave owners should not be too concerned about losing out in the deal, as slave 
labour in the colony was estimated to be a costlier system for the masters than one of 
free wage labour, costing them almost a quarter million pound sterling more per 
year.23  A clearer conscience and ethical rectitude could be obtained together with cost 
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savings by freeing the slaves and employing them as wage earners – a win-win 
situation in both spiritual and commercial terms. 
 Implementing the transition, however, would require a massive educational 
effort to bring the untutored slaves into a state of moral responsibility.  Religious 
instruction was considered to be a sine qua non for creating an industrious and 
virtuous wage labour force.  Comparisons were drawn from the West Indies, where 
90,000 had been freed and, in Jamaica alone, 30 churches and 16 Sunday schools with 
36,000 adherents and 10,000 pupils were operating immediately after abolition, 
resulting in an "exemplary conduct of the emancipated people", despite constant 
carping by the ex-owners that their wage offers were not accepted and that work 
discipline was lacking.24  Where missionaries were active in the West Indies, the 
transition was reported to have been smooth, resulting in reasonable wage settlements.  
Similarly, it was noted that the Society for Propagating the Gospel in London had 
stressed that the newly emancipated slaves had to be "brought under the control of 
religion" in order to avoid unrest and indiscipline.  The post-emancipation state of the 
ex-slaves in Cape Town was described as still wretched and poverty-ridden, but was 
attributed to the slowness of the climb to a self-sufficient life.  The incentive to better 
oneself and become upwardly mobile was to be provided by the moral uplift of 
religious instruction.25 
 This proved to be easier said than done, in an environment of continuing 
strength of the Muslim brand among the Cape Town underclass.  It did not help that 
competing Christian denominations were trying to cover the rest of the market.  
Letters to the editor complained that the Anglicans were lagging far behind others in 
their mission work, although the new St. George's church had the means to become 
more active.  Even the Dutch Reformed church, not known for its missionary zeal, 
was said to do better, and the British Reformed churches were going from strength to 
strength in comparison.  Fingers were pointed at the shareholders and church wardens 
                                                                                                                                            
slaves, compared to one with 40,000 free wage labourers.  The costs calculated were those incurred by 
the investors, not those incurred by the whole economy, so that this exercise constituted a financial 
analysis as would have been done by an investor at the time. 
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of St. George's who were accused of not promoting and funding mission work 
vigorously enough in church.  They were even accused of actively discouraging the 
participation of the poor: a letter to the editor expressed outrage at the fact that St. 
George's had moved the evening service to an earlier time, thus preventing the late-
working poor from attending and restricting the service to the pew-renting wealthy.  
He noted that when the service was still held late by candlelight, the free gallery for 
the poor had been filled to capacity.26 
 Contributors to the debate ridiculed the idea that the Cape needed an Anglican 
bishop to promote Christianity, and were adamant that Britain would have to finance 
such a position, not the colony.  They pointed out that Reformed churches in the 
colony were much more active and numerous, and seemed to get on well with the 
business of mission without needing a church hierarchy.  However, the Dissenters 
were not that much more successful in Cape Town, despite the envy of the Anglicans.  
The Wesleyan Branch Missionary Society reported that mission was going well in the 
rural areas, but that the urban effort was reduced to seeking out indigenous migrants 
to the town: a group of about 30 individuals in a "Fingo village below Table 
Mountain", functioning as herdsmen and coolies, and living in traditional African 
structures, was intensely courted as one of the few groups not yet captured by Islam.27 
 Schooling continued to be of central importance for the missions after the 
emancipation of the slaves, but was hampered by the drying up of contributions.  The 
Cape Town Branch of the LMS reported in 1839 that, of the total annual cost of 
operating five schools in town, amounting to £ 362, income from donations only 
covered £ 168.28   By 1840, the Dorp Street school of the LMS, led by a dynamic 
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missionary, had held its own, increased enrolment from the Muslim community, but 
could boast only few converts.  As in the case of the Wesleyans, the LMS turned its 
attention to the small Fingo (Mfengu) community to bypass Muslim resistance.  Also 
in parallel with the Wesleyans, they complained of the much lower levels of support 
they were receiving in Cape Town as compared to their rural stations.  The missions 
and newspaper editorials lamented that the urban religious infant schools were 
running out of funding because Cape Town donors had turned their backs on 
Christian charity and were withholding funds, while the rural mission stations had no 
comparable financial issues.  The board of the South African Infant School Society, 
filled with the great and good of Cape Town, noted with regret that the numbers of 
subscribers were declining, and only 20% of previous annual donation levels was 
being received. The number of their schools would have to be reduced from three to 
one (a school in Plein Street that had shrunk from 260 to 100 students), and the basis 
of religious instruction was in danger of being lost.  The explanation put forward for 
the shrinkage of funding was the fact that the new trend to establish secular state 
schools was convincing donors that their contributions were no longer essential.  In 
addition, ex-slave owners had benefited from the compensation for having their slaves 
freed, and felt no longer obliged to contribute anything to the education of the 
children of the emancipated population.  As the emancipated slaves themselves had 
been set free without funds, and lacked any financial means of their own, they were in 
no position to ensure education of their children, and both secular and religious 
training was falling between the cracks.  Editorials floated the idea that some kind of 
restitution was called for:  as slave owners had been compensated, why not extend 
compensation to newly freed parents of children?  Or oblige the recipients of 
compensation to provide some for their ex-slaves?  As government school funding 
was promising to match privately donated funds, an increase in private contributions 
would leverage up the total financing of education.29 
 In general, published opinion came down critically on those who were 
complaining about the religious fervour of the mission and school societies, and were 
holding back donations, but were not above benefiting from the increased education 
of the underclass that these efforts brought about.  An editorial pointed out the double 
                                                 












standards of those who called the LMS a bunch of "canting hypocrites", but happily 
took advantage of their school facilities.  A similar treatment was being meted out to 
the London Tract Society and the Ladies' Tract and Book Society who were importing 
and distributing religious and educational tracts from Britain, and translating them 
into Dutch.  Bunyan's Pilgrim's Progress, Abbot's Mother at Home, or Baxter's Call 
to the Unconverted had been translated and disseminated already, but further work 
was threatened by the dearth of donations.  Local donors preferred to support secular 
education and literature, and did not want to be seen to be associated with the "tract 
society" of missionaries and well-meaning ladies.  Did these people really want the 
poor to be limited to secular trash literature, the editorials asked rhetorically, did they 
want them to "continue under delusions of Mahomedanism or Heathenism"?  It was 
an uphill struggle to secure funding for remaining competitive in the Cape Town 
market.30  The Commercial Advertiser contributed to moral uplift by serialising 
educational literature such as Benjamin Franklin's Poor Richard, promoting thrift and 
hard work in building wealth, but could not reverse the decline in private donations. 
 Much of the fluctuation in the levels of donations was attributed to the 
transient nature of Cape Town society.  Merchants spent some time in the colony, 
then left to other parts of the empire, and the newcomers had to be introduced to the 
needs of the Cape.  Similarly, the many "Indians", colonial military and 
administrative men on long leave at the Cape, had money to spend but were 
unfamiliar with the structure of the local charitable societies.  Even long-established 
local gentlemen were criticised that they were generally willing to give when 
approached, but lacked the initiative and motivation to become active without being 
urged by fundraisers.  The needs were big for the small society at the Cape:  
missionary societies spent about £ 16,000 per year on schools, chapels, and mission 
outreach, while the government support for churches in the colony (primarily for the 
Anglicans and the Dutch Reformed) amounted to more than £ 8,000 .31  Without 
vigorous charitable giving, the growth of Christianity would stall. 
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Christian Culture, Secular Law 
 
 While Christian culture was promoted vigorously, public discourse was also 
careful to include the principles of equality before a secular body of law.  Christianity 
was considered to be the moral underpinning of society as a beneficial, civilizing 
force, but religious criteria were not to be used to discriminate against non-Christians, 
or adherents of non-established denominations.32  Reports noted approvingly that the 
beneficial effect of increased church attendance after emancipation was being felt in 
Cape Town.  Attendance was considered to bring out the better instincts of all classes 
and colours, a reference to the fact that the urban underclass was not only coloured 
but had a European component.33  Christianity "encouraged labourers and mechanics 
to be clean and sedate, not slovenly and sensual", and served to "relieve selfish 
anxiety and worries", thus contributing to a peaceful, productive society.  
Nevertheless, writers warned that restrictive legal practices based on religion were 
obstructing the development of such a society, as the moral improvement was better 
achieved through individual faith.   
 Public criticism was directed at a new marriage law for ex-slaves introduced in 
1839, which stipulated that a religious or civil marriage ceremony was only available 
to persons with a "Christian name and surname", effectively limiting the service to 
baptized persons.  Editorial comment deplored that this meant that newly freed non-
Christians could only enter into "de facto marriages", that their children could not 
inherit, and that the existing free black population was falling through the cracks.  
Much of the coloured population of Cape Town would be forced into concubinage 
and out of the inheritance process.   Marriage being a legal contract, there was no 
reason to discriminate by religious status. 
 Surprisingly, a Dutch Reformed minister's contribution to the public debate 
agreed with the secularists.  He argued, from a Reformed point of view, that baptism 
is a much more rigorous marker of Christianity than marriage, and that this is what the 
church and the authorities should focus on.  Marriage itself, and the marriage banns, 
were essentially a civil matter, to be conducted in a secular spirit and in a civil forum.  
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The church, being a "public assembly", could thus legalise marriages between a 
Christian and a non-Christian without any qualms.  The public interest of maximizing 
the number of legal marriages was paramount for society, and trumped any religious 
urge for purity.  In fact, he asked, how could ministers admit Christians to 
communion who were not legally married because their partner was not a Christian?  
He quoted a decision of the 1834 synod of the Dutch Reformed church which ruled 
that even two non-Christian parties could be legally married in a Christian church if 
they showed evidence of a civil marriage license.  Missionaries had been conducting 
such marriages as a matter of routine in the field.  As a promotion of responsibility 
and commitment, every effort should be made to legalise as many marriages as 
possible, regardless of the religious status of the parties.  It was not until 1860 that 
Muslim marriages were made official by law, qualifying them by the woman's right to 
object, a change that was accepted by the Cape Muslim community.  A choice 
between a secular and an equally valid Muslim marriage was now possible.34 
 The epidemics of infectious diseases regularly sweeping through Cape Town 
were a cause for religious introspection, and calls for atonement to avoid a worse fate.  
The epidemics were interpreted as God's punishment for the poor moral standards of 
the citizenry, an understandable sentiment in the rowdy "tavern of the seas".  During 
one of the epidemics, a letter to the editor in 1840 noted that the "Malays" of Cape 
Town had set aside a day for fasting and prayer for the abatement of the disease, and 
inquired why the Christian churches were not following this worthy example of the 
Muslim community.  A year earlier, the churches had indeed observed a "day of 
fasting and humility", to atone for assorted miseries that had befallen the colony, such 
as epidemics, drought, and crop diseases.  In that case, however, the Cape Town 
presbytery of the Dutch Reformed church had decided not to participate in such a 
voluntary inter-denominational effort without having the government declare an 
official day of prayer.35  The differences between Christian denominations with 
respect to the relations with secular authority were showing. 
 The respect for Muslims had its limits.  While seen as respectable craftsmen 
and lower-middle class citizens, Muslim lifestyles and beliefs were poorly 
understood, or ridiculed.  Apart from shock about seemingly incomprehensible exotic 
                                                 
34 Kollisch, The Mussulman Population, 24. 












rituals such as the khalifa, the concept of "Malay superstition" was widespread.  A 
typical anecdote printed in the paper told the fictitious story of two Malays who, 
while repairing a Reformed church in town, are startled to hear lamentations about 
lost parents coming from the deserted cemetery.  After a headlong flight, one of them 
returns with trepidation, only to discover a lonely parrot talking away on a 
gravestone.36  Official statements, however, scrupulously were designed not to be 
offensive, and not to favour one religion.  The Attorney General at the time, William 
Porter, took great pains to promote this stance.  In a speech delivered while on circuit 
in Grahamstown, he noted approvingly that the prophet Muhammad did not feel 
above settling disputes among sparrows, showing that nothing is too small in the 
pursuit of justice.  On another occasion, he opined that he found much in the Qur'an 
worthwhile, and would not object to having it taught to young minds.  In general, he 
made the point that "bad men have made religion the slave of their passions, yet for 
one pang that religion has inflicted, she has assuaged ten thousand."37 In 1860, Porter 
used the death of a respected Cape imam, Mammat, at the age of 102 to argue in the 
House of Assembly debate on ecclesiastical grants that this imam's "...character rose 
far superior to many of an opposite creed, and who profess more advanced and 
enlightened views."38 
 Christians were not only keeping an eye on what the Muslims were doing.  
Letters referred to the small Cape Town Jewish community and its difficulties in 
achieving equal status.  The case in point was the allocation of "prize negroes", who 
had been taken off foreign slavers captured by the British navy and landed at the 
Cape, to local masters for a lengthy apprenticeship.  At a time of perceived labour 
shortage in the colony after emancipation, these additional hands were much sought 
after, and the Collector of Customs who allocated them to worthy masters was 
besieged by requests. As a matter of routine, Jewish applicants were excluded from 
the consideration by the Collector.  Letters to the editor noted with outrage that this 
kind of illiberal discrimination was unacceptable, and showed a degree of hypocrisy 
that could not be inflicted on a small community who did not even have a full-time 
rabbi.  The Collector's defence that he "wanted the prize negroes to be brought up in 
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Christianity" was considered a poor excuse, as it was well known that most masters 
were neglecting the required religious education of their apprentices with impunity.  
Furthermore, the writers asked, if proper Christianity was the issue, why were 
Unitarians not excluded as masters, but Jews were?39 
 Opinions such as these demonstrated an astounding pragmatism vis-a-vis other 
faiths or non-religious people, even by men of the cloth, when matters of public order 
and justice were at stake.  However, believers were not above a good fight if they felt 




 In the post-emancipation environment, the competition with Islam was not the 
only worry of churchmen.  Catholics after their emancipation were to be reckoned 
with, and internal bickering within denominations was as common as within the 
Muslim community.  The lengthiest public debate was kicked off by complaints that 
the Anglican minister of St. George's was slipping towards Catholic doctrine.  That 
this doctrinal dispute led to a heated exchange of letters and opinions in the main 
newspaper is worth a pause by itself.  Religious feeling was high enough to motivate 
educated lay citizens to put pen to paper and join the public debate, in turn leading to 
a discussion whether this was an appropriate subject for a secular newspaper. 
 The debate40 kicked off with an indignant letter to the editor from a St. 
George's member, complaining that the minister was preaching increasingly quasi-
Catholic sermons, and that it was time to put an end to imitating the competition, and 
to return to good Protestant principles.  The editor responded with a balanced view, 
exploring the question of the place of such a discussion in the paper.  While it was 
recommended that members of the Anglican church should resolve doctrinal issues 
among themselves, it was recognised that church matters in Cape Town were matters 
of public interest and thus deserved to be aired in the public sphere.  Letters by other 
members of the public were pointing out that the minister was merely reminding his 
flock of the principles contained in the Book of Common Prayer, which constituted 
Anglican orthodoxy, not Catholic incursions. 
                                                 
39 SACA, 22 Aug. 1840. 












 Having opened this Pandora's box, opinions of adherents of various strands 
within Anglicanism, as well as of Catholics poured in, discussing everything from the 
infallibility of the Pope, through the role of good works in salvation, the 
appropriateness of saints as intermediaries, to the definition of image worship.  
Anglicans took differing positions on fine points of theology, Catholics wrote in to 
clarify their doctrine and point out differences.  A dialogue of a kind ensued, but 
questions were asked why one side should have the right to define and interpret the 
position of the other.  Minute discussions by anonymous contributors on the issues of 
transsubstantiation, infant baptism, and intervention by saints led to a despairing 
contribution noting that "experience teaches that controversies on religious subjects 
have, as yet, only ended in each party being more firmly convinced of the correctness 
of his own views." 
 Eventually, as the Cape debate simmered on, similar controversies were 
evident throughout the Empire.  Anglican bishops issued a call for forming an alliance 
with other Protestant denominations to conduct a coordinated campaign against 
Roman Catholicism in all British possessions.  In particular, the Presbyterian churches 
of Scotland and Ireland were to be approached to form a united front in the colonies.  
At the Cape, public opinion was sceptical: it was remembered that Irish Catholics 
were loyal colonial subjects in the Cape Colony, and it was asked with some 
justification why one should confront the Catholics rather than include them in a 
cooperative effort of all Christian clergy.41  The Cape was torn between competition 
and cooperation. 
 Competition usually gained the upper hand.  In 1841, the Anglican Colonial 
Chaplain John Heavyside exchanged irate letters with John Locke, Dissenting 
minister.  The issue was who could be buried in the cemetery of St. George's.  Locke 
claimed that it was a public burial ground, and that therefore he was entitled to bury 
the deceased of his Dissenting flock there.  Heavyside countered that the cemetery 
was not public but private, owned by the subscribers and pew tenants of the Anglican 
church, and only an Anglican minister could officiate.  Contributors suggested a 
compromise that would provide for an increase of the cemetery area to accommodate 
other denominations.42 
                                                 
41 SACA, 5 Aug. 1840. 












 The denominations were not immune to internal strife, often focused on the 
appropriate uses of funds, and on the structure of the church.  A loud public dispute 
erupted in the Cape Town Dutch Reformed church on the issue of expanding to a 
second urban congregation.  The 1837 synod had recommended that the town should 
have two churches and three ministers, as the over 5,000 existing members and 5,000 
members-in-waiting were too much for the capacity of the venerable Groote Kerk.  
Naturally, a faction within the church emerged and objected to this project, and asked 
for further reports that would justify this additional expenditure.  The Cape Town 
vestry of the NGK was dragging its feet about implementing the decision of the 
synod, and letters to the editor were asking why these delays were tolerated.  It was 
pointed out that the SAMS chapel in town had helped out the Lutherans and 
Presbyterians before in providing temporary premises for additional congregations, 
and that offers to the NGK had already been made.  The Cape Town consistory had 
already raised funds towards the construction of the second church, but there had been 
no accounting of how these funds were spent.  Church members turned to the 
Colonial Secretary, John Bell, with requests to intervene and force the church 
administration to move on the project.  The response from the government was an 
affirmation of the separation of church and state: there would be no intervention by 
the Governor in internal church matters, and members should go through the courts to 
force an open accounting of the funds.  If problematic handling of funds would come 
to light, the church synod was free to censure or otherwise penalise the Cape Town 
vestry.  It took about two years from the beginning of the dispute until it was clear 
that a second Dutch Reformed church would be established in Cape Town.43 
 
The Cape Against the World 
 
 Notwithstanding the vigorous competition of views at the Cape, and the 
acerbic criticism of perceived faults of fellow citizens, local public opinion coalesced 
when outside criticism was levelled at the Cape.  Publications and statements in 
Britain, Australia, India and elsewhere in the empire were scrutinised with a fine-
tooth comb for evidence of unfair denigration of the Cape colony, and a sturdy 
                                                 












defence was mounted.  One of these instances occurred when the import of poor 
juveniles from Britain as indentured apprentices to Cape masters became an issue in 
Britain.  We will deal with the perception of a "labour shortage" after slave 
emancipation, and the vigorous debate about it, in detail below.  What is of interest 
for the religious discourse is the question of whether these juveniles were receiving 
appropriate religious and secular education, a similar issue that had cropped up in the 
case of prize negroes, slaves, and indigenous Khoi.  A British charity, the Children's 
Friend Society, had operated a program since 1833 that took juveniles from asylums 
and workhouses in Britain in order to apprentice them at the Cape and elsewhere in 
the empire.  The Society was severely criticised in London and Australia as an 
"abominable society under the cloak of charity", a "kidnapping society" that abducted 
kids for forced labour in the colonies, and was a miserable failure.  The Cape was 
singled out for particular criticism, alleging abuse of the juvenile immigrants there, 
and the withholding of religious instruction.  The editor of the Commercial 
Advertiser, John Fairbairn, who was also the honorary secretary of the Cape Town 
committee of the Society, refuted the criticism strongly:  he claimed that the Cape 
committee had been extremely diligent in selecting good masters for the apprentices, 
and that abuses were the exception, not the rule.  He conceded that providing 
education for the juveniles in their scattered locations was difficult, but that good 
families as hosts were compensating to some extent.  Contributors noted that the 140 
clergy and missionaries at the Cape should be enough to provide decent religious 
instruction, but that the geographical spread of the juvenile apprentices was too big 
for the religious instructors who were concentrated in population centres: it was 
recommended that English clergymen should be imported and dedicated to teaching 
the juveniles on a circuit.  Letters to the editor opined that all the fuss in London and 
Australia was triggered by the fact that the Cape society was such a fractious one, the 
ethnic and religious mix leading to slander and exaggeration that reflected on the 
image of the Cape abroad. "There is a strong party spirit at the Cape", wrote one, 
adding that "Dutch colonists and farmers are painted unfavourably".  By 1840, there 
were calls that no more "juvenile delinquents" be shipped to the Cape to be 
apprenticed, because they were strengthening the undesirable element in society, and 












destitute children was mooted as an alternative, where they would receive work 
training collectively under supervision.44 
 Another instance of a quick defensive reaction to criticism from overseas was 
a negative report of the Colonial Church Society in London in 1840.  It alleged that 
the Cape colony was poorly served in religious matters, only three or four clergymen 
serving 60,000 people.  As the colony was so "destitute in religious instruction", the 
Society proposed to send ministers and schoolmasters to rectify the situation.  The 
reaction from the Cape was swift.  Comments in the Commercial Advertiser pointed 
out that the report had underestimated the Cape population by some 100,000, and 
overestimated the scattering of the population over the huge territory.  People were 
concentrated reasonably well in towns.  Furthermore, rather than having only a 
handful of clergymen, the Cape boasted 88 ministers from 12 denominations and 
missions, all "working clergy", plus a number of instructors and lay preachers.45  If 
the paper would have thought of including the Muslim imams, the numbers would 
have been even more impressive.  But the point had been made that outside criticism 
was ill-informed, and that the Cape was better than its reputation. 
 
2. Socio-Economic Discourse 
 
The Competitive Instinct 
 
 As in the case of religious discourse, the public debate on social and economic 
issues was imbued by a Smithian purism of combating monopolies, fostering open 
competition, and opening up opportunities for diversification and innovation, all 
within a well-regulated context and the rule of law.  The practice, as we have seen 
above, often was a more complex matter, a pragmatic mix of collusion and 
competition depending on the circumstances.  But most contributors to the public 
forum felt it incumbent on themselves to demonstrate their preference for free trade 
and an open-access economy.  The regulatory role of the government was most often 
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invoked with reference to social issues, law and order, but also in cases of unlicensed 
economic activity that disadvantaged others.  A classical liberal in the tradition of the 
Scottish Enlightenment would have felt quite at home in this discourse. 
 A frequent topic of editorials and readers' comments was the need to get 
government out of everyday business.  The discussion dwelt on the drawbacks and 
inefficiencies of the "public enterprises" such as those engaged in the retail trade in 
wine and pharmaceuticals, and insisted that business of this kind was not a suitable 
pursuit for government.  Profit not being a reliable public resource, the state should 
stay out of this kind of business.  This, however, did not mean that commerce should 
be unregulated: on the contrary, it was felt to be of paramount importance that the 
state should enforce licensing laws to preserve good business standards.  It was noted 
approvingly that an unlicensed private seller of wine and brandy (a popular sideline in 
drink-happy Cape Town) had been apprehended in a sting operation by an 
independent agent who pretended to be a prospective customer.46 
 Public authorities were not only encouraged to open up markets, but also 
scrutinized for the intransparent letting of public works contracts.  With some relish, 
the press reported that the small town of Swellendam had awarded a contract for the 
painting of the drostdy without tender, at an allegedly inflated price of £ 500.  This 
compared to bigger jobs in Cape Town being accomplished for the price of £ 50, an 
indication of the greater competition and market transparency in the bigger city.47 
 The felt need for sound regulation sometimes tipped into a desire to limit 
competition in the interest of a more harmonious society.  "Self! Self! Self! is the 
ruling principle here", complained a letter to the editor in 1830, "but narrow-
mindedness ever defeats its own object."  It went on to contrast the "unfair" fierce 
competition among shopkeepers and traders in Cape Town with the orderly 
cooperation within craft guilds and associations in Britain, arguing that "cooperation 
produces wealth".  The writer suggested that the ancien regime under the VOC was to 
blame for preventing cooperation among merchants, and that permitting merchants to 
associate and collude would eliminate a lot of friction.  Established traders who 
constantly objected to the entry into the market of "peddling importers" and "lady 
peddlers" would be protected from such impositions.  Apparently, it was common for 
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wholesale importers and single women to occasionally offer goods at the retail level, 
and perhaps undercut traders who had built up expensive stocks.  Similarly, the 
licensed publicans of Cape Town clamoured for protection from "unlicensed shops, 
hotels and restaurants" which were disturbing their business.  Entry into the retail 
market, whether legal or illegal, seems to have been accomplished relatively easily.48 
 Taking advantage of unsuspecting outsiders was a common strategy.  As in the 
case of the wealthy Muslim visitor, Mirza Khan, at the beginning of the century, the 
long-term visitors from the Indian civil and military services who were drawing full 
allowances at the Cape were regularly overcharged.  "Indian" letter writers to the 
editor complained about poor service and extortionate prices.  Good servants were 
hard to find or overpaid, and landlords were extracting premium rents from these 
gullible visitors.49 
 Cape Town's daily market for perishables came in for criticism concerning 
inefficiency and lack of competition.  As only limited space and time in a public 
square was made available for this purpose, letter writers argued that relatively few 
traders could clog the space with their wagons, thus preventing more traders to 
participate.  Easier entry of more market participants and therefore more competition 
could be ensured by relocating to a larger space, and by extending the trading times.  
Writers also urged the prevention of the establishment of a proposed "corn and wheat 
depot" by farmers' collectives, as this would be a move to restrict competition as had 
been done by the wine farmers earlier in the case of the "wine depot".50  
 The cartel of bakers was the source of constant annoyance, but opinions as to 
the right solution differed widely.  It was noted that the price of bread in Cape Town 
was significantly higher than that in Britain, despite the similarity of the wheat price 
in both locations.  The question was asked in 1829 whether the Cape bakers were 
extracting higher profits because of the lack of free entry into the business.  In 
response, one baker wrote to the editor, offering to guarantee loaves of correct weight 
at a fixed price if subscribers could be found to guarantee him a market for a 
subscription of 170 rixdollars per year.  Not much was done about the matter, 
however.  In 1839, an editorial still had to report that Cape Town bakers were making 
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apparently excessive profits, adding about 200% for baking costs to the cost of grain.  
Within ten years, bakers were said to have accumulated cartel profits of about £ 15-
20,000.  In the spirit of the times, a reader suggested to form a joint stock company to 
produce greater volumes, pass on the savings to consumers, and thus supply even the 
poor.  As the Cape was suffering not only from the cartel but also from bakers' fraud, 
new regulations for bakers and butchers were finally instituted in 1839, mandating 
accurate weight and prohibiting adulteration and false advertising. 51 
 After much further debate, a private cooperative association was formed in 
Cape Town in 1840 with the aim to hire a baker, provide him with flour purchased in 
bulk, and sell bread to the subscribers at a fixed agreed price.  An editorial in the 
Advertiser objected on grounds of economic principle.  Why do this in Cape Town at 
this time, it asked, when new regulations were already increasing competition and 
weakening cartels?  Smith's division of labour was already starting to work in the 
urban area and was creating competition among bakers.  The recent tripling of the 
wheat price, not collusion, explained the high price of bread.  A cooperative that fixed 
prices would do nothing for increasing competition.52  Pragmatic cooperation was 
facing unyielding market principles. 
 
Monopolists and Their Adversaries 
 
 The concern about continuously improving the competitiveness of the 
economy was expressed not only in the complaints about details, but also in terms of 
principle, echoing the prevalent streams of political economy in the liberalising 
empire.  An editorial in the Advertiser proposed the thesis that "people generally rely 
too little on themselves, and expect too much from the government."  It went on to 
postulate that government has the tendency to be fickle, self-aggrandising, and 
interfering (not a bad description of the colonial administration of the time), and that 
private initiative is driven by more rational considerations.  The invisible hand of the 
free market would provide the proper incentives to make the economy more efficient 
and less distorted by direct government intervention.  Government could usefully 
devote its energies to opening up the market and liberalise, however.  As an example, 
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the editor pointed out that the establishment of more fairs and markets would provide 
more outlets for farmers to offer their goods and motivate them to increase 
production.  On the whole, published opinion wondered why the economy at the Cape 
was so sluggish.  The perceived paradox was how little of the potential was realised, 
how little was cultivated for marketing, and how negligible the manufacturing 
development was.  Conveniently, much of the blame could be placed on the Dutch 
ancien regime, a period during which the Cape was subject to a "mercantile horde of 
monopolists", a "company of money-changers and traffickers" who would not allow 
individual economic initiative and stifled development.  The beginning of proper 
colonial administration was not to be placed in 1652 with van Riebeeck's landing in 
Table Bay, but in 1795 with the first British occupation of the Cape.  Given that there 
had been only a little over 30 years of increasingly enlightened government, the recent 
achievements of the colony were considered remarkable: a modest export trade in 
some products had been created, and the Cape had been integrated into a liberal 
trading order.  Much was still to be done:  one of the obstacles to a Smithian division 
of labour to generate a manufacturing economy was seen to be the policy of scattering 
new settlers loosely around the vast territory of the colony, instead of concentrating 
them around urban centres that could then develop diversified and specialized 
economies in place of pockets of subsistence agriculture.53 
 A dominant theme was the unrelenting battle against existing and emerging 
monopolies.  This was by no means restricted to economic matters alone: an editorial 
piece in 1829 combined economic, religious and civil freedoms in a general assault on 
the restraints on liberty.  It argued that the principle was the same, whether supporting 
the emancipation of Catholics, promoting the opening of trade through a repeal of the 
"restrictions on trade and commerce", removing the privileges and monopolies of the 
East India Company, or fighting for the freedom of the press (illustrated by the case of 
the expulsion from India of the editor of the Calcutta Independent Press by the East 
India Company).  Letters to the editor added that the Cape not only suffered from the 
disqualifications on the basis of religion, and from the restrictive burden of taxes and 
ordinances, but also from the frictions inherent in a diverse urban society: the litany of 
problems included the jealousies between religious sects, inefficient distinctions made 
                                                 












on the basis of colour, the prevalence of "ethnic prejudice", and the innumerable 
personal feuds that were conducted in all spheres of life.  In 1830, the press opined 
that the obsolete and indefensible hierarchy based on the Cape's diversity must be 
overcome.  The old order was described as an inefficient mix of untouchable public 
servants, burghers in a social and legal limbo, chattel slaves, indentured prize negro 
apprentices, indigenous Khoi who were treated as game to be domesticated, and the 
second-class citizenry of Malays and free blacks.  Sweeping away the old hierarchy 
would lead to equality before the law, the only desirable outcome that could guarantee 
a competitive economy in a free society.54 
 The retail monopolies for wine, beer and spirits evoked the indignation of 
commentators.  A letter to the editor in 1839 referred to Adam Smith's point about the 
benefits of competition for ale-houses: they can not sell more than is demanded, and 
therefore competition is the best vehicle to prevent price-gouging.  In addition, it was 
argued that the discretionary granting of these licensing monopolies was an incentive 
for corruption, and that it brought with it not only bribery of public officials, but also 
the bypassing of licensing laws by selling illegal Cape brandy ("smoke").55 
 The perennial bête noire of the public discourse was the East India Company. 
During the late 1820s and early 1830s, much editorial space was devoted to listing the 
drawbacks of the Company's monopoly of the Eastern trade.  The 1829 debate in the 
House of Commons on lifting the Company's monopoly was covered in great detail, 
always stressing the beneficial effects of free trade.  The strongest opprobrium was 
directed at the prices of commodities enjoyed by the Company when trading with the 
Cape.  Editorials and letters hammered away at the fact that the Company could sell 
tea at the Cape at excessively high monopoly prices, while buying the colony's export 
commodities at normal market prices.  The Advertiser calculated that an estimated 
100,000 rixdollars per year were taken out of the colony as excess monopoly profits.  
Reports on the gradual opening of the China trade led to renewed demands for the 
removal of Company monopolies at the Cape, and for an opening of the opium trade.  
The island of St. Helena, "owned and misruled" by the Company, was held up as an 
example of the pernicious effects of giving one entity a monopoly, as the Company 
was alleged to force the inhabitants to farm, but at the same time was undercutting 
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their efforts by its own imports.  The argument that the Company could only service 
its debt by maintaining monopoly profits was dismissed as erroneous and self-serving.  
A meeting of the leading Cape Town merchants, including Pillans, Ebden, Neethling, 
Sutherland, de Wet, Vos, Ross, and Collison, was reported to have agreed on a 
forceful demand to eliminate the Company's monopoly on tea, on the grounds that tea 
of poor quality was being sold at inflated prices, and that private competitive trade 
would result in better quality and lower prices.56 
 
City and Countryside 
 
 The public debate illuminated the gradual opening up of a gulf in economic 
behaviour between the city of Cape Town and its hinterland. 57 Reports stressed that 
city business tended to be quick, flexible and adaptable in reacting to market changes 
while farmers in the rural areas were slow in adapting to change.  On the positive side, 
the lack of innovative momentum in the countryside contributed to a reasonably stable 
food supply.  On the negative side, however, this would not be sustainable if farmers 
would not inform themselves about innovation and take initiatives to improve the 
efficiency of agricultural production.  Letters to the editor supported this 
wholeheartedly, promoting the spirit of knowledge sharing and of publishing relevant 
improvement ideas.  This, however, was felt to be a matter of individuals informing 
themselves, not of government imposing solutions or picking winners.  A second key 
ingredient was to be the development of a more highly skilled and motivated labour 
force.  This was to be achieved by abolition of slavery, and by the ending of the 
enserfment of the Khoi, followed by an educational campaign to motivate the newly 
freed labour to take an interest in the business they were working for.  Finally, it was 
recognised that farmers were not about to risk capital for expansion if they were 
restricted to the small Cape market.  Opening up of an export market for agricultural 
commodities would require a removal of British import restrictions, and an 
improvement of transport infrastructure to get the harvest to the ports without 
exorbitant transport costs. 
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 The analysis in the press concluded, however, that an increase of agricultural 
production would not be marketable internationally in the long run.  As an alternative, 
the commentators urged surplus farmers and their labourers to consider a move into 
manufacturing for export, but lamented that this suggestion was falling on deaf ears.  
No move to new cash crops, agroprocessing, or into manufacturing was evident.  
Those who could no longer make a living from the land in the colony should not wait 
for the future arrival of more skilled agricultural labour, but should engage actively in 
retraining their labourers and investing in the manufacture of consumer goods, close 
to urban centres and export facilities.  As in Australia, imports of consumer goods 
were high, and were not matched by adequate exports.  Investors with available 
capital were urged to find a new niche, as it would be uneconomic to employ 
immigrant skilled labour in agriculture.  It was generally deplored that the rural areas 
did not show initiative, and farmers merely increased the numbers of slaves and 
labourers without focusing on increasing their productivity.  Overall, commentators 
noted that there was a fixation on land as a key asset and store of value, a mindset that 
prevented redirecting the focus of economic activity towards manufacturing.58 
  By 1840, wool exports were rising fast, having grown from £ 3,000 to over 
26,000 in a space of six years.  This occasioned the opinion that the wool industry was 
a good example of a new opportunity for British investment in the Cape economy, a 
precedent that could lead to others.  The wine, grain, and cattle industries had not 
been able to break out of the local supply and limited export mode, and it was time for 
new entrepreneurial initiatives.  Letters to the editor pointed out that there were many 
useful potential investment opportunities at the Cape, but were not taken up by risk-
averse investors.  Flax growing and processing into exportable oil was cited as a 
success in India, and a possibility for the Cape.  The large urban area of Cape Town 
was criticised for having no significant productive activity, much energy and capital 
being poured into real estate.  As a remedy, it was suggested to tax new building 
construction in Cape Town heavily, unless it was erected for a productive purpose.  
As high urban wages were here to stay, it would make greatest sense to invest in high-
value products, shifting labour from agriculture to manufacturing.  A way to add 
value to existing materials would be to grind bone and horn into inputs for fertilizer 
                                                 












and colours, carve it into craft items, and extract oil for leather processing.  Sea salt 
production would supply and help expand the curing industry, which had to use 
expensive imported British salt for curing.  Commentators lamented that none of these 
opportunities were seized by the Cape investors.  Not even small technology 
improvements were seized quickly:  on the occasion of the opening of a Regatta Club 
in Cape Town that would improve boat design, a letter to the editor inquired why it 
had taken so long for anyone to realise that it would cut the transhipment time 
between ships and the harbour jetty by two thirds if the paddle boats would be 
replaced by sculling craft.59 
 Above all, it was considered essential to increase skills at home and to retrain: 
the unskilled and unmotivated were destined to go under, the skilled and 
entrepreneurial were to thrive.  Critical comment was reserved for those farmers who 
neglected to innovate in this way.  In 1829, the Advertiser considered that there was 
plenty of labour in the colony:  European labourers, farmers and their families, and 
large numbers of slaves and free blacks were all available for skills improvement, if 
only there were the will to make an effort.  On the whole, the colony was thought to 
be able to support many more people, as subsistence was relatively easy, moderate 
exertion yielded enough to live on, and underemployment was evident.  In order to 
engage in more profitable intensive agriculture close to urban centres, farmers would 
have to stop expanding into outlying territories which only support a marginal 
existence, and would have to invest heavily in skill building of the labour force.  
 On the occasion of reporting the results of the Commission of Inquiry on 
Trade in 1830, editorial comment concluded that inefficient farming practices 
(obsolete plough technology and poor yields) and poor infrastructure made agriculture 
anywhere but close to Cape Town unprofitable.  In addition, government intervention 
in the grain markets was shown to be inefficient.  A misguided policy of self-
sufficiency banned grain exports if a minimum price level was reached, and only 
allowed imports of grain if the price was well above what inefficient Cape farmers 
were incurring in costs, to protect local farmers' profits.  A "grain fund" was operated 
by the government, fed by a tax on bakers, to smooth out the price swings.  The 
recommendation of commentators was to abolish the protection of farmers, open the 
                                                 












trade in grain without special duties, and foster competition that would increase 
farming efficiency.  An adequate return would still be available to farmers who 
diligently improved productivity, while inefficient ones would deservedly fall by the 
wayside.  If the prevalent system of quit-rent (long-term leasing of farmland owned 
by the government) would be replaced by freehold ownership, farmers' motivation to 
innovate and invest would be increased, and would reduce the incentive for 
government to keep food prices high. 
 Barrow's travel reports through Southern Africa met with a prickly response 
by Cape public opinion.  His assertion about the Boers' "indolence and sloth" in the 
interior was met with the sharp rejoinder that this was not a natural state of affairs, but 
was a result of restrictive government regulations that destroyed farmers' incentives to 
be entrepreneurial.  A more open and less tax-burdened economy would motivate 
more farmers to take advantage of free trade and open markets.  As in other areas of 
public life, published opinion was optimistic about the entrepreneurial potential of 
human nature if only external restrictions and distortions were lifted. 
 
The "Labour Shortage" 
 
 Following the emancipation of the Khoi in 1828, and the abolition of slavery 
1834-38, a constant refrain of public discourse at the Cape, both rural and urban, was 
the perceived emerging shortage of labour.  The perception, vigorously disputed by 
the free-market camp, was that emancipation had removed the motivation to work for 
the established masters, and the system of wage labour alone was not going to result 
in a sufficient supply of labour.  In response to complaints by white settlers that their 
previously bonded Khoi labour force was disappearing to claim their own land for 
cultivation, editorial opinion maintained that the grants of land to small farmers were 
a beneficial policy to improve the lot of the indigenous population in the same way as 
that of white settlers.  It was pointed out that, of the 34,000 Khoi in the colony, only a 
few thousand were moving from mission stations and farms to new land, and that 
there was no case for government intervention in the free movement of labour to more 
promising locations.  On the contrary, "oppressed groups must first learn from 
mistakes after liberation", and free migration was useful to "improve the benighted 












by the Khoi was to be encouraged in order to move to a more equitable society, the 
settlers' complaints about insolence and absconding notwithstanding.60 
 While it was recognised that Mauritius had done well by importing Chinese 
labourers, and starting rice and sugar cane cultivation, the solution to the "labour 
shortage" was seen to be home-grown.  Waiting for the government to subsidise the 
immigration of labourers was considered to be a waste of time, and likely to still be 
too costly to make new ventures profitable.  Contributors pointed out that it took more 
than high wages to attract skilled labour to the Cape: an own house, and subsidised 
passage from Britain to the Cape were a sine qua non.  A public investment of at least 
£ 20,000 would be necessary to lure enough immigrant labour to the colony to 
increase productivity and lower wheat and meat prices by a margin sufficient to 
justify the investment.  In addition, a letter to the editor stated that Englishmen 
arriving in South Africa lose their sound industrious spirit, as they "imbibe the habits 
of indolence among a motley population".  The real culprits, as pointed out in letters 
to the editor, were the farmers' habits to keep a surplus of inefficient bonded labour, 
and their reluctance to invest in increasing the skills of labourers to improve 
productivity.  It was noted that the total 1830 population of the colony of 134,000 
included 34,000 slaves and 40,000 free blacks, a labour pool that had great potential: 
slaves who were hired out often were at least as productive as free white or coloured 
labour, an indicator of the possibilities inherent in skill building and emancipation.  
Slave populations in the peri-urban area often included skilled craftsmen in addition 
to unskilled farm labour: the auction sale of the Bergvliet estate in the rural suburbs of 
Cape Town included 36 slaves, six of whom were skilled artisans, ten house boys and 
house maids, six children, and only 14 unskilled labourers.61 
 Complaints by farmers about the "desertion" of newly freed farm labourers 
were met with disdain by public opinion.  Editorial comment noted that brick 
manufacturers around Cape Town could maintain a stable labour force, because they 
paid a reasonable wage, the workers had the freedom to use their leisure time and had 
Sundays off, lived with their family in their own dwelling, and had schools and 
churches nearby.   Furthermore, the editor observed that the directors of the South 
African College had reported that labour for the construction of school buildings had 
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been easily obtainable.  Were these not the same people, the editor asked, who were 
complaining loudly about an agricultural labour shortage?  Owners of large farming 
operations in Constantia and Wynberg/Rondebosch, such as the Cloete or van Renen 
families, were petitioning that the emancipated labourers were unwilling to work for a 
"reasonable wage" – small wonder, said the commentators, as farmers had brutal 
reputations and the wages offered did not compensate for the risk.  Farmers' lobbying 
for a "vagrancy law" to force workers to stay on a farm was barking up the wrong 
tree, editorial comment observed.  Such laws should be only used to control crime, 
not to interfere in the free movement of labour.  The liberty of workers to enter into 
contracts of their choice had to be preserved.62 
  A move by free labour from a more restricted, low-wage employment to city 
manufacture was entirely normal, and farmers would have to pay market wages and 
provide amenities if they did not want to lose workers.  The Advertiser demonstrated 
with a hypothetical calculation that a typical large wheat farm investment in the Cape 
Town hinterland could generate about 15% profit even if decent wages were paid to a 
productive workforce of labourers and herdsmen.  Collusion by farmers resulted in an 
offered wage for an agricultural labourer of only 1s6d, while a brick worker could get 
at least 2s plus amenities.  The agricultural wage offered had not risen during the 
period that had seen an increase of the wheat price from £ 7 to £ 20, a fact that the 
workers pointed to when asking for a wage increase to 3s.  The press warned that the 
farmers would lose their crop if they would not negotiate in good faith.   A reader's 
letter from the small town of Malmesbury reported that no labour shortage was 
experienced there as soon as good wages were offered.63 
 The colonial secretary, Colonel Bell, was quoted in 1839 to have refuted the 
notion that thousands of ex-slaves had abandoned the farms as unfounded.  He argued 
that more free labour was available now because the previous overstaffing had 
become obvious after emancipation.  Farmers would have to pay wages that were 
competitive with city wages in order to retain labour.  Furthermore, female domestics 
had left their place of work to live in their own house, supported by their husbands.  
In short, he argued, there was no such thing as a "labour shortage", the working of the 
market was merely becoming visible.  Reports about the friction between planters and 
                                                 
62 SACA, 29 Jan., 5 Feb. 1840 












newly freed slaves in Jamaica about wage levels were taken as opportunity to draw a 
lesson for the Cape: principles of a liberal economic policy demanded that the liberty 
of exchange in a free market was to be guaranteed, allowing labourers the freedom to 
negotiate a market wage.64 
 Not all the discussion went in the workers' favour when the rule of law 
necessary for a market society was invoked.  After 1838, commentators stressed that 
the transition from slave to free labour had to be based on clear contracts that were to 
be honoured.  If workers were not adhering to this principle, they were to be punished 
for violating a contract, to "inculcate the custom".  Withdrawing labour by going on 
strike was considered such a violation.  In 1839, five masons were charged for 
quitting work on a construction site because they had been reprimanded for the 
quality of their work.  They were sentenced to pay 5s each, and to forfeit the wages 
for the time they missed by going on strike.65 
 On the whole, complaints about the shortage of labour were met by the 
argument that the labour market would clear if everybody would react to market 
signals, adhere to the law, and act entrepreneurially.  Reports about a shortage of 
cooks in the colony?  This was not a problem, answered the commentators, but an 
opportunity to start catering businesses and cooking schools, taking advantage of 
niches opening up in the market.  Difficulties in finding domestic staff in Cape Town?  
Just establish a "servant employment exchange" to bring together those seeking jobs 
and those seeking servants.  Trying to find seasonal labour for harvests?  Labour 
agents could compete to mobilise urban workers for temporary farm work, a much 
more market-efficient solution that retaining underpaid farm labour by coercion.66 
Following the emerging principles of political economy closely, "shortages" were no 
longer treated as physical limitations, but as a lack of transparency in the market.  
Markets would come into equilibrium if prices were allowed to adjust to reflect 
supply and demand.  As the labour market would sort out the wage levels, the 
resulting division of labour would accelerate the economic development of the colony 
– a straightforward Smithian argument.  To achieve this division of labour, new 
settlers would have to be located near urban centres, not spread out thinly across the 
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vast territory where they would fall into a mode of subsistence agriculture.  
Unfortunately, commentators noted, there was an illusion that frontier land was better 
for settlers, and this misguided policy prevented more sophisticated development of 
the colony.67 
 At the same time, pragmatic partial solutions were mooted to bridge temporary 
malfunctions in the market.  Training the emancipated slaves who already had 
artisanal skills was one of them.  Another was the suggestion to lobby for the landing 
of more prize negroes at the Cape, to increase the labour supply:  while not many 
more slaving ships were being intercepted in the Mozambique channel by 1840 (the 
exception being a cargo of 700 captives taken from an apprehended Portuguese 
slaver), there still were significant captures by the British navy off West Africa.  
Instead of dropping them in Ghana, commentary in Cape Town suggested that they 
could be much more productively apprenticed and employed at the Cape.  Yet another 
option was the continuation of the import of juveniles from British orphanages by a 
London charity, despite the objections of humanitarians in Britain that this was a 
despicable kidnapping racket.  Experiments to try to induce European immigrants to 
come by subsidising their passage were recommended regularly.68 Participants in the 
discourse were slipping easily between standing on high liberal principle and 
grabbing for quick advantage.  The same persons, whether merchants or other 
citizens, promoted an open economy one day and lobbied for protection the other. 
 
Banking, Money and Usury 
 
 One of the direct interfaces between religion and commerce happened in the 
drawn-out public debate about the morality of credit, and the level of interest.  We 
have seen above that the period under review saw a transition from a system of 
private individual creditors to a system of commercial banking at the Cape.  This 
discussion was intertwined with the debate on the pros and cons of issuing paper 
money instead of relying on specie, and on the wisdom of financing government by 
public borrowing.69 
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 It soon became obvious that the informal way of providing and obtaining 
credit between individuals did not serve the colony's economic needs well, and was an 
invitation to fraud.  A letter to the editor in 1830 expressed the writer's outrage at the 
high incidence of fraud committed by generally well-to-do citizens.  While 
squandering their assets, they were said to be running up huge debts with merchants, 
giving fictitious income as collateral for the credit lines.   Among less well-off 
debtors, a similar lack of discipline prevailed: petty debts were found to be 
enforceable only with difficulty, as no property or income could be readily identified 
to be attached.  As both plaintiffs and defendants in petty debt collection cases were in 
similar economic circumstances, they often switched roles as debtors and creditors, 
confusing matters even more.  In addition, transient fraudsters made their mark at the 
Cape.  One example was the arrival of an adventurer from Australia who stayed for 18 
months at the Cape, talked his way into becoming Collector of Accounts, promptly 
embezzled significant funds, and absconded on a ship to England.  To end the high 
incidence of forgery of paper money, all currency issued between 1804 and 1828 had 
to be recalled in 1830, and new notes were issued.  Meanwhile, the existing 
government-owned Discount Bank was operating very conservatively, limiting its 
discounting to bills and promissory notes rather than including bonds.  Incurring very 
few losses because of its cautious approach, it was in good financial shape – the 
financial needs of the colony were not met.70  
 To make a start on formalizing the credit sector, prominent merchants and 
advocates of Cape Town71 initiated the discussion on the establishment of a savings 
bank.  The aim was to have an institution that could attract deposits from the lower-
income part of the population, and put these funds to productive use by lending them 
out against sound collateral.  Credit would be put on a more formal footing, and the 
lower orders would be uplifted by saving for education and old age.  Good bills and 
bonds (mortgages) would be discounted at the prevalent rate of 6%, but land was not 
considered to be very useful collateral in Cape Town: short-term credits were the 
norm, and collateral had to be easily monetized.  As land prices were falling, the 
interest rate on loans with land collateral would have to be double that for normal 
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credit.  Commentators supported the creation of the bank as highly overdue, and 
stressed that investments should be made in high-quality bonds only.  Several months 
later, however, a letter to the editor inquired about any progress with the 
establishment of the bank, and worried that "it has suffered the fate of death of all 
Cape projects in infancy".  Other correspondents observed that inefficiency was 
widespread at the Cape, and that a lot of talk, speeches and plans were not followed 
by action.  The "Club" and the "Exchange", gatherings of merchants, were mere 
talking shops.72  Pessimism about actually implementing worthy plans was 
permeating the discussion.  The sceptical public did not expect much action to follow 
words. 
 Following the successful establishment of commercial banks, citizens still had 
cause to complain.  In 1839, the three Cape Town banks stopped discounting bills, 
citing a money shortage in the colony.  The newspaper explained that circulating 
money was insufficient to accommodate the doubling of many prices in recent years, 
and that the large trade deficit of the colony had removed specie overseas.  In 
addition, the Boer farmers who had trekked out of the colony into the interior in the 
1830s were blamed for having taken large amounts of cash with them, thus depleting 
the stock of specie circulating at the Cape.  The Cape government had been issuing 
too much paper money in the form of "promissory notes", thus devaluing the currency 
(now the pound sterling after the replacement of the devalued rixdollar), in turn 
fuelling the rise in prices.  The inflation through promissory notes had been 
significant: an estimated 1.4 million rixdollars in paper money had been added to the 
stock of  2.1million circulating in 1806, and had to be redeemed at the time of 
replacement of the rixdollar by sterling. The trade deficit was financed temporarily by 
the use of slave emancipation compensation payments, partly by direct import of 
specie, partly by arranging payments for imports directly in London.  Additional 
sources of specie were the payments by ships restocking at the Cape, and expenditure 
by the "Indians" spending their rest and recreation sabbaticals there.73 
 A liquidity and solvency crisis at the Cape of Good Hope Bank in 1839 
threatened the £ 60,000 subscribed as capital by prominent members of the 
Commercial Exchange.  It was reported that, in time-honoured fashion, the Bank's 
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shareholders first asked for a bailout by the government bank to the tune of £ 100,000, 
then complained that the government bank was competing against them.74 
 The glut of paper money, much of it in promissory notes as part of 
compensation to slave owners, had depressed interest rates to 4%, and had eventually 
caused the excess liquidity to flow elsewhere.  Now that the glut was over, the fears of 
a money shortage and the upwards pressure on interest rates caused an intense soul-
searching at the Cape in late 1839:75 how far could interest rates rise before they were 
considered usurious?  And who was defining what usury actually was?  The trigger 
was the proposed bill to abolish the laws on usury, so interest rates could rise beyond 
the statutory ceiling.  The bankers were lobbying for the passing of this law, in order 
to return the commercial banks, including the crisis-ridden Cape of Good Hope Bank, 
to solvency.  The public was sceptical.  How would competition between banks be 
assured, and collusion avoided, given that the Cape was so far from the commercial 
centres of the world?  It was suggested that the lifting of the interest rate ceiling 
should last only three years, to give all parties time to unwind their positions, then be 
forced again to live within the ceiling.  Otherwise, it was feared, the historically low 
interest rates on mortgages would rise rapidly, as capital from abroad would not flow 
into the financially isolated Cape fast enough, and a local banking oligopoly was 
likely.  Countering this view, editorials maintained that all laws limiting interest rates 
are ineffectual, as parties will find a way to circumvent such ceilings.  Countries 
without rate ceilings were observed to be able to maintain equilibrium interest rate 
levels at about 5% in an open credit market, while countries with ceilings were 
showing de facto rates of 10-12% on the informal credit market.  Free competition 
was always to be preferred to achieve efficient results. 
 The economic arguments were soon superseded by a vigorous debate about 
the Biblical interdiction of usury, and whether it was applicable to the case at hand 
(had the Cape Muslims been asked what they thought of it, they would doubtlessly 
have weighed in with opinions about the Qur'anic prohibition of interest).  Opponents 
of the lifting of the interest ceiling argued both the economic and the religious angle: 
usury, i.e. charging excessively high interest, was scripturally unsound, and in 
addition would disrupt an economy with a "money shortage" that could not possibly 
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service the large volume of outstanding bills.  Free-market supporters of the removal 
of limits first made the point that the Biblical definition of usury allowed the charging 
of interest between consenting equal parties, and only prohibited taking unfair 
advantage of the poor and helpless.  They went on to argue that limiting interest in 
legitimate private transactions was tantamount to stealing, because investors could 
borrow from the bank at the legal limit of 6% and thus finance a business that could 
yield up to 15% profit.  In effect, the limit allowed borrowers to appropriate the 
lender's property, and by implication the property of low-income depositors in the 
bank who could have gotten a better return on their savings.  The Biblical 
commandment forbidding stealing assuredly would trump the prohibition of usury. 
 The argument ended in farce.  A review of existing laws yielded the surprising 
result that no law capping the interest rate at 6% was on the books.  The Dutch usury 
law applicable at the Cape at the time of the British takeover had not been carried 
over into the post-takeover period.  The bill to lift the ceiling was withdrawn, as no 
legal limit existed.  Nevertheless, the government continued to impose the ceiling 
administratively, and the debate of the free traders versus the protectors of money 
market stability continued. 
 Argument erupted again a few months later, when the South African Bank and 
the Good Hope Bank clashed over the issue of the rate ceiling, and over the question 
of whether paper money could be issued by private issuers.  The SA Bank supported 
the status quo, i.e. maintaining the ceiling and restricting the issue of paper money to 
the government.  The newly emboldened Good Hope Bank responded that the other 
bank was just afraid of competition, that interest rate caps could be removed without 
adverse effects, and that it would be beneficial if banks could issue paper money.  As 
government paper money was not always easily convertible, it would be an 
improvement of the colony's money markets if easily redeemable private notes were 
issued.  Money supply in a situation of tight liquidity would increase, and lubricate 
commerce.  The argument was not only about substance.  The two competing banks, 
roughly similar in paid-in capital, had quite different sets of shareholders.  The Good 
Hope Bank was the vehicle of Cape Town's merchant elite, including Ebden, Ross, 
Chiappini, Pillans and Cloete.  The SA Bank's capital was subscribed by the city's 












them to challenge the prevailing system with greater ease than would have been 
possible for their competitors. 
 The Advertiser commented on the situation by supporting the lifting of any 
interest rate caps on the basis of economic principle and the tight liquidity, but 
lamented that banking at the Cape was the province of speculators, not level-headed 
financial businessmen.  It compared the Cape unfavourably to Scotland, where banks 
were designed to serve business development as necessary intermediaries, and to 
enable the poor to accumulate savings.  In contrast, Cape bankers were short-term 
speculators without regard for long-term development.76 The small capital base of the 
banks, designed to meet the needs of the shareholders, not the economy, was 
considered to be too low to allow enough bills to be discounted, the editor 
commented.  The result was that private individual lenders again filled the gap, as 
they had done before the emergence of commercial banking.  Private lenders 
commonly asked for interest at one percent a month, much more than the ceiling rate 
of 6% per year for commercial banks.  It made no sense, the editor concluded, to 
maintain the fiction of preventing usury, interest rates should be freed to rise to the 
market rate, reasonable interest could be paid on deposits, and more money would 
circulate.77 
 
Public Purse and Public Spirit 
 
 As practically the whole budget of the colony's government was spent on 
recurrent expenditures, primarily civil service salaries, public investment needs had to 
be discussed in the same way as charitable contributions: donations and subscriptions 
had to be sought from the public, shares in proposed projects had to be funded by 
individual investors.  However, the funding drives that benefited individuals were 
generally more successful than those that would provide public goods and amenities.  
Churches, educational institutions, and philanthropic causes (such as buying slaves' 
freedom or supporting the poor) managed to attract funds.  Similarly, fundraising for 
projects that would benefit the subscribers directly, such as the provision of 
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reasonably priced bread, met with a positive response.  Projects involving roads, 
water supply, or lighting met more resistance.78 
 Better roads to connect Cape Town to the interior were a constant subject of 
debate, but of little action.  In 1830, it was noted that private investors had contributed 
funds to road improvements in the Hex Valley and the Bokkeveld, at some distance 
from Cape Town, and that it would be only logical if the same would happen in the 
proposed construction of a hard road across the sandy Cape Flats, or a safe road over 
the Hottentot Hollands mountains just beyond the Flats.  The Advertiser even engaged 
in some early economic cost/benefit analysis, and demonstrated that time savings in 
transporting goods had a clear monetary value to the economy.  Other contributors to 
this discussion mooted the idea of toll subscriptions, to be paid by frequent 
commercial and agricultural road users, and providing a better revenue base than ad 
hoc tolls.  In any case, the merchants met to petition the government to also make an 
investment contribution by reducing taxes proportionately to the private subscriptions 
that would be needed for the road improvement. 79 
 Ten years later, the road over the mountain pass had been improved 
successfully, but debate about an all-weather road across the Flats still raged on.  A 
joint-stock company was being formed to make things happen, as the 1830s had been 
a good decade for the formation of new companies.  Most successful joint stock 
companies, however, were in the service sector: banking, steam navigation, fire and 
marine assurance, and wharf operations were among those that survived.  Editorials 
and letters lamented that the colony was not getting any new infrastructure to connect 
Cape Town to the interior, preventing the market economy and civilisation from 
spreading.  Infrastructure and public spaces were perceived to be decaying, as 
committees proliferated and pontificated, but no action was taken.  The decision-
makers were seen to focus on international matters and to neglect local needs.  
Appeals were made to counteract the promoters of Australia who seized on Cape 
inefficiencies to claim that "the Cape Colony is a perfect failure", that "the typical 
Cape person smokes most of the day", and that the "Caffres are irreclaimable".  
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Correspondents deplored the "strong party spirit at the Cape" which prevented 
productive cooperation.80 
 The hard road across the Flats was deemed to be easily financeable, but 
correspondents were at a loss to understand why the Legislative Assembly was not 
approving it.  Arguments about the difficulty of building on the shifting, sandy soil 
were dismissed by contributors who suggested that the soil could be improved easily, 
and that much more difficult soil circumstances had been overcome in Australia.  Was 
the Cape too lazy, they asked?  Fingers were pointed at Darwin, who, during his brief 
stay at the Cape, had reported that the sandy Flats were useless, and that no water or 
hard material was available between Cape Town and the agricultural settlements of 
Paarl and Stellenbosch.  It was noted that a regular postal service could be run on an 
improved road, to replace the erratic private services available on seasonal roads and 
tracks.  Private post wagons were operating to Stellenbosch and Paarl only 
occasionally, when the volume was sufficient to cover the cost, and often refused to 
go.  Furthermore, it was argued that Stellenbosch, now isolated from Cape Town, 
could become an efficient supplier to the urban area, and even produce for export, 
with all-weather transport.  Without such facilities, the 26-mile transport costs of one 
leaguer of wine, sold in Cape Town at 60 rixdollars, were 20 rixdollars.  One 
shipment of six leaguers, valued at 360 rixdollars, incurred a loss of 150 rixdollars  by 
losing two oxen to exhaustion.81  
  Urban streets were in no better shape than the roads to the interior.  Holes and 
rocks in the roadway caused frequent damage to vehicles, and obstructed all traffic.  
Letters quoted the American practice approvingly, whereby citizens of a 
neighbourhood got together and fixed a common problem without much argument.  
Why was this not happening in Cape Town?  It was estimated that the inhabitants of 
Strand Street would manage to clean up all the loose stones in their street in 45 
minutes, if they all sent their servants to collect them in baskets.  As an added bonus, 
the editor suggested, they could then "pelt the municipality with them".  Instead, 
suggestions to sue the municipality were raised.82 
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 Water supply matters similarly suffered from misguided self-interest.  
Comments in 1830 noted that the water sources in suburban Wynberg were tapped 
excessively upstream by the rich citizens, not leaving anything for the poor 
downstream.  It was pointed out that this was a self-defeating strategy, as the poor 
were going to move away to another water source, thus depriving the upstream estates 
of easily accessible labour.  A socio-economic issue was couched in pragmatic 
argument to make a persuasive point.  In the urban area proper, a "superintendent of 
water works" was in charge of installing water connections, and of checking on 
households' water consumption to avoid waste.  Indignant correspondents asked why 
there had to be a monopoly on connections, and what business it was of this official to 
check on people who were paying by volume used, rather than a fixed amount.  
Property rights were paramount, and as long as they were willing to pay for it, they 
should be allowed to use water wastefully.  Individualism trumped public benefits. 83 
 The debate about securing the Cape Town harbour against the devastating 
winter storms that caused regular shipwrecks in Table Bay was conducted in like 
manner.  Everybody agreed that something had to be done:  opinions differed widely 
about what that was, and who should do it.  The Cape of Good Hope Trade Society in 
London, normally a staunch ally of the Cape merchants, was lobbying strenuously for 
the construction of a stone pier that would provide a more secure place to load goods 
and passengers than the old wooden jetty that had done service for ages as the landing 
place for small boats transhipping from ships anchored in the bay.  The Cape 
merchants reviewed the costs and declined to be involved.  The consensus of the 
Commercial Exchange was that the costs of the stone pier, about £ 20,000, would 
vastly exceed the stream of wharfage income and would be impossible to finance.  
Members of the Exchange felt that the London Society was mistaken, refused to serve 
on a commission to review the matter, and proposed that the construction of smaller 
jetties would serve the same purpose at lower cost.  The Society concluded that Cape 
merchants were ignorant, and did not recognise what was in their own interest.  But 
other motivations may have played a role behind the scenes:  commentators wondered 
why there were so many fine-weather wrecks in Table Bay, and concluded that 
captains were tempted to cash in on insurance claims by deliberately wrecking their 
                                                 












vessels.  The commission that was to investigate this matter mysteriously contained 
only local merchants and no seamen, leading to suspicions that this was going to 
result in a whitewash to preserve the Cape's reputation, and protect any merchants and 
captains who may have been involved in the insurance racket. 84 
 The Advertiser summarised that such debates illustrated that there were two 
major unresolved issues for public expenditure at the Cape: infrastructure and 
immigration support.  Both were essential for the development of the colony, but 
neither was being tackled seriously.  Two birds could be killed with one stone, if 
public/private partnerships would subsidise the passage of immigrants to the Cape, 
provide them with instant employment on infrastructure projects, and let private 
employers pick them up after the completion of these works.  How could the 
government claim that there were no funds available, if other British colonies could 
find ways to finance such key tasks?  The public funds, matching private ones, could 
be raised by a small surcharge on customs duties (one of the main revenue sources) 
and by the sale of Crown land in the colony.  The road across the Flats, for instance, 
could be constructed in three years for a total of about £ 15,000, a sum that could 
easily be raised.  The editor concluded, once again, that there was too much 
discussion and idle talk about public projects, yielding no results.  Both government 
and private investors should act more decisively.  The government responded to the 
barrage of criticism that the financing of infrastructure or immigration subsidies 
through land sales was out of the question, as any land sale income was needed to 
retire the huge public debt.  In any case, land was only selling for very low prices: 
3,500 acres of Crown land in Swellendam district had been sold for £ 3, and the 
London Times had confirmed that colonial land was generally not very easily 
monetised.  In desperation, Hamilton Ross commented that "public assets seem to 
have been all mortgaged for paper currency; Capetonians might as well be asked to 
remove Table Mountain as to pay off debt".  If this attitude persisted, editorial 
comment argued, no public works would ever be constructed, and the colony would 
sink into stagnation.  If government could not bring itself to raise revenues or borrow 
for investment, then private funds must be raised to finance infrastructure and provide 
                                                 












credit to productive British immigrants.  Private initiative would show more 
efficiency than incompetent government.85 
 Whatever infrastructure was actually constructed in the 1830s and 1840s was 
relatively small-scale, and dependent on private investors.  Shareholder committees 
raised the funds and implemented projects such as jetty construction or road 
improvement.  Small municipal infrastructure improvements, such as the covering of 
open ditches and canals, were completed with public funds.  Overall, the tenor of 
local opinion was that the poor image of the Cape colony abroad was undeserved, but 
that the bickering and indecision created an exaggerated impression of backwardness.  
Defensive commentary maintained that the dangers of Cape Town's harbour were 
minor, that the shortage of skilled labour was an illusion, that the Dutch population 
had an undeserved reputation for sloth, and that servants were treated better than 
reported.  As in the case of the religious discourse, the Cape closed ranks against 
foreign critics.86 
 Meanwhile, the educational and religious charities were trying to tap the same 
funding sources, but often were struggling as well.  The South African College was 
financed by private contributions in 1829, and a committee formed to start infant 
schools for the poor called for donations in 1830.  The Ladies' Benevolent Society 
successfully collected for their charitable work since the 1820s, and its members were 
held up as a good example of the charitable spirit, filling the gap where the lack of 
government provision for the poor was felt.  While commentators lauded the ladies' 
dedication, empathy, and good judgement in weeding out fraudulent claims, they 
noted that only £ 120 was collected in 1838, much below the needs.  The 
Philanthropic Society, designed to collect funds for the purchase of the emancipation 
of female slave children, had prominent sponsors, ranging from the governor to 
merchants such as Ebden, Watermeyer and Liesching, to the wealthy "Indians" 
sojourning at the Cape.  But charitable funding was erratic.  Editorials urged the 
government and private donors to support the state infant schools which were failing 
for lack of funding.  Who would educate the poor, to become "industrious domestics, 
labourers and artisans", if nobody stepped forward?  Why was there no local spirit of 
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charity to support these schools, if other schools financed by overseas missions were 
thriving?  Capetonians preferred to be bailed out by foreign money, not their own.87 
 
The Illuminating Case of Street Lighting 
 
 The long discussion about what to do about the poor lighting of Cape Town's 
streets provides an insight into the tortuous way to arrive at results in providing public 
services.  In 1830, letter writers complained that everybody in town seemed to be 
commenting on the unsafe darkness of the streets at night, but nobody was about to 
take an initiative in the matter.  Why was nobody raising private subscriptions for a 
trial lighting of one area of the town, to test the suitability of such an approach?  In 
response, another contributor, identifying himself as "a mulatto", noted in a letter to 
the editor the circulation of a proposal that all non-whites should carry lanterns at 
night, or be arrested.  This was an exceedingly silly suggestion, he thought: who 
would be able to determine the colour of a person in the Cape Town night?  As a 
better suggestion, he proposed that everyone, regardless of colour or status, should be 
obliged to carry a candle or lantern at night.  This extremely individualistic proposal 
would ensure that busy streets would be lit up well by the many carriers of lights, less 
frequented streets would only be lit up as needed when individuals were passing 
through.  No lighting would be wasted on empty streets.  The editor opined that the 
discussion demonstrated the lack of public spirit in Cape Town.  Only individual 
solutions were sought, nobody was starting initiatives for the public good.  "What is 
everybody's business is nobody's", he concluded.88 
 The lighting debate illustrates how municipal infrastructure and public order 
were intertwined in the public's mind.  As in many other colonial port cities, the 
concern about crime and citizens' safety was high on the priority list.  The existence 
of an unstructured urban underclass, and the presence of many transients, gave rise to 
numerous comments about the quality of policing, and to suggestions on how to 
improve the rule of law.  As public dissatisfaction with the underpaid and low-skilled 
informal security services mounted, a more formal and organised urban police force 
emerged slowly.  At the same time, constant complaints about the deterioration of 
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personal safety on the Grand Parade, an area of perambulation and recreation, brought 
about more attention of the authorities.  Eventually, a kind of "zero tolerance" 
approach was advocated, urging the authorities to clamp down even on small offences 
to encourage lawful behaviour.  When poor youths were prevented from collecting 
acorns in the government-owned Company Gardens because these were destined to be 
fed to the governor's herd of pigs, letter writers waxed indignant about such 
heartlessness.  In response, the Advertiser editorialised solemnly that these acorns 
were undoubtedly government property, and that "government acorns belong to 
government pigs".  Judging by the continuing complaints, zero tolerance was not 














Chapter Four: Religion/Economy Linkages in the Nineteenth-Century Cape 
Discourse 
 
Let them say that the Cape is a dreary place, 
Let them prate of the land of Ham, 
It will rival the countries of Japhet's race, 
Or the homes of the sons of Shem. 
     C.L.1 
 
 Early nineteenth-century Cape Town, a heady mix of ethnicities, religions, and 
social groups, much maligned but stoutly defended by its creolised inhabitants, was a 
small version of other urban mixing bowls of culture that had emerged in the wake of 
early modern globalisation.  Let us draw together the evidence of the predominant 
mindset at the Cape by summarising the themes in the public discourse, seen against 
the backdrop of the religious, social, and economic realities.  The religious and socio-
economic discourses in Cape Town were remarkably similar and intertwined, and of a 
different quality than the attitudes prevailing in the interior of the colony. 
 
Transition and Transformation. 
 
 Capetonians of all shades were actively conscious of the fact that they were 
living in a period of rapid change.  During the political upheavals of the turn of the 
century, changes could still be perceived as temporary and as driven by faraway 
conflicts.  After the new British order had been made permanent, it had become clear 
that a transition from the static, hierarchical system to a new, dynamic paradigm was 
in progress.  The urban elite became increasingly infused by British imperial thought 
and anglicised, and attempted to change the social, cultural and economic 
environment actively in that image.  The middle classes became aware of new 
opportunities, and of the option of upward social mobility.  The underclass saw the 
real possibility of emancipation from bondage opening up within their lifetime, and 
                                                 












witnessed the Khoi emancipation in 1828 and the abolition of slavery in 1834-38.  All 
were swept along by the explosion of religious conversion that had become possible 
from the beginning of the century, observing in real time how the Christian 
denominations multiplied and grew, and how Islam gained adherents visibly.  
International trade volumes and the number of trading partners increased rapidly. 
 The public discourse in religion, economics and social matters reflected this 
perception of change.  The concept of "development", a steady and continuous 
progression through personal, moral, social, and economic improvement, had taken 
hold in the wake of the influx of British political economy and Christian 
humanitarianism.   For both Christians and Muslims, expansion was the guiding 
principle:  the question was how to accelerate the process, and how to manage the 
frictions inherent in it.  Underlying this was the felt need to push the mindset of the 
yet unconverted towards a more spiritually sound, but also more industrious and 
"civilised" stage.  Similarly, the tenor of the economic debate was the need to expand 
and innovate, how to develop a supply of skilled labour for more efficient business, 
and how to change entrenched inefficient mindsets.  Desperation crept into the 
discourse when attention turned to the lack of entrepreneurship and innovation in the 
colony, particularly in the rural areas. Dynamic attitudes were deemed to be essential 
for coping with the rapidly changing trade and business environment.  Economic 
growth and transformation to manufacturing were the guiding principles, but inertia 
interfered.  The debates about the religious concept of usury, and about an efficient 
credit market, both called for long-overdue change and updating. 
 The social transformation was momentous, at least de jure if not always de 
facto, and occasioned vigorous debate about how to deal with the transition to free 
labour.  An expansion of education at all levels was promoted as the best way to do 
this, from infant schools for the poor to the South African College for the elite.  The 
intensive spreading of education, knowledge and information was the tool of choice 
for missionaries, imams, merchants, charitable ladies, and opinion leaders, to cope 
with the difficulties of transformation.  The default solution to any issue, religious or 
socio-economic, was to push education and the building of new skills.  Both religious 
and economic attitudes were attuned to the necessity to move forward and develop: 
liberty, education and conversion were considered to be an effective combination to 












change were to proceed hand in hand.  Einstein's quip about life as a bicycle ride, that 
to maintain balance you have to move forward, would have been subscribed to 
wholeheartedly by the Cape opinion leaders. 
 An indicator of the quickly changing orientation of the urban population was 
the pattern of reporting by the press.2  The editorial choice on what to focus on 
underwent a significant change within a mere ten years, presumably reflecting the 
shifting interests of the reading public.  Reporting by the South African Commercial 
Advertiser in 1829-31 was still heavily dominated by parochial matters, looking at the 
need to resolve local problems while applying enlightened thinking.  By 1839-41, 
much of the news space was taken up by international reports, ranging throughout the 
empire and beyond: news from the United States, Latin America, France, Germany 
and Russia were filling the Advertiser's pages in addition to news from the far-flung 
empire, reducing the local issues to the margin.  The link to the world at large had 
become much more important, and even local problems were seen through the lens of 
comparison to other parts of the world.  While the debate about the impact and 
consequences of Khoi emancipation in 1828 was conducted mostly on the basis of 
theoretical principle and local anecdotal evidence, the aftermath of slave 
emancipation after 1838 was carefully compared to what happened elsewhere, and 
benchmarked against global socio-economic developments. 
 
Diversity, Tolerance and Identity 
 
 Public discourse recognised, albeit with regret, that the kaleidoscopic mix of 
ethnicities, religions and cultures in the port city of the Cape was an obstacle to 
orderly, well-planned progress and development.  Neither a dominant morality and 
religious dispensation, nor a linear path to economic development could be imposed 
without furious resistance by promoters of alternative solutions.  The government was 
resigned to just maintain the peace, and preserve a modicum of law and order.  
Nevertheless, the awareness of problematic diversity did not discourage the 
participants in the public debate from offering pragmatic recommendations on how to 
work with it.  Both religious and economic issues were discussed in a business-like 
                                                 












manner, without too much concern about purist ideological positions.  Principles of 
theology and political economy were invoked frequently, but were quickly abandoned 
when a workable compromise was possible, or when a personal or group advantage 
could be secured. 
 It is remarkable that, although diversity was often deplored as an irritant, no 
calls to extinguish it were heard in the mainstream of urban public debate.  On the 
contrary, the "ethnic cleansing" of Khoi and San communities conducted by groups of 
farmers in the interior of the colony, and the atrocities committed against indigenous 
groups outside the colony by the Boer farmers who had trekked to the northwest, were 
aired with indignation in Cape Town.  Column space was given to mixed-race Griqua 
letter writers who complained that their community beyond the Orange River border 
of the colony was being invaded and abused regularly by Boer groups.  As the Dutch 
farmers were also claiming to be Christians, asked a mixed-race letter writer, why 
were they not better people?  Similarly, much editorial space was devoted to expose 
the mistreatment of non-white labour, whether slave or free.  In the same spirit, the 
religious groups did not call for the banning of other Christian or Muslim faith 
communities, but were content to compete peacefully and within the framework of the 
law.  Catholic emancipation, and the social benefits of the Muslim faith were 
highlighted as desirable features of Cape society. 
 The government kept out of disputes arising from diversity.  Despite the 
efforts of religious groups to obtain a ruling from the authorities when intra- or inter-
religious argument flared up, the usual response was a firm refusal to get off the 
secular fence, and a suggestion to resolve the issue within the religious sphere.  Even 
the complaints of Christian citizens about the alien nature of the physically 
challenging and noisy khalifa rituals of the Muslims were not acted upon 
authoritatively, but it was left to the Muslim leaders to find a face-saving solution.  A 
modus vivendi developed at the Cape, recognising the differences but acknowledging 
that no religion or culture could establish clear dominance.  Suggestions proliferated 
on how to make everyday relations work more smoothly in a spirit of tolerance and 
pragmatism, while recognising the real differences that existed.  Public discourse 
indicated that strict Christian-based rules to prohibit Sunday work were considered 
unnecessary and inflammatory in a multi-religious society which needed to aim for 












 The urban economy was geared to deal with diversity.  Wholesale and retail 
trade, the mainstays of the economy, were open to all comers, niches being available 
from very small informal operations to large formal firms and joint stock companies 
with an international focus.  Ethnic and religious groups slotted into the available 
opportunities, such as Muslims ("Malays") becoming dominant in artisanal trade and 
fishing, or Khoi gaining a reputation as highly skilled coach and wagon drivers. 
 The diversity of cultural and ethnic groups did not translate into a collection of 
well-defined, side-by-side group identities.  The emancipation and 
immigration/importation processes, coupled with the expanding universe of religious 
affiliations, produced a fluid pool of possible identity elements that could be 
combined into a personal identity architecture.  Children of immigrant white labourers 
who had fallen on hard times or had succumbed to drink, were integrated into Muslim 
families and their heritage.  Mixed-race products of masters and slaves, if suitably 
lighter-skinned and adherents of a religion acceptable in higher social circles, could 
enter the Cape elite.  The Griqua descendants of whites, Khoi and slaves considered 
themselves to be steeped in Dutch cultural and religious heritage.  The increasingly 
hybrid "coloured" urban lower classes could choose to be that plus "Malay", or a 
flavour of Christian, or add an occupational identity element.  Ethnicity and race, 
generally considered identities not subject to much choice, transformed themselves at 
the multi-hued Cape into something you could try to redefine.  After all, as the street 
light correspondent had pointed out, who would be able to identify the colour of your 
skin correctly in the Cape Town night? 
 
Individualism and Self-Interest 
 
 Through the public discourse, the Cape society shows itself to have been a 
highly individualised, fractious community in which it was essential to preserve a 
personal advantage against the incursions of others.  While being born into a 
religious, social or cultural heritage played some role, particularly at the upper 
echelons of society, choice among many options was both observed and promoted.  
Spiritual drifters were urged to choose the "right" religion and pursue moral uplift.  If 
they did not, choosing the second-best religion was still better than nothing.  












albeit not always successfully.  Similarly, having a choice in the market was always 
considered to be better than being subject to monopolies, although the chance of 
securing a monopoly for oneself quickly dissipated this high principle. 
 Altruism was, of course, not unknown.  Protestants approved of the 
emancipation of Catholics, Christians urged the adoption of rules that would make life 
easier for Muslims, and whites waxed indignant about the treatment of Khoi and 
slaves, or about the wretched state of the poor.  Philanthropic societies and charities of 
many kinds thrived, although they struggled to raise enough funds.  Yet, the altruism 
was one of individuals, who voluntarily made an effort to help the less fortunate.  In 
the same way, it was directed at individuals, not at improvements of the public sphere.  
There was a will to fund schools for the poor, mission activity, the provision of 
church premises, the buying of slaves' freedom, or the relief of individual misery, but 
the promoters of private financing of infrastructure, or of better policing found the 
going difficult.  Raising more government revenue for public works and services met 
even more resistance from a fiercely individualistic citizenry.  The opinion that 
private charities had sufficient impact to provide a safety net for the poor, and that 
there were ample opportunities for self-improvement and upward mobility, was not 
seriously disputed.  Lifting oneself out of dire circumstances through hard work, skill 
building , personal discipline, and a moral lifestyle was the commonly prescribed 
recipe. 
 The temptation to gain a personal advantage, fairly or unfairly, was always 
present, made easier by a local government that was weak in enforcing laws. It was 
relatively easy to commit fraud or exploit legal loopholes, and get away with it.  The 
wealthy had no trouble evading a large part of their tax payments, builders were 
skimping on quality materials.  No uniform moral code bound the urban population 
together, the only bond between all individuals being the fact that they were making a 
living in a port city with a strong focus on local and international trade.  Individuals 
entered this trading economy easily, in the same way that they were encouraged to 
enter religious communities.  This was in stark contrast to the rural hinterland, where 
public opinion constantly discerned a strong spirit of group solidarity, and of 
homogeneous pockets of cultural identity.  The rural mission stations were extolled 
for their success in instilling religious and social uniformity and a moral life, while it 












individual self-interest.  Commentators would have liked to see a Smithian balance of 
enlightened self-interest and a moral consciousness of the public good: unfortunately, 
all they could observe was untrammelled self-interest, and a propensity to secure an 
advantage. 
 Nevertheless, the rule of law played a prominent role in the public discourse.  
Contributors agreed that it was highly desirable to maintain sound public order, have 
an honest and effective police force, strongly discourage crime and petty larceny, and 
protect private property rights.  Alas, it was often admitted that this was wishful 
thinking, and that the reach of government was too weak to enforce it.  The courts, 
however, made an effort to uphold individual property rights, and to adjudicate 
between rival claimants according to British law. 
 Personality clashes were prime drivers of disputes that seemingly concerned 
matters of substance.  Both Presbyterian and Muslim leaders left their congregations 
in high dudgeon when it became clear that rivals beat them to key functions, and 
started their own operations with parts of the old flock and new recruits.  Strong 
missionary personalities soon tired of the frustrations of Cape Town and sought 
opportunities in the less contested interior.  Key merchants' personalities and interests 
collided in the discussions on the South African College or on the pros and cons of 
flexible interest rates and paper money.  The individualisation a la Simmel, brought 
about by an increasingly open commercial urban economy, may have resulted in a 
benign neglect of ideological differences, but propelled personal ambition to the fore 
instead.  The tolerance of other worldviews was bought at the price of big egos. 
 This was not necessarily just a negative feature.  The window of opportunity 
for individual achievement was used to innovate and to take selected risks.  Investors 
were quick to spot openings in real estate, trade, or financial services where there 
could be quick payback and capital did not have to be tied up too long.  While 
innovation in public transport, harbour operations or postal services was slow in 
coming, the chance of making a quick rixdollar by renting out rooms and providing 
services to gullible travellers and Indian civil servants at extortionate prices was taken 
quickly.  Temporary bottlenecks in labour supply were removed by making use of 
imported juvenile apprentices or "prize negroes", while looking for innovative ways 
to lure immigrants to the Cape or to develop local skills.  Imams set aside religious 












and secular schooling for young children, then to return to Muslim schools that were 
adding secular subjects to religious instruction.  The risk of losing families to the 
Christian community by doing this was deemed acceptable in view of the potential 
benefits of acquiring secular skills.  New business models were established in 
commerce and religion, even if they carried risk, as long as they promised quick 
returns. 
  
Competition and Collusion 
 
 A rich vein of concern with the pros and cons of competition runs through the 
public discourse at the Cape.  The individualisation fostered by the diversity of the 
port city was confronted with the growing integration into a global economic system, 
and with the lifting of the lid on religious proselytising.  During the decades of 
growing awareness that an increase in personal freedom was possible, this confluence 
of trends sharpened the sense of having a choice in many areas of life.  In social 
terms, at least an attempt could be made to redefine one's social station.  The choice 
of religious affiliation opened up, and was exercised vigorously.  The tenor of public 
discussion constantly pushed in the direction of opening up markets and removing 
monopolies and restrictions. 
 The economic discussion hammered away at the obstacles to trade caused by 
protectionist British laws and regulations, and at the highly visible monopoly in the 
China trade enjoyed by the East India Company.  At the local level, the opening up of 
produce markets, the relaxation of licensing and retailing rules, and the removal of the 
perceived bakers' oligopoly and alcohol monopolies were pursued tenaciously.  The 
lifting of ceilings on interest rates was promoted as a way to increase competition and 
avoid inefficient informal lending.  Using the same arguments of enlarging the 
freedom of choice, the discussion promoted a framework for the coexistence of 
different religions and denominations in order to expand the opportunities for moral 
and spiritual uplift.  Despite vigorous debate about the relative superiority of 
individual faiths and confessions, a consensus emerged that it would be best to live 
with competing religions, as long as their rivalry was kept within the confines of an 
open society based on the rule of secular law.  Participants in the spiritual market 












commentators endorsed the legitimising of Muslim marriages in order to enlarge the 
basis for public and private morality.  Religion in general was lauded as a contributor 
to good social behaviour, and as deserving of more competitive space.  In both 
religion and business, conventional wisdom prescribed that well-regulated 
competition would benefit all individuals in the community. 
 In the argumentative society of the Cape, dissenters who challenged this 
paradigm were not scarce: nostalgia for a well-ordered corporatist and hierarchical 
society was voiced, and many contributions to the debate deplored the lack of civic 
spirit and the prevalence of selfishness.  Nevertheless, the dissenters were a minority, 
complaining about a course of events that was not going their way.  Other critics 
endorsed competition, but complained that enforcement of fair rules in the market was 
lax, and that competition deteriorated into lawlessness and fraud. 
 Suppliers of both religious and economic services were keenly aware of this 
window of opportunity, and engaged in robust competition.  As was to be expected, 
the fervour for competition evaporated when there was a chance to collude with other 
suppliers or to secure a privileged position through a ruling of the authorities.  To its 
credit, the government maintained a hands-off policy, and mostly let competition take 
its course.  Merchants complained loudly when the privileges granted to Cape wine 
imports into Britain were withdrawn, but had to live with it.  Anglicans were claiming 
a rightful place as the Empire's established dominant religion, also in vain.  Despite 
many alarmist calls to stop the spread of Islam in the urban underclass, and to 
counteract the educational edge of Islam, no radical action was taken.  On the 
contrary, the authorities tried to extend support to Muslim schools to put them on the 
same footing as Christian ones, an attempt thwarted only at the last minute by senior 
Christian clergy.  Official attempts to exclude Jews from the competitive allocation of 
"prize negro" apprentices were met with public criticism. 
 Cooperation rather than competition was evident in the rural areas, where 
Christian missionaries, despite their confessional differences, collaborated readily and 
provided mutual support.  Areas of the vast interior were demarcated for individual 
denominations by the sheer fact of distance and difficulty of travel, and contacts 
between the pockets of mission were cordial.  Annual meetings of mission societies 
stressed the good relations with other missions, and celebrated the pace of 












farmers was common, this was expressed in terms of argument about who had the 
right to local unskilled labour, and often was settled by negotiated arrangements to 
provide labourers.  In general, agricultural operations were castigated as outdated and 
not competitive, relying on ever larger numbers of forced or cheap labour, and in need 
of an opening up to a competitive labour market with equilibrium wages. The urban 
scene presented a much more competitive picture in all respects.  
 
Trust and Suspicion 
 
 Trust in strangers was a commodity in short supply at the urban Cape.  The 
transient social nature of the city, as opposed to the more settled social relations in the 
hinterland, kept individuals from relying too much on others who were not known to 
be as reliable as kin or close associates.  The diversity of religions and cultures added 
to the perception that members of other groups had different value systems, and were 
not necessarily to be trusted in the long term.  Suspicion of others was a precaution 
against being taken advantage of. 
 Prominent citizens felt the need to take to the public forum to dispute the 
claims of others in the community who may have impugned their integrity.  Members 
of religious congregations took pen in hand to voice their suspicions of others in the 
same group who may have been deviating from the straight path.  Muslim imams 
suspected each other publicly of deliberately twisting the last wishes and dispensation 
of the revered Tuan Guru for personal advantage.  Fair-weather wrecks in Table Bay 
gave rise to conspiracy theories about insurance fraud.  Those who criticised the 
mission schools and did not contribute to the funding were suspected of being free 
riders in an improvement effort financed by others.  Citizens were reluctant to 
contribute to initiatives benefiting the public at large, suspecting that others would not 
join.  Others voiced suspicions that members of the underpaid police force were 
deliberately waiting to apprehend culprits until a sufficient reward was offered.  
Above all, a constant suspicion about the motives of British and Australian critics of 
the Cape Colony permeated the debate.  In this spirit, Cape merchants suspected their 
sometime allies in the London merchant community of condescension when they 
criticised the Cape attitudes towards harbour improvements.  Similar knee-jerk 












juveniles to the Cape for indentured apprenticeship, or when Australian commentators 
were thought to be furthering their own interests as immigrant destination by 
blackening the image of the Cape Colony. 
 In general, suspicion about the motives of others came easily to Capetonians at 
this time of transition.  While there was a general consensus that tolerance of the wide 
variety of views and lifestyles was best for the maintenance of peace, this did not 
mean that differing views were embraced as equally valid as one's own.  As there 
were many combinations of identities, it presumably appeared to be the safest course 
to keep the circle of trust as small as possible, and to rely only on those fellow citizens 
whose cultural and business thinking was known to be compatible with one's own 
worldview.  Most joint stock companies that emerged in this era were designed for 
services such as insurance or operating companies, and did not require long-term 
commitment to investing capital.  The investors in the first Cape banks were tightly-
knit groups of like-minded merchants, often linked by family ties, who were looking 
for speculative gains. 
 
The Cape's Place on the Cultural Values Map 
 
 Where would we place a society like early nineteenth-century Cape Town on a 
map of cultural values that would give us an indication about the path of development 
characteristic of such a society?  The features of the society appear fairly clearly as 
follows: 
• Rapid cultural and economic transformation, felt by all. 
• Creolisation and ethnic mixing of the entire community, not only parts of it. 
• Secular government, limited to administration and maintaining law and peace. 
• Rich religious, cultural, ethnic and social diversity. 
• Vigorous religious competitiveness under a secular authority. 
• Growing religious affiliation based on personal choice, and a strong role of 
religion in personal identities. 
• Tolerance of other worldviews in the interest of maintaining one's own 
options. 













• High degree of individualism and pursuit of self-interest for the short term. 
• Poor public spirit, and lack of cooperation for long-term goals. 
• High degree of competitive spirit with a tendency to slip into occasional 
collusion. 
• Low levels of interpersonal trust, focus on temporary interpersonal alliances. 
• Focus on protection of personal property rights. 
 
 These features resonate with the clusters of values used in the World Values 
Surveys conducted from the 1990s to the early 2000s by Ronald Inglehart and his 
collaborators3.  The results of these surveys have been consolidated in a map that 
plots the different positions of surveyed countries on two coordinates: one ranging 
between a traditional values set oriented on religion and a secular-rational one that 
indicates a dynamic, science-based model; the other ranging between values that 
stress community survival and those that indicate reliance on the expression of 
individual preferences.  The graph below illustrates that this method clusters groups 
of countries by cultural-religious heritage: Protestant Europe occupies the extreme 
end of the intersection of high secular-rational and high self-expression values; 
African countries are clustered at the opposite extreme where highly traditional and 
strongly community-survival values intersect.  Other cultural clusters show different 
combinations of these value sets: countries with Confucian or Communist heritage 
show high secular-rational readings, but less focus on individual self-expression; the 
English-speaking world shows high individualism, but less secularity than Protestant 
Northern Europe.  The general development path over time that has been derived from 
this cross-sectional data base suggests that a common feature of many cultural areas is 
to first get on a collective track of secularisation and economic growth, then using the 
acquired material security to break out of the collective survival mode into a more 
individualist paradigm.  Economic success increases from the south-western to the 
north-eastern corner of the graph. 
 The map shows clearly, however, that there is no linearity or determinism in 
this pattern.  Cultural zones set their own pace in combining and changing the value 
sets.  Based on this insight, one can easily insert the urban Cape society into the map, 
                                                 












although it belongs to a different era.  The facts of a small circle of trust, a high 
reliance on religious values, and the lack of long-term rational vision puts it at the 
traditional/religious end of the vertical axis.  On the other hand, the high 
individualisation, the tolerance of other worldviews, and the competitive instincts of 
the population places the Cape at the self-expression end of the horizontal axis.  The 
overall result is one of individuality and self-expression racing far ahead of any 
secularising and rationally planning trends.  The urban Cape presents an outlier 
among the major homogeneous cultural zones, by virtue of being an urban, highly 
diverse society. 
 
The Inglehart Values Map 2009: Adding 19th-Century Cape Town 
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Human Development and Values 
 
 This position of the urban Cape in an unusual combination of values explains 
the fact that all efforts to organise the community for efficient long-term visions and 
investments met with strong resistance.  Rather than move first from a static, 
traditional and hierarchical society in the direction of a dynamic, modernising and 
cooperating society to achieve collective material gains, the Cape moved straight into 
a quasi-postmodern paradigm of a highly individualised competition of personal 
preferences, without leaving the traditional values behind.  This contrasts with the 
general pattern evident from today's surveys, that societies that also remain close to 
the traditional end of the spectrum generally have not developed a similarly high 
degree of individualism, Latin America perhaps having gone farthest in this direction.   
One must, of course, consider that we are placing a multi-ethnic and hybrid port city 
in a data set of countries where both rural and urban values are averaged.  
Undoubtedly, similarly cosmopolitan cities in the cultural zones listed here also 
showed quite unique patterns of development, a matter we investigate below.  
Nevertheless, the discrepancy illustrates the gap between urban and rural values 
vividly: judging by the public discourse, the rural Cape would have been located 
much closer to the south-western corner of the graph than Cape Town was.  Rural 
communities placed a premium on the solidarity of groups that forged a common 
identity, in order to ensure survival.4  In Cape Town, survival of the community was 
secondary to personal achievement, as a common identity of the community was 
lacking. 
 The result was a development pattern that relied heavily on individual skills of 
navigating a competitive environment, finding unique niches and combinations of 
activities that ensured an advantage.  This made the economy behave in a peculiar 
way: creative and innovative energies, used for long-term investment and risk-taking 
elsewhere, were channelled into short-term commercial activities.  The usual pattern 
of development in this modernising and industrialising period of change would have 
been to harness the individual initiative and spirit of innovation for the expansion of 
both social and physical capital, in a deliberate effort to increase material security in 
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the long run – the basis of the development of productive capitalism and economic 
growth.  What was missing at the Cape was the move from traditional/religious values 
towards secular/rational ones.  This would have happened in a society less resistant to 
the "regimented organisation of human activities" and to the development of a 
collaborative "civic ethos", the hallmarks of modernisation and secularisation.  The 
feature blocking this move at the Cape was the strong diversity and intense 
competitive spirit in the community, much of it represented and reinforced by the 
highly visible religious competition.  An atomised community did not have the 
collective strength to forge coherent material development.  Trust in strangers and the 
law, a precondition for long-term risk-taking, was low.  In comparison, the sense of 
individual autonomy was high, and was channelled into commercial, social and 
spiritual personal strategies.5 
 We thus are observing a community in which "development" was defined as a 
low-growth, low-confidence process of manipulating ad-hoc opportunities creatively.  
At a time when other areas of the world experienced rapid economic growth on the 
coat-tails of the British Empire's globalisation, the simultaneous incidence of (1) 
vigorous religious and economic competitiveness, (2) an opening of opportunities to 
build personal identities, and (3) diversity-driven individualisation directed 
development onto another, more anarchic path at the Cape.  In a more homogeneous, 
less culturally competitive society, competitive instincts of individuals may have been 
channelled into increasing productivity.  This kind of growth-oriented economic 
activity with long-term investment, however, only manifested itself after the middle 
of the century, when the diamond and gold finds in the northwest drained economic 
attention away from the Cape and resulted in the "minerals boom" of the late 
nineteenth century with its centre of gravity in the newly dynamic areas.  Peaceful 
religious competition at the Cape, meanwhile, avoided sectarian conflict and enabled 
individuals to thrive, but became an obstacle to collective progress. 
                                                 













Chapter Five: Comparative Perspectives 
 
1.    Colonial Comparators 
 
 These conclusions for the early nineteenth-century Cape can be profitably 
compared to the pattern identified by earlier work on other creole locations6, in order 
to assess whether Cape Town represents a unique case or shows similarities to trends 
elsewhere.   
 The post-emancipation experience of the Caribbean and of other African 
colonies offers interesting insights into the way in which diverse and creole societies 
coped with the achievement of formal freedom from chattel slavery in a global 
imperial context that had economic, social, and political liberalism as its Leitmotiv.  
Asian colonies displayed ethnic and cultural mixes that matched those at the Cape.   
To focus more narrowly, it is not the emancipated or multicultural society as a whole 
that needs to be examined, but only the cosmopolitan port cities that show a trajectory 
similar to that of Cape Town.  
  Exploring the available literature on colonial cities,7 a number of 
commonalities appear, without yielding convincingly matching parallels.  However, 
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nuggets of common experience can be used, focusing on the following features 
typical for nineteenth century Cape Town: 
 
• British Empire Linkage:  Caribbean, Southeast Asian, Indian, and West 
African cities (Kingston, Singapore and the Straits Settlements, Freetown, 
Bombay, Madras etc) were similarly embedded in the nineteenth century 
Empire and its globalising influence. 
 
• Port and Entrepot City:  Kingston, Bahia, Rio, Melaka, Penang, Freetown, 
Bombay, or New Orleans can serve as comparators to Cape Town in their 
function as major points of transhipment or port activity. 
 
• Ethnic Mix:  Brazilian and Asian cities (Melaka, Penang) exhibited a similar 
diversity in ethnic and cultural terms. 
 
• Religious Mix Including Islam:  Straits Settlements, Freetown, and Bombay 
have the religious diversity that compares well to the Cape case. 
 
• Creole Environment:  Jamaican, Brazilian, and West African port cities, as 
well as New Orleans developed a creole culture similar to that at the Cape. 
 
• Slave Society:  the Caribbean and Brazil are cases of a colonial transition from 
an established slave society to a more fluid and complex one, seeking 
identities.  The West African experience is more that of a source of slaves than 
one of local slavery. 
 
 On the whole, then, all comparisons must be partial.  Some locations were 
slave societies based on sugar plantations and exports (the Caribbean, or Brazil), 
giving them a different flavour from the Cape.  Others had the religious diversity and 
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the crucial presence of Islam as a competitor, but did not emerge from slave societies.  
As this work is focusing primarily on the role of religious diversity in cities of a 
liberalizing colonial empire and not on the heritage of slavery, locations such as the 
Straits Settlements (Penang, Melaka, Singapore) yield the best comparative results.  
The city of New Orleans, a creole intersection of cultures, also helps in establishing a 
pattern. 
 
The Straits Settlements 
 
 Asian colonial port cities present a particularly good match for Cape Town, as 
several of them were involved in a similar transition from Dutch to British rule in the 
Indian Ocean littoral, and displayed a religious mix that included Islam and 
Christianity.  Melaka (Malacca) is the prime example here, having been a trading port 
well before the arrival of the Portuguese and their successors, the Dutch, and sharing 
with the Cape the fate of an initially temporary, then permanent handover to the 
British at the beginning of the nineteenth century.  Newer, British-founded ports such 
as Penang and Singapore showed belated, but similar hybridity.  Batavia, the eastern 
headquarters of the VOC, had of course maintained a close affinity with the Cape 
throughout the Dutch period.  So did ports in the eastern Indonesian archipelago such 
as Makassar. 
 Most Asian port cities had either a potentially productive hinterland (as did 
Cape Town), a nearby network of other regional ports, or both.8  Bombay, Madras, 
and Calcutta benefited from possibilities of textile production, and the processing of 
hides and other agricultural products.  Rangoon, Bangkok and Saigon had rice-surplus 
hinterlands, Batavia and Surabaya were located in areas focused on agroprocessing 
and spices.  Colombo had tea and rubber, while Melaka, Penang and Singapore 
benefited from tin and rubber in the hinterland, and a network of Indonesian 
archipelago ports.  Not all of these port cities, however, became important processing 
and exporting centres, although most of them were the type of cosmopolitan and 
hybrid cities we would expect to lead the way in development.   
                                                 












 Let us look at the religious relations in some of them, and consider the 
implications.   Rangoon, Bangkok, and Saigon were cities with a dominant official 
religion, Buddhism, and small expatriate-type enclaves of other religions.  Bombay 
and Calcutta had a pre-1800 British colonial mix of Hinduism, Islam and a thin layer 
of administrators' Christianities, but the bulk of the urban population, having an 
established pre-colonial local religious heritage, treated religion as inherited by birth, 
and not subject to contestation.  British rule encouraged communal corporate 
identities, leading to settled religious communities living side by side and negotiating 
as corporate bodies.9  Batavia, although multi-ethnic and multi-religious, was 
superimposed on a traditionally strong Javanese Hindu-Islamic cultural base, and had 
only a brief interlude of British rule in 1811-16 that was not enough to bring in any 
missionary fervour: the non-competitive attitude of the Dutch Reformed tradition of 
the colonial elite was not interrupted.10  All these port cities managed to channel their 
innovative energies into long-term material development. 
 Colombo and Melaka, however, originally mainly Buddhist and Muslim 
respectively, went through a Portuguese period with strong Catholic conversion 
activity, followed by a Dutch period with an addition of a Dutch reformed element, 
and concluded by the British period beginning in the early nineteenth century that saw 
the explosion of missionary activity and an influx of Hindu migrants.  Both port cities 
had accumulated a number of rival religious communities over the colonial years, and 
migrants from distant areas constituted a large part of the population.  Religious and 
cultural competition may have gone beyond the tipping point at which consensus-
based collective development became difficult.  Colombo maintained some economic 
momentum based on its tea and rubber plantation hinterland.  Melaka did not and 
declined, eclipsed by the new British ports of Penang (1786) and Singapore (1819). 
 Melaka's case is intriguing when looking for a confirmation of the fate of Cape 
Town.  In addition to the accumulation of Chinese, Arab, Indian, Malay, and 
European ethnicities and religions, the city had undergone a clear creolisation.  The 
"Portuguese-Eurasians", a mixed-race Christian population group derived from 
successive intermarriages and sexual liaisons between Europeans and Asians had 
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emerged, matching the "coloured" population of Cape Town.  Chinese-Malay, Indian-
Malay and Chinese-Eurasian descendants enhanced the mix.  Indeed, the whole 
community had become essentially creole, as many of those formally accepted as 
Europeans were of mixed descent, the mere fact of acknowledgement by a 
"European" father making the difference.  As in the other Straits Settlements, Melaka 
was experiencing what has been termed "ethnic oscillation", the occurrence of shifting 
ethnic and religious affiliations of individuals.  A laissez-faire lifestyle had evolved, 
avoiding official interference in the construction of personal identities.   On the eve of 
slave emancipation in the British Empire, about 10% of Melaka's population were 
urban slaves from a wide variety of Indian Ocean origins – further targets of religious 
competition as abolition loomed.  As in the case of the Cape, the combination of high 
religious diversity and a thorough hybridisation of the community as a whole had 
resulted in competitive individualism, and a turning away from corporate identities.  
Individuals of different ethnic and religious backgrounds easily established business 
and family relationships without being too concerned about their respective cultural 
identity structures.  Melaka remained peaceful and free of sectarian conflict, but 
stagnated in its traditional role as trading port and entrepot without forging a more 




 Port cities of the colonial Americas, whether with a British, French, Spanish, 
or Portuguese heritage, usually served as export outlets for large-scale plantation 
agriculture.  Sugar in the Caribbean and Brazil, and cotton in the southern United 
States had created large populations of agricultural slave labourers on estates by the 
early nineteenth century, many of whom were recent imports from West Africa.  Only 
a small number of Europeans and mixed-race people, primarily planters and their 
supporting population, were in evidence.  At mid-nineteenth century, three quarters of 
Jamaica's population were classified as "Negro", primarily agricultural labourers of 
West African origin, the remainder being mostly "Coloured" (mixed-race).  About 5% 
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were listed as "European".12  A recognisable slave culture had developed on the 
plantations and in the ports, characterised by African spiritual practices and beliefs 
meshed with indigenous adaptations of superficially introduced Christianity. 
   In Jamaica, African spirituality and slave Christianity were perceived by the 
British colonial elite as potentially disruptive: in large concentrated slave populations, 
preaching by their peers could result in insubordination, tipping into organised 
rebellion.  The example of the successful Haiti slave uprising against the French 
before 1800 was concentrating colonial minds.  Independent slave-based quasi-
Christian groups such as the Native Baptists were suppressed in the early 1800s, and 
replaced by officially sanctioned Anglican, Wesleyan, Baptist, Presbyterian and 
Moravian missionaries, who were expected not to engage in the promotion of 
systemic change.  Anglicans and Presbyterians primarily served the white population, 
Wesleyan Methodists relied on the support of the urban mixed-race group, and the 
Baptist and Moravian missionaries were primarily interested in conversions among 
the plantation slaves.  Rather than competing, the denominations were delineating 
spheres of influence.  Any differences between the denominations, however, were 
swamped by the antagonism between white planters and missionary humanitarians in 
the run-up to emancipation.  All missionary work was seen as supporting the British 
humanitarian and abolitionist movement, and was resisted accordingly.  In turn, much 
of the active resistance against slavery arose out of the mission stations and their 
offshoots on the plantations.  All promotion of organised religion, whether African or 
Western, among the slave population was politically suspect: the common 
predicament engendered cooperation, not competition. 
 Kingston and other urban centres had developed a creole nature, being 
dominated by a mixed-race population composed of "free blacks" and urban domestic 
slaves, a de facto "coloured" agglomeration of the results of inter-racial sexual 
contact.  Joining the Anglicans and Dissenters in town, Jews and French Catholics 
added to the religious diversity.  Of all denominations, however, it was the Wesleyans 
who established the closest identification with the coloured population (the urban 
majority), leaving the Anglicans, Presbyterians, Catholics and Jews to share the 
                                                 












adherence of the white minority.  Thus, competition was not a key feature of religious 
life in Kingston, to the extent that it was at the Cape at the same time.13 
 After emancipation, an element of competition crept into the Jamaican 
religious life, as education of the ex-slaves became a government priority, in order to 
assist them to become upwardly mobile.  Dissenting clergy feared a domination by the 
established Anglican church in receiving funds for education, and opposed any 
government funding.  Further competition appeared after the big initial post-abolition 
success of the Baptists in converting the ex-slaves: voices were raised among other 
missionaries (such as the LMS) that the Baptists had only succeeded so spectacularly 
by adopting traditional Africanist elements into their faith, moving away from 
mainstream Christianity.  This, however, was a rural phenomenon, not an urban one.  
The Wesleyan Methodists retained their lock on the urban coloured population, and 
friction erupted mostly within the denomination, driven by the church's reluctance to 
acknowledge the equality of white and coloured congregants.  As in Cape Town, the 
complaints about the Anglican church were that it was too staid and slow-moving to 
make any headway in conversions.  There were attempts to suppress the African-
inspired popular Christian rituals at Christmas and Easter, to little avail.14 Creole 
Kingston experienced its share of religious competition, and saw little modernisation 
and development beyond servicing the gradually declining sugar export industry.15 
 As in the urban Caribbean, Brazilian port cities boasted a high proportion of 
creolised mixed-race inhabitants, both free and enslaved until emancipation, whose 
more individualistic and egalitarian life contrasted with the hierarchical and 
regimented existence of the labourers of mostly African heritage on plantations and 
rural mission stations.  Members of these "coloured" groups were artisans, small 
traders, fishermen, skilled labourers and professionals who often achieved significant 
wealth, owned slaves, and acted as creditors and business partners for plantation 
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managers and the white colonial elite.  Social mobility was not easy, but possible.16  
Unlike the British Caribbean, however, the religious life of colonial and post-colonial 
Brazilian cities was dominated by Catholicism.  Competition in the religious sphere 
came almost entirely from semi-clandestine traditional African spirituality and ritual, 
manifested in the focus on spirits and supernatural phenomena.  Creolisation had 
taken place, but spirituality was kept firmly under the Catholic umbrella, even if 
tinged with Africanist practice. 
 An intriguing parallel to Cape Town exists in the case of New Orleans.17  Both 
port cities had a pre-anglophone colonial history, and were taken over by British and 
American authorities, respectively, in the early 1800s.  Both had a potentially 
productive hinterland, New Orleans being more easily connected to it by the 
navigable Mississippi river, while Cape Town had no comparable transport 
infrastructure to overcome the ring of mountains and sand flats surrounding it.  
Neither city achieved significant industrialisation and modernisation in the early 
nineteenth century, but remained wedded to the port and trading functions.   As in 
Cape Town, creolisation had taken place, the urban population showing evidence of a 
large segment of mixed-race and mixed-culture people in contrast to the two-tier 
hierarchy of the rural hinterland.  Urban slaves had more personal leeway than their 
rural counterparts, being able to be contracted out for work, engaging in artisanal and 
domestic work rather than farm labour, and having more opportunities to achieve 
freedom through manumission or purchase.  A significant population of "free blacks" 
was a characteristic of both cities, the number in New Orleans being boosted by the 
influx of freed slaves from the British Caribbean after 1838.  Both were considered as 
non-typical for their region.  The creole population of both cities, free and slave, 
clustered in employment around the port and waterfront. 
 The handover from French to American rule after 1815 put New Orleans on a 
somewhat different trajectory from that of Cape Town.  The predominantly Catholic 
society, with some Africanist elements, was not immediately confronted by an 
aggressive British missionary effort as the Dutch Reformed/Muslim society was at the 
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Cape.  Furthermore, New Orleans became part of an expanding continental economy 
and turned more towards servicing its hinterland, while Cape Town integrated 
outward into the British imperial network.  Finally, the slave and free black 
population in New Orleans, in line with most colonial slave locations of the Americas, 
was of a more homogeneous West African heritage than the atomistic slave and 
indigenous serf population at the Cape, making the urban creole culture more 
uniform.  On the whole, then, New Orleans experienced a creolisation of a more 
community-friendly kind, slavery lingered until the 1860s so that the subsequent 
identity-renewal phase occurred later, and the city was not subject to vigorous 
religious competition at the time of regime transition in the early 1800s.  The link to 
the American hinterland kept the economic momentum going despite the absence of  




 Although every case of a colonial port city has its own peculiarities, there are 
a few insights that can complement the list of community characteristics outlined for 
the case of British colonial Cape Town. 
 
• Creolisation alone, although common in colonial port cities, creates a new 
urban culture that can still be conducive to collective effort and civic spirit, 
and does not necessarily hamper economic development in conjunction with a 
productive hinterland.18  The added presence of vigorous competition between 
faiths can create a tipping point at which individualisation and atomisation of 
the society preclude a secular-rational modernisation process, although there is 
a good chance that the peaceful religious competition encourages tolerance. 
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• Religious diversity alone, unaccompanied by significant creolisation, can 
result in a community of independent religious islands that achieve internal 
homogeneity and relate to each other as corporate groups competing for 
resources and status, rather than as suppliers of spiritual goods to freely 
choosing individuals.  The strong group identities serve as drivers for a 
modernising local economy, but can tip into conflict and communal 
violence.19 
 
 The locations that combined creolisation of the whole community, religious 
diversity and religious competition for individual adherents were the ones that 
produced commercially successful individuals, but stagnated in terms of 
modernisation and long-term economic development.  Cape Town and Melaka were 
reasonably close examples of this combination.   
 It is important to recognise at this point two definitional issues of religious 
competition:  the nature of competition as collective or individual effort, and the 
importance of the number of religious groups contesting the terrain.  First, the 
collective versus individual angle.  Religious competition can have two quite different 
aspects: the competition between religious groups for influence in the community, 
and the competition of religious groups for individuals, in the sense understood by 
Rational Choice theory.  The former can easily lead to communal conflict and disrupt 
economic development, but is likely to form identities that are conducive to a 
collective striving for progress.  The latter may direct religious fervour into more 
peaceful and market-oriented paths, but robs the community of a sense of common 
purpose. 
 The second feature of religious competition is what has been described as the 
"polarisation" aspect.  In contrast to the mere fact of diversity or fragmentation, i.e. 
the existence of a number of religious groupings in a community, polarisation 
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describes the intensity of the threat perceived by a religious group as coming from 
another one of similar strength.  Econometric work on religious diversity has 
suggested that fragmentation alone has little effect on long-term economic 
development.  Polarisation, on the other hand, seems to have a significant negative 
effect on economic development when a small number of religious groups of similar 
strength are competing.  The detrimental effect is biggest when there are only two 
major competing religions of similar size, and decreases with the increasing number 
of groups claiming smaller shares of the population.20 
 For the colonial locations examined above, both aspects are relevant.  Cape 
Town exhibited the feature of two major competing religious blocs, similar in size: 
Christianity and Islam.  Polarisation theory, therefore, would indicate poor prospects 
for long-term development because of mistrust and the high potential for conflict.  
Moreover, religious competition at the Cape was primarily of the kind that contested 
the allegiance of individuals, and only in a minor way a group contest for dominance.  
Again, the spirit of collective purpose would have suffered, impairing development, 
although the risk of violent conflict was diminished.  A double strike against the 
Cape, then, in economic terms, although creolisation and individualisation avoided 
communal conflict.  
 The early British Cape, then, had selected features in common with creole port 
cities of the nineteenth century around the world.  The best comparison, however, 
may be available when looking at the same city of Cape Town today, about 180 years 
later. 
  
2.  Back to the Future: Cape Town Today 
 
 Having emerged from the straitjacket of the apartheid decades in the early 
1990s, the creole community at the Cape discovered that it is again in danger of being 
marginalized.  The new Africanist democratic majority government of the country, 
although pluralist and democratic, is setting political priorities that aim to reverse past 
injustice against the most oppressed, but is at the same time relegating the concerns of 
past marginal groups (white liberals, the Coloured) to the sidelines.  The creolised 
                                                 












Western Cape, dominated by these marginal groups and consisting to 60% of persons 
of significantly mixed heritage, has felt this keenly, and has presented the nation with 
the paradox that two thirds of those defining themselves as Coloured voted in the 
1994 elections for the New National Party, the heirs of the architects of apartheid.21   
A decade later, creole Cape Town struck again, and elected an "anti-Africanist" 
municipal administration, largely composed of liberal white, coloured, and religiously 
based small parties, to form the only significant polity in South Africa not under the 
direct control of the African National Congress.   
 Are these signals from a creole community to be taken seriously?  Perhaps, but 
they are also a manifestation of the fact that cultural allegiance is something that 
transcends racial and political markers.  The identities driven by language, religion, 
history, geography, values, and shared location are asserting themselves again now 
that the apartheid lid has been lifted.  The official fiction of a homogeneous “nation of 
coloured people" as a separate racial category is gone.  Again, competing group 
identities are contesting the mind of the individual, the traditional cultural markers 
being joined by a sense of continuing threat by skewed resource allocation, 
affirmative action, crime, or educational bias against the mixed bag of people 
including those previously described as Coloured.22  Is a large subgroup of this 
population, forming the heart of hybrid Cape Town, correct in thinking of themselves 
as “brown Afrikaners”, linked to the lighter-skinned Afrikaners by a shared Dutch 
Reformed tradition, the Afrikaans language, and values formed by close historical 
proximity, not to speak of the shared blood in each other’s veins?23  Rejection in the 
presence of such close kinship is painful, particularly when representatives of the 
white ruling class have consistently, albeit patronisingly, paid lip service to the 
relationship:  from Hertzog in 1925, to white apologists in the 1960s, the statements 
describe the nature of Coloured people as essentially “European”, Western, or as the 
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“Afrikaner working class”.  Van Wyk Louw states: “The Coloured people are our 
people”24.  Alternatively, is the identity to be reduced to one of exotic diversity 
symbols, entertaining tourists and locals alike in the reincarnation of the Cape Coon 
Carnival?  Or does one revert to an essentialist Khoi or Malay/Muslim cultural 
ancestry?  Or is the creole community to either join the black or the white 
mainstream?25   
By the early 20th century, Cape vernacular Afrikaans had become a political 
and social statement for the mixed-heritage population that was losing political clout.  
The Straatpraatjes satirical column that appeared in the English/Afrikaans bilingual 
APO newspaper between 1909 and 1922 lampooned everything that was pompous 
and self-important, and illustrated the uncertainty and ambiguity of the Coloured 
population with bitter self-irony.  Significantly, this was done in a well-chosen 
Kaapse Afrikaans street vernacular that highlighted the creole nature of the city’s 
underclass, and its aspirations to become socially accepted by anglicising its speech 
and names.26  The column faded away with the APO and “Coloured politics”, but the 
vernacular remained.  Today, close to 6 million people in South Africa profess to 
speak Afrikaans at home, equally split between the previous “White” and “Coloured” 
groups.  In the Western Cape, home of the vast majority of mixed-race South 
Africans, Afrikaans is the home language of more than 60% of the population, white 
and non-white.27  This group of “Afrikaners” of various shades of skin colour, from 
lily-white to ebony, shares a powerful creolising language that conveys common 
identity.  About 15% of Western Cape “Coloured” people speak English as first 
language, but 90% of all English and Afrikaans speakers in this group are bilingual.28 
A polyglot urban culture enlarges the horizon, but also is a source of cultural 
uncertainty: a sample survey in the Mitchell’s Plain suburb of Cape Town yielded a 
significant percentage of respondents stating both a single language (primarily 
Afrikaans) and bilinguality as prime feature of household speech.  Interestingly, two 
thirds of respondents in this suburb stated a strong preference for their children to be 
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bilingual in future, a recognition that English will be an important skill in a 
cosmopolitan city.29  Language shapes identity strongly at the Cape, indeed. 
 
The New Religious Scene 
 
 Religion continues to exert a significant influence.  The strong Cape Muslim 
identity endures, but may only be sustainable in the long run because of a feeling of 
being part of a worldwide Islamic “hinterland”, reflecting the historical Muslim 
concept of “one religion with many nations”.  The members of the Dutch Reformed or 
more generally, the Protestant denominations may not see themselves as similarly 
spiritually sustained by, say, the international Dutch Reformed confession or the 
World Council of Churches, or even the fractious Anglican communion: they exhibit 
the post-modern Christian acceptance of “one nation with many religions”, which 
makes the Christian identity more easily replaceable by social, ethnic, language, or 
creole ones.30  Islam may be a stronger transformer of culture than mainstream 
Protestant Christianity can be in the Cape environment of competing cultural 
identities. 
 As with language, the “Coloured” population at the Cape shares Christian 
religious heritage with the white and African ethnic groups.  The Muslim community 
does not have this affinity with white groups, but shares the faith with a wider 
national and international ummah.  Identifying oneself as a Christian or a Muslim 
removes one temporarily from the ethnic, creole, or language identity and joins one to 
the wider circle of believers.  Again, the Western Cape sample survey provides 
insights:  two thirds of respondents in the previously “Coloured” areas of Mitchell’s 
Plain indicate that they see themselves as belonging to one specific cultural 
community.  When prompted to name which one that is, about one third of them 
point, unsurprisingly, to the familiar “Coloured” identity.  However, more than 20 % 
choose to identify themselves primarily as Christian or Muslim, far more than those 
who identify mostly with “South African”.  Nationwide samples analysed by racial 
categories confirm that 20% of the “Coloured” population primarily identify with a 
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religious identity, compared to about 30% each who see themselves as “Coloured” or 
“South African”.31  More than three quarters find religion highly important in their 
lives, the vast majority attend religious services regularly. 
What are we to make of a driver of cultural identity that rivals the 
ethnic/creole marker in importance?  It is partly linked to language:  nationwide, the 
largest share of the “Coloured” population belongs to the family of Dutch Reformed 
Churches, closely associated with Afrikaans.32  The Muslim minority has its own 
Afrikaans tradition.  Membership in traditional mission churches (Anglican, Catholic, 
Methodist, each less important than the Dutch Reformed tradition) has a more 
anglophone connotation.  At the Cape, the Dutch Reformed/Afrikaans element looms 
even larger in the total, as does the Muslim community which continues to be heavily 
concentrated in Cape Town.  Perhaps half a million Dutch Reformed adherents share 
the “Coloured” label with a similar number of Muslims in the greater Cape Town 
area.  However, these Dutch Reformed members share the faith and liturgy with over 
a million “white” Afrikaners, and their Cape Muslim counterparts are part of a bigger 
South African community including South Asian and other more recently arrived 
Muslims.33   On the whole, today's Cape Town shows the same "polarised" structure 
of religious adherence as it did in the mid-1800s, about equally-sized self-declared 
communities of Christians and Muslims, with a large undeclared element.34  
This compares to a similar “ethnic overlap” of the Cape Town Coloured 
population with a “Coloured” identity of more than 3 million nationwide, or with the 
affinity of this group with the wider Cape Town area creole culture of several million 
people of all colours, increasingly supplemented by rapid immigration of indigenous 
Xhosa from the dysfunctional Eastern Cape province and migrants from other African 
countries.  Identity, however, does not only need kindred spirits but also needs 
outsiders from whom one can distance oneself.  These are now in good supply, as new 
immigrants into the urban area do not share the ethnic and cultural makeup of the 
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established population.  About half of survey respondents in “Coloured” areas of the 
greater Cape Town area state unequivocally that “Africans” are the population group 
whose religious beliefs differ most from the respondents’ own.  “Whites” are seen as 
more compatible.35  The antipathy against the “African” identity reflects the long-held 
fear of being aggregated with underprivileged groups, as well as the current anxiety 
about being marginalized again by Africanist policies of affirmative action. 
 If the question is whether there is a set of identities, based on culturally mixed 
heritage, one of which an individual in a creolised society may choose as the primary 
one in certain circumstances, relegating other identities temporarily to the back 
burner, then the answer may be yes.  At times when a threat is perceived that is 
expressed in racial or ethnic terms, individuals will seek security in a group identity 
that responds to this ethnic focus – e.g. the identity of being “Coloured”, or “non-
African”, or “Black”36.  If the threat is to the home language, the group identity will 
encompass those who speak and value this language – e.g. all Afrikaans-speakers, 
regardless of race, will feel at one to oppose the deterioration of the status of their 
language in education and public life.  This oscillation between multiple personal 
identities is coming to the fore again at the Cape, after the lifting of the lid of the 
primarily race-based single-identity system of the twentieth century.  Cape Town is 
already practicing what is being promoted for the new South Africa as a whole: a 
"cosmopolitan multiculturalism" in the words of Kader Asmal, an attitude that 
recognises that citizens have "multiple loyalties based on factors that may differ from 
each other, and may even be contradictory".37 
 The religious identity brings a somewhat different aspect to the table. 
Ethnicity or language in the Cape context imply mixing, ambiguity, creolisation.  The 
traditional mainstream religious affiliations discussed here, on the other hand, seem to 
be escaping much of the creolisation and syncretism.  While many African-Initiated 
Churches celebrate the integration of mainstream Christianity and African traditional 
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thought, and the fast-growing Pentecostal movement stresses exuberant 
demonstrations of the power of the spirit, the Dutch Reformed tradition, mainstream 
English-speaking Christian churches, and Cape Islam have settled into a fairly 
conventional mould, eschewing syncretism, fundamentalism or charisma.  The 
mainstream Christian and Muslim traditions are promoting an identity that provides a 
quiet spiritual counterpoint to the noisy mixed identities of the creole city. 
 The depth of traditional religious feeling at the Cape is likely to match the 
South African national levels yielded by the 2001 World Values Survey.  In contrast 
to more secularised Europe, 90% of South Africans surveyed stated that they are 
religious and believe in God.  Unusually, this seems to go in parallel with a 
widespread feeling that the individual has significant choice in and control of life 
(85% feel this to be higher than average), and with high levels of tolerance for 
different lifestyles (only 20-30% are concerned about neighbours with different faith, 
different national origin, and different sexual preference).38 Traditional values go 
hand in hand with those expressing and tolerating individuality. 
 The rainbow of this transforming nation exists not merely in multi-cultural 
political philosophy, but in the mind of each individual at the Cape, mixing and 
refracting a range of vivid colours into an ever-changing kaleidoscope.  The 
rainbow’s end is always elusive, but faith provides the confidence that the riot of 




 This anchor, quietly stable and submerged under racial identities for many 
decades, is now becoming contested again in an echo of the turbulent times of 
transition during the early decades of the nineteenth century.  Moreover, it is 
becoming contested not in the sense of religious groups vying for group advantage 
collectively, but again in the sense of seeking individual converts among the 
indifferent and the disillusioned.  It is no longer the competition between Islam and 
mainstream Christian denominations that sets the pace now: it is the vigorous 
                                                 












proselytising of the Pentecostal and charismatic Christian churches among the urban 
population in search of a meaningful spiritual home. 
 Neither one of the two large faiths at the Cape, Christianity and Islam, have 
stood still in orthodoxy.  The spectrum of Cape Islam has been expanded by the 
addition of new Sufi tariqas with different outlooks from the old established ones, and 
by a Shia community.39  A Turkish-inspired component of Islam has again entered the 
Cape picture, promoting interfaith dialogue and cultural understanding in the spirit of 
the Turkish sage Fethullah Gülen.40  The competing number of Muslim voices has 
increased, overwhelming the capacity of the Muslim Judicial Council of Cape Town 
to maintain homogeneity and uniform doctrine.  The reformist push by the Claremont 
mosque in Cape Town, introducing sermons by women and other innovations, has 
been challenged by the orthodox establishment, but with little success.41 Nevertheless, 
the pragmatic proven strategy of the Cape Muslim community to seek 
accommodation with any current regime appears to be unchanged, reflecting the fact 
that Muslims are a small national minority despite being well-represented at the Cape.  
Contemporary commentators lament the accommodationist stance of local Muslims, 
and exhort them to engage with social and political issues as a collective, to little 
avail.42 
 Mainstream Christianity is experiencing a similar expansion of the Christian 
spectrum.  The most dynamic force in South African Christianity since the last 
decades of the twentienth century has been the explosive growth of the Charismatic 
and Pentecostalist churches, particularly the new wave of Pentecostalism that is 
superseding the original spread of "classical Pentecostalism" arriving from the United 
States during the early 1900s.43  In contrast to the personal-salvation-oriented 
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traditional Pentecostalism, and the communitarian, syncretist African Independent 
Churches (AICs), the "new Pentecostalism" engages the aspiring lower and lower 
middle classes and encourages personal initiative and material uplift.  This new wave 
often is an urban and suburban phenomenon, while the AIC message with its 
traditional Africanist emphasis on community solidarity and ancestors often appeals 
to the rural poor who can eventually re-establish a quasi-traditional community when 
migrating to urban areas.  In both cases, the rootlessness associated with urbanisation 
is addressed by the offer of a congenial, sympathetic community that assists in 
navigating the modernising process, and provides a new anchor.  Despite the 
cooperative spirit within each congregation, the Pentecostalist movement as a whole 
is highly atomistic and resistant to efforts to organise it in local, national, or 
international bodies. 
 Small wonder, then, that the Pentecostal recruiting drive has found fertile 
ground at the Cape.  The individualist, hybrid-identity predisposition of the urban 
population, coupled with a sense of rapid, uncontrollable transition after the rigidities 
of apartheid, is providing spectacular growth of adherents, mostly at the expense of 
traditional mainstream Christian denominations, but also drawing from the newly 
urbanised AIC members and from those in search of a clear, affirmative message.  
The market-oriented recruitment technique of the Pentecostal churches is drawing 
other denominations into a similar mode, replaying the situation in which individuals 
choose an affiliation rationally.  In line with the current interpretation that the neo-
Pentecostalism is a revival of the "Protestant ethic" originally associated by Weber 
with the early Calvinist churches, the Pentecostal congregations stress the principles 
of personal discipline, clean living, self-help rather than dependence, hard work, 
saving for the future, individualism and initiative.  This is proving to be an attractive 
offer for low-income individuals who are searching for rational paths to social 
mobility.  Theoretically, this process should be moving a community towards a 
modernising path of long-term development, as small entrepreneurship grows into 
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larger-scale investment.  At the Cape, this seems to be thwarted again by the 
combination of religious competition with a creole environment. 
 As in the early nineteenth century, trust is in short supply.  Again, this can be 
expected to at least match national survey results which indicate that almost 90% of 
respondents do not trust other people much, and that 70% are convinced that they are 
being taken advantage of if they are not vigilant.44  Religious polarisation plays its 
part in reducing the possible circles of trust for individuals, adding the variable of 
religious difference to those of race, ethnicity, social status, or income level.  Despite 
valiant efforts at outreach and interfaith dialogue, both the Muslim and Christian 
population groups are wary of those who do not belong to the own faith.  In the last 
decade of the twentieth century, the Muslim population of the Cape Town 
metropolitan area has been found to be most comfortable in association with co-
religionists, and to limit contacts with non-Muslims to the levels necessary for daily 
life in the city.  Surveyed Muslims in the "coloured" population of the Cape, living in 
close neighbourly relationships with "coloured" Christians, nevertheless consider 
adherence to Islam an added asset in interpersonal relations.  Despite centuries of 
acculturation at the multicultural Cape, and despite decades of the imposition of 
synthetic racial identities, the faith identity is a source of comfort for Cape Muslims, 
and serves as a vehicle to limit trust in others who share other identity features.  In a 
similar way, the fastest-growing urban Christian groups, surveyed in a study of 
charismatic churches a decade later, tend to encapsulate themselves socially in their 
congregations, also using faith to override other identity drivers such as race, 
community spirit, or poverty.  The affinity most keenly felt is that to the family, 
leaving the loyalties to the greater community and the national purpose far behind.  
Under these circumstances, productive long-term cooperation is an uphill struggle.45 
 
A Service Economy of Individuals 
 
 As noted initially, Cape Town has been struggling to join the ranks of "world 
cities" that are connected by a web of economic and cultural networks, despite the 
apparently suitable cultural assets and cosmopolitan outlook it possesses.  Recent 
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efforts to push the city further into this network from the margins include the 
construction of a major convention centre, the attempts to establish a skills and 
facilities infrastructure for attracting more of the international film industry, and the 
public investment in major sports venues and transport infrastructure to serve the 
2010 World Soccer Championships.46 In a fractious and argumentative city, these 
efforts are an uphill struggle, as well-meaning municipal, provincial and national 
authorities try to fit them into a planning framework that is by definition a top-down 
one.   The city of Cape Town has a rolling "Integrated Development Plan" (IDP), the 
province of the Western Cape, surrounding Cape Town, boasts of a "Strategic 
Infrastructure Plan" (SIP) and is designing an ambitious "Micro-Economic 
Development Strategy" (MEDS).  Both try to coordinate with national strategies for 
housing, transport, energy, water and other key issues in a still skewed and unequal 
economy.47  The alphabet soup of plans is confronted by a fast-growing sprawling city 
of over three million people, more than one million of whom are estimated to live in 
temporary, makeshift "informal housing" in settlements poorly served by 
infrastructure.  In this environment, the maintenance of law and order is difficult 
enough, even without attempting to impose an orderly pace of development.48 
 Let us glance at the MEDS planning process as a representative recent 
example of the potential mismatch between public intentions and the urban reality in 
Cape Town.49 This planning exercise, conducted over several years by teams of 
consultants, aims at identifying suitable economic growth sectors in the Western Cape 
and at suggesting public sector interventions, or public-private partnerships, to bring 
about such growth.  Based on occupational data from the 2001 census, skill profiles, 
and extensive interviews and research, the study attempts to "pick winners" that 
would generate jobs and growth with some public prodding and support.  
Unsurprisingly, the prime candidates for the Western Cape's accelerated development 
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(largely driven by Cape Town) turn out to be wholesale and retail trading, cultural 
industries and creative arts, the film sector, small and micro enterprises, tourism, 
financial services, construction, and the large and poorly recorded informal sector.  
The overlap of informal business, micro enterprises, and trading in consumer goods 
and services is the core of the potential, channelled into commerce, art and crafts, 
music, film, and tourist services.  Fishing, marine services, and port functions support 
this base.  
 This combination is what the cultural template of the city would suggest, and 
echoes the situation of the nineteenth century.  The difficulty arises in taking the step 
to promoting the growth of these sectors, or to use the pattern to incubate new types 
of ventures, such as biotechnology, or sophisticated financial services beyond 
insurance and traditional banking.  As the MEDS rightly recognises, the very 
informality and small-scale nature of business activities militates against organised 
intervention.  Formal and informal business overlaps, skill needs change and do not 
favour long-term human resource development, and economies of scale are difficult to 
attain.  The diagnosis of an anarchic and atomistic business community seems spot-
on, but the prescription for targeted funding and organised collaboration may be 
wishful thinking.  The infrastructure needs of economic growth also are not addressed 
easily.  The MEDS suggests an ambitious streamlining of public transport in the urban 
metropolitan area, based on suppression of crime, cooperation between taxi and 
rail/bus services, and massive public investment.  In the current urban context, 
investment may have to wait until confidence in crime control grows, and until the 
continuously flaring conflicts between public and private transport operators cease.  
Creole and chaotic Cape Town is defeating the planners easily, long-term cooperation 
is still a distant target. 
 Contemporary commentators and editorials constantly dwell on the puzzling 
inability of Cape Town to make use of its cultural and environmental assets and pull 
itself together to achieve steady and efficient development without endless bickering 
and rivalries, while other South African cities appear to be able to do this better.  
Earnest admonitions on how better cooperation and efficient planning would vastly 
improve Cape Town's striving for "world-class" status are proliferating.50  Other 
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equally strident voices argue that the "world-class" aspirations are an illusion and an 
unnecessary luxury as long as large sections of the urban population are without basic 
services, and that urban planning should refocus on the poor.51  Both lines of 
argument seem to disregard the city's nature as a cauldron of competing individualists, 
rendering any kind of planning extremely difficult.  This fact has encouraged a more 
grassroots-focused set of advocates who recognise that informality and bottom-up 
development may be the best way forward for the city.52  In the densely packed 
informal settlements, where Hobbesian survival is an everyday reality, and 
Pentecostal and charismatic churches thrive as a much-needed anchor and life support 
system, such stirrings are visible.  Very low formal employment and high dependence 
on social grants in these settlements have made it necessary for the inhabitants to 
become enterprising in informal ways, both legal and illegal.  Small trading and 
service businesses are a common feature, and a plethora of semi-legal premises 
serving alcohol are reminiscent of the nineteenth-century Cape.  Projections imagine 
that "these communities will have realised that if they want development they will 
have to drive it themselves, networking with organisations elsewhere".  Furthermore, 
these voices argue, "the term 'informal settlement' will stick, but it will lose its stigma 
and gain some distinction, because although 'formal' connotes convention, legality 
and order, it is not always appropriate, creative or inspiring".53 
 This may indeed be one way forward that appeals to Capetonians, as the creole 
city battles against attempts to impose orderly planning and long-term strategy.  
Religious competition and general hybridisation is pushing all layers of the 
community towards seeking individual or small-scale paths to personal and social 
advancement.  The Pentecostalist churches encourage their members to be self-
supporting and to learn how to organise small-scale, short-term projects in ad hoc 
alliances of individuals.  While top-down development efforts often meet violent 
resistance, are ignored or sabotaged, or generate a "cargo cult" of passive 
expectations, the small efforts by private entrepreneurs, NGOs, religious groups, and 
local activists bear fruit quietly "under the radar". 
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The Religion/Economy Linkage Revisited 
 
 As the nineteenth century opened with a time of transition, creolisation, 
individualisation, emancipation, and religious competition, so does the twenty-first 
century.  The same forces are at work, again pushing the Cape into a direction of 
creative anarchy. 
 
• Religious competition is reinvigorated, but may be fragmenting into more 
groupings, thus avoiding the bane of two-player polarisation. 
• Competition takes place for the adherence of individuals, not for group 
dominance, operating in a broadly secular and pluralist community. 
• Religion plays a key role in the values of individuals, and brings with it 
traditional values.  On the other hand, tolerance of different worldviews and 
lifestyles is high. 
• Faith communities, such as long-acculturated Muslims and self-help 
"Protestant Ethic" Pentecostalists, accommodate the secular authority of the 
day and foster market-oriented behaviour. 
• Trust between faiths and individuals is low, obstructing long-term 
cooperation. 













Chapter Six: Conclusions for Development Strategy 
 
 Does the review of the attitudes in nineteenth-century Cape, the progress of 
similar colonial port cities, and realities in today's metropolitan Cape Town yield any 
insights that could help in the judgment of how culturally diverse cities develop?  One 
clear conclusion is that cultural and religious diversity does not have to be just the 
heavy weight that is holding back economic development as indicated in the statistical 
studies, nor is it only the creative panacea that is promoted by advocates of hybridity.  
If one unpacks the elements of development, one finds that competitive diversity 
encourages some of them, and discourages others.  Development is not stalled or 
accelerated as a whole, but proceeds differently in diversity-driven communities, as 
opposed to more homogeneous ones.  There is a "diversity bonus", as well as a 
"diversity discount" in the development process of such communities.  The assets of 
diversity and hybridity are innovation, creativity, and tolerance of many other 
identities.  The drawbacks are atomisation, and a lack of public spirit and long-term 
life strategies. 
 A second insight is the difference that religious competition makes.  If 
superimposed on a creolised, hybrid society, the individualisation process combines 
with a sense of personal choice and initiative in all areas of life, sharpens the 
individual competitiveness, and diminishes levels of interpersonal trust.  In an 
ethnically and culturally more homogeneous society, the competition element can 
easily tip into group conflict, something that is likely to be rare in a community averse 
to strong group identities. 
 Finally, the best chance for improvement and development in diverse and 
personally competitive societies seems to lie in the harnessing of the type of social 
capital that is predominant, not in the vain attempt to impose models that need 
different types of social capital that are lacking.  We are dealing with communities 
that have an abundance of personal initiative, uniquely constructed personal identities, 
a taste for innovation and creative solutions, a tolerance of unusual and unorthodox 
worldviews, and a population of intensely competitive individuals.  We also note the 
absence of a strong community spirit (despite strong efforts to foster one), and the 












long term.  Development does happen in such a society, but it is of a kind that focuses 
on shorter-term achievable goals, arrived at through temporary alliances of interested 
individuals. 
 It would seem, therefore, that a promising strategy for a city like Cape Town 
should avoid projects that require a large measure of civic consensus, but should 
utilise the principle of market-oriented competition and individual entrepreneurship 
inculcated by the religious communities.  This may well be in direct contradiction to 
the aims of national and regional development policy, which often relies on top-down 
planning approaches unsuitable for a creole environment.  Drawing on the 
behavioural foundations laid in the nineteenth-century Cape and revitalised today, a 
realistic urban strategy would draw on the following elements: 
 
• High priority on the establishment and maintenance of the rule of law, to 
provide a secure platform for the free exercise of innovation and 
entrepreneurship.  Small-scale and informal enterprise is channelled into legal 
and more formal activity if there is a perception that the risk is only economic, 
not a threat to life and property. 
 
• Relaxation and liberalisation of licensing and labour regulations, to reduce the 
fear of entanglement in red tape and to enable small initiatives to expand with 
flexible and reversible employment strategies. 
 
• Dismantling of public or licensed monopolies, where there is a chance of 
small entrepreneurs entering the market profitably.  Vigorous enforcement of 
fair competition and regulatory standards is a necessary corollary, to avoid 
collusion, intimidation, and fraud. 
 
• Guarding the open market in religious promotion and new religious ventures, 
both between faiths and within them, in order to maintain the competitive 
ferment and to avoid a congealing of faiths into rival identity monopolists.  
Efforts by Muslim and Christian establishments to impose limits on 
innovation and diversity and enforce internal homogeneity through recourse to 













• Embracing the entrepreneurial and skill-building potential of the religious 
groups that are actively encouraging personal initiative and material 
improvement.  The role of the rapidly expanding missionary churches and 
Islam of the early nineteenth century is now played by the growing urban 
charismatic and Pentecostalist churches, and education-oriented Muslim 
foundations.  Competitive growth encourages entrepreneurial behaviour.  If 
not invited into a dialogue on the improvement of the community, the new 
religious congregations and associations may isolate and "encapsulate" 
themselves. 
 
• Making room for informal initiatives driven by religious and other non-profit 
groups.  Such initiatives tend to be stifled by integration into a formal, 
bureaucratic environment. 
 
• Facilitation of unorthodox art, lifestyles and religious expression, to utilise the 
creative potential of the community's tolerance of diversity. 
 
 In the early nineteenth century, religious competition for souls in the 
heterogeneous Cape acculturated the individuals in search of identities to the new 
competitive environment brought about by the globalising British Empire.  
Missionaries and imams, irrespective of their underlying motives, established the 
mindset that self-improvement and an active personal search for identity construction 
were assets for the survival in a transforming colonial world.  In the same way, the 
new "evangelical fervour" in post-apartheid Cape Town is educating a diverse 
population searching for stability how to survive in a globalised competitive world, in 
which economic cycles are felt by everyone.  It is not just the fact that elements of 
Max Weber's "Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism" are observable in the 
Pentecostal revival.  This is happening all over South Africa and in other regions of 
the world.  More importantly for cities such as Cape Town, this competition and 
market orientation in the religious market is superimposed on a community of hybrid 
individuals who have no truck with long-term planning and inner-worldly asceticism, 












development.  The driver of development in such cases is more likely to deserve the 
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